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This study challenges the dependency perspective claim

|

that Spanish American countries developed agro/mineral export
economies in the nineteenth century as a result of their
integration into the capitalist international economy.

It

offers an alternative interpretation which argues that the
process of State building and the response of the emergent
Spanish American States to internal political class struggles
were chiefly responsible for setting the direction of their
economies as well as the degree and character of their inte
gration into the international economy.
Rather than focusing on the effects of the international
economy in. explaining the roots of dependency and underde
velopment in Spanish America, this study examines the

historical development of inter and j.ntra class conflicts in
the aftermath of the V?ars of Independence.

Th.ese conflicts

focwacd primarily on the role of the State in the political
economies of the net countries because, the various dominant
classes each relied upon disparate forms of production and
surplus appropriation which sometimes required incomputable
political requisites for their maintenance and reproduction.
The importance of the State as a major determinant in
economic development is outlined in an examination of the
colonial period while an analysis of Peruvian and Argentine
development during the nineteenth century finds that the
new State administrations in these countries were too weak
to manage conflicts within the dominant classes until agro/
mineral export development provided them with the physical
and institutional resources to do so.

These States followed

policies which encouraged the growth of agro/mineral export
enterprises as a means of acquiring revenues to strengthen
their bureaucratic apparatuses, create hegemonic ruling
classes and eliminate or attenuate political conflicts be
tween sectors of the dominant classes.

The study concludes

that while tha international economy made this solution to
political conflict and State consolidation possible, the in
ternal political and class forces at work were the determining
elements of agro/mineral export development.
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PART I:

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: DEPENDENCY t
MODES OF PRODUCTION AND THE STATE

CHAPTER I

THE DEPENDENCY APPROACH AND SPANISH
AMERICAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT

In the late 19th century, the nations of Spanish America
emerged from a period of relative economic stagnation or de
cline and almost constant civil war into a period of relative
economic growth based on agro/mineral exports and relative
political stability.

Economically, this period was charac

terized by the emergence of 'classical export economies' in
which agro/mineral products were exchanged in international
trade for manufactured goods, capital and infrastructure in
vestment.

Politically, this period was characterized by the

emergence of the 'oligarchies', small groups of landowners,
merchants, urban politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals
who formed a solid basis for governing, whether in liberal
democratic or authoritarian guise.
The confluence of these two developments have led recent
interpretations of this period tc imply that (1) political
stability in Spanish America in the late 19th century was a
result of the prosperity created by agro/mineral expert

growth1 ? 12} since the industrial development of Britain {and
to a lessor extent the U.S. and Germany} sparked the world
market demand for Spanish American agro/mineral products,
both the development of their export economies and their
political stability can primarily be explained by external
factors;2 and (3) since externally induced export growth in
Spanish America led to underdevelopment, underdevelopment was
caused by an international economic system controlled by
Western Europe and the U.S.2
Such interpretations, in my estimation, are flawed be
cause they ignore the role of class conflict and the state in
the creation of the agro/mineral export economies and politi
cal stability in Spanish America.

This study will attempt to

show, through an examination of these factors, that agro/
mineral export growth was directly linked to the search for
political stability in 19th century Spanish American nations,
and thus, that underdevelopment has its origins in factors in
ternal to Spanish America.

Dependency Theory And 19th Century Spanish America
To ask the question of why the Spanish American nations
became agro/mineral export economies in the late 19th century
ie to ask the more important question of why they became
underdeveloped.

The term ’underdeveloped* is used here in a

very specific se^se.

It does not mean that thes* nations
2

loft undeveloped, obviously economic developments did occur
throughout the 19th century (more land cultivated, people put
to work, production extended, wealth created, etc.).

Yet,

with the close of the 19th century, Spanish America was well
behind the Western European nations in economic development.
This of. course could be explained by citing the head start
Western Europe had over Spanish America but, what about the
nations which exceeded Spanish American economic development
without the benefit of a head start?

The United States, for

example, starting from a relatively similar position wound up
by the end of the 19th century, on the road to advanced industrial capitalism,^ while Japan, starting in the mid 19th
century with a feudal system, was not very far behing.^
Obviously, development and underdevelopment are rela
tive terms.

Developed or underdeveloped (or for that matter

undeveloped) in relation to what?

West European, American

and Japanese industrial capitalism are taken as the standard
for development, not arbitrarily, but because they have pro
duced great wealth and high standards of living.

In effect,

they not only provide subsistence but an enormous surplus
that# however mal-distributed, provided their peoples with a
relatively better life than non-industrial nations.

Under

development, on the other hand, is the lack of advanced in
dustrial capitalism.

Less wealth is created and thus, a

moire meager surplus available and a poorer life for the
majority.

At bottom then, while Western Europe, the U.S.

and Japan were creating industrial capitalism (development)
in the 19th century, the Spanish Americans wero creating
non-industrial agro/mineral export economies

(underdevelop

ment) .
Of the various explanations for this development, the
one that has received the most attention in recent years is
'dependency theory’.®

Although the creation of such neo-

Marxists as Andre Gunder Frank7 and Fernando Henrique
Cardoso,

Q

dependency theory has been accepted by such non-

Marxists a.3 Peter H. Fmith as an approach that has
"...great potential as an explanatory tool..." which he
hopes "...political history in the 1980's will pursue".9
Dependency theory itself was conceived by its authors as a
response, critique and alternative to the writings of such
os Jacques Lambert, Gino Germini, Frank Jay Moreno and
W.K. Rostow who argued that underdevelopment in Spanish
America was the result of an 'original' undevelopment which
could only be overcome through greater contact - trade and
investment - with the more developed countries.^-0

These

authors posited dual economies and societies in Spanish
America wherein relatively developed modern capitalist
sectors st-ood in opposition to undeveloped feudal or

4

'traditional* sectors.

Development, they concluded would cone

with the diffusion of modern economic, social and political
values from the developed modern sector into the undeveloped
sector.

Close ties and economic, social and political inter

course with the advanced industrial countries would facilitate
this process in the same manner and to a greater degree.
Frank began his attack by rejecting these notions and
arguing quite the opposite.

What the 'dualist' theorists

took to be the 'original' or 'traditional' characteristics
of Spanish American economies and societies, he argued, were
rather the results of economic contact between Spanish
America and the advanced industrial nations.

In effect,

the same process which had developed the developed nations
underdeveloped the nations of Spanish. America.

In this

formulation development and underdevelopment are opposite
sides of the same coin of capitalist development.**
For Frank, Spanish America has been part of the world
capitalist system since the 16th century and, its incorpora
tion info that system has determined the structure of its
economy, society and polity as much as it has determined
those of the advanced industrial nations.

This occurred

Frank argues, by virtue of European capitalist expansion in
the lGth century, spearheaded by Spanish capitalism, which
subordinated the nuw Spanish American nations to the logic

5

of capitalist accumulation.

By integrating Spanish America

into the world capitalist system, Spanish America became
'capitalist' itself, the defining characteristic of capi
talism being production for the market.

Through colonial

domination, the Spanish American colonies were forced to
become coinplementaries of the European economies, producing
for the most part raw agricultural and mineral (gold and
silver) products in exchange for manufactured goods from
Spain, and later, with the industrial decline of Spain,
England, France and the Netherlands through Spain. ^
Thus, according to Frank, the integration of Spanish
America into the world capitalist system not only conditioned
or affected its economic, social and political development,
it determined itI

The dynamic capitalist central or 'metro

politan' nations, because their economies generated economic
growth autonomously, determined their own economic, social
and political direction.

Spanish American nations, on the

other hand, finding the impetus for their economic growth
outside their borders, received an external determination of
their economic, social and political structures.

Thus- the

rhythm of the international economy, directed by the needs
of the advanced industrial nations, determined the stages of
Spanish American underdevelopment.

From the dependency

perspective, therefore, Spanish American nations are

6

'dependent1 societies, the direction of their development
depending on the dynamic of change in the advanced capitalist
nations.

In Theoton5.o Dos Santos' words,

13

Dependence is a conditioning situation in which
the economies of one group of countries are
conditioned by the development and expansion of
others. A relationship of interdependence
between two or more economies or between such
economies and the world trading system becomes
a dependent relationship when some countries
can expand through self impulsion while others,
being in a dependent position, can only expand
a3 a reflection of the dominent countries, which
may have positive or negative effects on their
immediate development.
If the result of dependency is the growth of agro/mineral
export economies which ultimately lead to poverty, economic
stagnation and social turmoil - the blame must be laid to
external domination by the world capitalist system.
There is of course some dispute within the dependency
perspective as to the weight that should be ascribed to the
international economy as opposed to internal factors such as
class relations and politics in the creation of underdevelop
ment.

Frank's rather crude original formulation, which

mechanistically attributed all change in the underdeveloped .
nations to the changes in and demands of the 'metropolitan'
n a t i o n s 4 has, to some degree, been softened by his later
formulations.

In these Frank gives some place to the struggle

of classes within the underdeveloped countries but, then goes

7

i

on to assert that these classes and the results of their
struggles are, in the last instance, determined by their
relationship with the metropolitan nations.^

It is diffi

cult for dependency analysts to avoid this conclusion if the
economy, society and polity of the dependent countries are
structured by their relations with the international economy.
Cardoso and Faletto, who amonyst the dependency writers give
the most salience to the play of class forces in dependent
countries, find themselves forced to the same conclusion as
Frank.

For Cardoso and Faletto, class relations within the

Spanish American countries do determine the nature of the
internal economy but only after they have received their
determination from the international economy and, only within
the context of dependent development.

It is not, as with

Frank, that local classes are puppets on the string of inter
national capitalism and must dance to its tune, but rather
that Spanish American integration into the international
economy sets the limits within which local classes can act.
As Joseph Kahl says of their perspective,16
It tries to separate analytically the political
from the economic forces, and suggests that
although the maneuvering limits are set by the
external world - by imperialism - the range of
possible responses to a given situation
depends upon internal political alliances and
creativity,.. The key to an understanding of
those realities is a focus on the internal
response to external dependency.

8

While this is quite true once a country is in a situation of
dependence, and follows closely the approach that will be
untilized in this work, it does not explain why or how a
country becomes dependent in the first place.

Here, Cardoso

and Faletto are one with Frank in arguing a variant of the
Leninist theory of imperialism in which Spanish American
*

underdevelopment or dependency is a result of the expansion
ist tendencies of capitalism (for Frank of course this
expansionism began three centuries before Lenin's 'highest
stage of capitalism).17

In this vein they argue that, 2.8

...the situation of underdevelopment is produced
historically when the expansion of early commercial
capitalism and later industrial capitalism ties the
backward regions into the international market, and
these regions become suppliers of essential raw
materials for the advanced countries as well as
purchasers of their industrial goods. Therefore,
internal development in the countries of the
periphery is shaped according to the needs of the
metropolitan powers that dominate them.
However, in arguing that internal class relations and
political development have a 'relative autonomy' in their
response to situations of dependence, Cardoso and Faletto
do not abandon the Frankian linear determinism of the
international economy.

Rather than this being expressed as

some kind of external force determining internal development,
for Cardoso and Faletto the external force of the international
economy expresses itself as an internal force.
words,19

In their

The concept of dependence tries to give meaning
to a series of events and situations that occur
together, and to make empirical situations under
standable in terms of the way internal and external
structural components are linked.
In this approach,
the external is also expressed as a particular type
of relationship between social groups and classes
within the underdeveloped nations.
and,
Of course, imperialist penetration is a result of
external forces (multinational enterprises, foreign
technology, international finance systems,
embassies, foreign states and armies, etc.). What
we affirm simply means that the system of domination
reappears as an 'internal* force, through the social
practice of local groups and classes which try to
enforce foreign interests, not precisely because
they are foreign, but because they may coincide
with values and interests that these groups pretend
are their own.
(my emphasis)
and, I might add, are structurally determined by external
link3.
The position of the dependency analysts' is undoubtedly
correct in its description of the results of developing an
exclusively agro/mineral export economy.

Such economies are

so sensitive to the vagaries of the international market that
a drop in world prices for a particular commodity, a shift in
demand to an alternative commodity or the substitute of a
synthetic which could be manufactured in the developed econo
mies themselves, can throw the whole economy of the agro/
mineral exporter into a tailspin.

Conversely, a sudden and

dramatic rise in demand for a particular commodity may produce

10

dramatic prosperity and growth masquerading as development.2In either case as the dependency theorists argue, the economy
of the agro/mineral exporters is determined by the demands
and shifts in demand of the developed industrial nations.
Where dependency analysis fails though, is in explaining how
this relationship of dependence is created in the first
place.

Obviously, for countries under the administration of

a colonial power, this relationship may be created by force.
But, what of those countries that are politically independent?
For the dependentistas, the 'effects' of the capitalist
international economy system create dependent economies particularly in independent countries.

Thus, although Frank

and Cardoso and Faletto do recognize the importance of the
winning of political independence in the early 19th century
in producing a potential break in dependency,22 they argue
that a new period of dependence succeeded the old when inter
national market forces weighted the internal balance of class
forces in favor of those who would profit by the creation of
agro/mineral export economies. ^

As Cardoso and Faletto

explain, "The wars of independence had been waged to achieve
a political order and a different "pact" with the new
metropolis.

The way in which the latter evolved economically

would put its stamp on Latin America".24
The metaphysics of such an explanation are clearly

apparent*

If the capitalist international economic system

was responsible for the integration of Spanish American
economies into that system as agro/mineral export economies
then, why did it not integrate the United States, Germany,
or even France, for example, in the same manner?

If the

answer cannot be found in trade or the international economy
itself, wouldn't it more likely be found in the internal dif
ferences of these countries upon which the international
trade links had effects?

This is impossible from the per

spective of dependency analysts.

For them, Spanish America,

Western Europe, and the United States all had fundamentally
the same type of economies - capitalist.

Since all were

capitalist, any explanation which is based on the basic
internal differences between Spanish American economies,
polities and societies and those of Western Europe and the
United States, is absurd.

In other words,

'capitalism*

creates dynamic central economies in one part of the inter
national economy and dependent underdevelopment in the
other.
Conceiving of capitalism as a system which creates both
development and underdevelopment eliminates capitalism as an
explanation for either.

Yet, isn't the question of develop

ment in reality a question of the development of capitalism?
The prodigious increase in material wealth and production in

12

the modern era is a result of the capitalist system of produc
tion which requires continued progress and expansion for its
very survival.

The reproduction of the system as it i s r is

not enough, it must reproduce on an expanded level; more
production, higher profit, greater efficiency, higher comsumption, more technologically developed production
tools, etc.25
The basic weakness of-the dependency approach is thus
in arguing that the international trading system is capi
talism.

Capitalism, for them, is a market, a market in

which trade is for profit and profit, that is capital, is
acquired through trade.26

But is capitalism simply trade and

can trade create development, much less underdevelopment?
The problem of the definition and origin of capitalism
is not new.

Marx pointedly criticized the classical

economists for arguing for the primacy of market forces and
relations in their definition of c a p i t a l i s m .27

in the

1950's Paul Sweezy and Maurice Dobb debated ;just this issue
on similar grounds.

Sweezy argued that the expansion of trade

in 16th century Western Europe gave capitalism there its
impetus.

Dobb, on the other hand, argued.that changes in the

relations of production, that is, the change from feudal
coercive labor systems to capitalist free wage labor, produced
through class struggles, explains the origin and growth of

capitalism in Western Europe.28

Dobb here, X believe, more

closely follows Marx who, while taking note of the importance
of a rising world market for commodities in that era, defined
capitalism as a system of production.

As Marx points o u t , 2 ^

The first theoretical treatment of the modern mode
of production - the mercantile system - proceeded
necessarily from the superficial phenomena of
the circulation process as individualised by the
movements of merchant's capital, and therefore
grasped only the appearance of matters. Partly
because of the overwhelming influence which it
exerted during the first revolutionising period
of feudal production - the genesis of modern
production. The real science of modern economy
only begins when the theoretical analysis passes
from the process of circulation to the process of
production.
While it is true, as the dependency theorists point
out, that capitalism has to do with producing for a market
and making profit, concentrating on these factors leaves its
material basis hidden.

The relationship between wage labor

and capital better defines capitalism because it is this re
lationship that must be produced and reproduced for commodi
ties and capitalist profit to be produced.

A 'mode of

production* therefore is not a system of trade, nor is it a
market.

It is a specific set of relations and forces of

production, the former being the relation of the direct pro
ducer or laborer to the means of production, or in other words
property relations, end the latter being the means of produc
tion themselves (end their level of organization and technical

1«

development).30

The uniqueness o£ the capitalist 'mode of

production’ is in the tensions created within the system of
production that produce the conditions for the production of
greater and greater material wealth.

Capitalist relations

of production - wage labor and capital - compel capitalist
units of production to constantly revolutionize the means of
production and, under the threat of extinction, to accumulate
or *d i e 1.
In this view, perhaps the most important criticism of
Frank's thesis comes from Ernesto Laclau.

Laclau argued

that Spanish America could not be defined as capitalist in
the period under discussion.

For Laclau, participation in

international capitalist markets did not define Spanish
America as 'capitalist*.

That the products produced by

slave, share-cropping, debt peonage or feudal labor were
sold for a profit in a 'capitalist' world economy did not
make these relations of production capitalist, as Frank
asserted.32

They were, for Laclau,

'pre-capitalist' forms

of relations of production which could hardly be expected
to generate the dynamic possibilities of industrial capi
talist production.

The failure of Spanish America to

develop was then a result cf the non-capitalist nature of
its e c o n o m i e s . L a c l a u * s criticism has been echoed by
others.

John Weeks has argued, "...that in many or even

15

roost cases where there is a net flow of surplus out of the
backward countries into the advanced countries in commodity
or money form ... this is a consequence of backwardness, not
its cause."34

In other words, although Weeks acknowledges

that the Spanish American countries have not done well in
international exchanges, the reason is not that they have
been exploited by the advanced countries or the fworld
capitalist eccnomy1, but because of their backward relations
of production.

For Weeks, exploitation, that is, the

extraction of surplus value, occurs in the process of
production, not trade.**5
To argue this is not to dispute the dependency
theorists* claim that an unequal economic relationship
exists and has existed between the Spanish American econo
mies and the advanced industrial economies, but to dispute
its basis.

Geoffrey Kay has convincingly shown that the

nature of trade and investment in Spanish America, particu
larly during the 19th century under the aegis of merchant's
capital could not create capitalist relations of production.
Kay, following Marx, 36 argues that trading or merchant's
capital, though it has effects on pre-capitalist economies,
does not transform their production relations.

It may destroy

certain branches of production, e.g. British destruction of
Indian textiles through the dumping of cheap Briti£i textiles.
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or help conserve or expand others, e.g. European demand for
beef in the 19th century aiding in the extension of cattle
raising in Argentina and Uruguay, but it does not replace
them with capitalist relations of production.

As Kay notes,37

...historically, merchant's capital has never been able
to effect this transition to capitalism proper itself.
Its dependence on the non-capitalist class that is
directly responsible for their merchant capitalists
exploitation of labor leads it to support this class
at the very moment it is undermining it. Its
revolutionary edge is always blunted by this conserva
tive bias. This is fully apparent in the effect it has
on production ... merchant capital is trading capital
and the surplus it seizes is used to expand trade not
the forces of production.
Where merchants and merchant's capital hold sway, Marx
argues,^8
This system presents everywhere an obstacle to the
real capitalist mode of production and goes under
with its development, without revolutionising the
mode of production, it only worsens the conditions
of the direct producers, turns them into mere wage
workers and proletarians under conditions worse than
those under the immediate control of capital, and
appropriates their surplus-labor on the basis of the
old mode of production. (my emphasis)
and, if trade and money were all that were necessary,39
...ancient Rome, Byzantium etc. would have ended up
their history with free labor and capital, or rather
begun a new history. There, too, the dissolution of
the old property relations was bound up with the
development of monetary wealth - of trade etc. But
instead of leading to industry, this dissolution led
in fact to the supremacy of the countryside over the
city.
As Colin Leys points out, dependency theory is flawed
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by its genesis as a critique of western development theory.
In arguing the opposite of western development theory - that
close contact with the developed nations did not create
development but underdevelopment - the dependentistas accept
the main explanatory variable of their opponents - interna
tional trade.40

There is no doubt, of course, that inter

national trade may have important effects on the internal
economic development of a country.

But, as we have seen, it

cannot determine major changes e.g. a transition from pre
capitalist relations of production to capitalist relations
of production.4^

The question of underdevelopment in

Spanish America then is a question of what forces, other than
the external, were responsible for the perpetuation of non
capitalist economic relations.
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See for example the collection of essays in Ronald
Chilcote and Joel Edelstein (eds.), Latin Americat The
Struggle with Dependency and Beyond (N.Y.: Wiley, 1974).
Also see Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment
in Latin America (N.Y.: Monthly R. Pr., 1967); and Andre
Gunder Frank, Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment
(N.Y.: Monthly R. Pr., 1979), 164-171.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4That is, a predominantly agricultural economy.
Stuart Bruchey, The Roots of American Economic Growth
Harper, 1965).

See
(N.Y.:

^An important work on the Japanese transition to capi
talism which notes the importance of the role of the State is
Frances V. Moulder, Japan, China and the Modern World Economy
(London: Cambridge U. Pr., 1977).

6
The dependency approach has generated a large number
of theoretical and empirical studies on Latin America, as
well as Africa and the Caribbean. For the uninitiated there
are several good reviews of deoendency theory literature,
see Philip O'Brien, "A Critique, of Latin American Theories
of Dependency" pp.7-27, and David Booth, "Andre Gunder Frank:
An Introduction and Appreciation" pp.50-85, Beyond the
Sociology of Development, eds. Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett and
David Booth, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); and
J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, "Modernization
and Dependency," Comparative Politics, X, Number 4 (July 1978),
535-557. Perhaps the best critique from the left is Chapter 3
in John G. Taylor, From Modernisation to Modes of Production
(London: Macmillan Pr., 1979), 71-98. Non-Marxist critiques
of dependency theory have centered around the testing and
empirical validity of the theory, see Richard Fagen,
"Studying Latin American Politics: Some Implications of a
'Dependencia' Approach," Latin American Research R ., XII,
Number 2 (.1977) , 3-26; and David Ray, "The Dependency Model
of Latin American Underdevelopment: Three Basic Fallflciqs.
J . of Inter-American Studies, XV, Number 1 (February 1973),
4-20.
7
Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment: and Frank,
Dependent Accumulation.
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^Fernando Henrique Cardoso and En 2o Faletto, Dependency
and Development, in Latin America (Berkeley: U. of Calif.
Pr., 1979).
^Peter H. Smith, "Political History in the 1980's: A
View From Latin America," J. of Interdisciplinary History, XIIf
Number 1 (Summer 1981), 13 & 18.
iOSee for example Jacques Lambert, Latin America; Social
Structures and Political Institutions (Berkeley: U. of Calif.
Pr., 1967); Frank Jay Moreno, Legitimacy and Stability in
Latin America: A Study in Chilean Political Culture {N.Y.:
N.Y.U. Pr., 1969); Gino Germini, "Stages of Modernization in
Latin America," Latin America: The Dynamics of Social Change,
eds. Stefan A. Haiper and John R. Sterling, (N.Y.: St. Martin's
Pr., 1972), 1-43; and Walt Whitman Rostov, The Stages of
Economic Growth (London: Cambridge U. Pr., 1960).
U-Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment, 3-20 & 221-227;
and Andre Gunder Frank, Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpendevelopment
(N.Y.: Monthly R. Pr., 1972), 3-17.
^^Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment, 3-12 & 20-28.
A major argument in Frank's original formulation of depen
dency theory was that a main reason for the poverty of Spanish
American nations was their de-capitalization through depen
dence.
In other words, the surplus produced by Spanish America
has been drained out of it and to the metropolitan countries
and thus, there has been little capital available there for
investment, development, etc. This thesis will not be discussed
here as it raises questions not considered relevant and because
Frank has somewhat retreated from this position recently, see
Frank, Dependent Accumulation. For critiques of this position
see Elizabeth Dore and John Weeks, "Class Alliances and Class
Struggles in Peru," Latin American Perspectives, IV, Issue 4,
Issue 21, Number 2 (Spring 1979), 63-77; and Charles
Bettelheim, "Appendix I," Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange
(N.Y.: Monthly R. Pr., 1972), 271-322.
13Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Crisis of Development Theory
and the Problem of Dependence,” in Underdevelopment and
Development, ed. Henry Bernstein (Harmondsworth, Eng.:
Penguin, 1973), cited by O'Brien, 12.
^Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment, 21.
15Frank, Lumpenbourgeoisie, 1-12 & ff; and Frank,
Dependent Accumulation - 10-11.

20

16joseph A. Kahl, Modernization, Exploitation and
Dependency in Latin America (New Brunswick, N.J.: Trans
action Bks,, 1976), 136.
l^V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capi
talism (N.Y.: International Pub., 1939). Also see Bill
Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism (London: New Left
Bks., 1930); Fernando Henrigue Cardoso, "Imperialism and
Dependency in Latin America," In Structures of Dependency,
eds. Frank Bonilla and Thomas Girling, (Princeton:
Princeton U. Pr., 1973), 7-16; and Andre Gunder Frank,
"Economic Dependence, Class Structure and Underdevelopment
Policy," in Dependence and Underdevelopment, eds. James
Cockcroft, Andre Gunder Frank and Dale Johnson, (N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1972), 19-45. Their positions are made clear in
(Cardoso, 7-10) and (Frank, 36-38). Bill Warren has argued
though, that in Imperialism, Lenin abandoned Marx and Engels'
position that capitalism was a progressive developmental
force (Warren, 11-83). Although Lenin could write of the
effects of Imperialism in the non-capitalist countries that,
"The Export of capital greatly affects and accelerates the
development of capitalism in those countries to which it is
exported" (Lenin, 65), the overall effect was that, "Capi
talism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression
and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming
majority of the people of the world by a handful of
'advanced' countries" (Lenin, 10). Lenin was, of course,
less concerned with capitalism in the less developed coun
tries than in the 'advanced* countries and believed that it
had become 'decayed' and 'moribund' there precisely because
it could exploit the less developed countries (Lenin, 99-108).
This characterization of capitalist imperialism has been, in
Warren's opinion, the foundation for all subsequent Marxist
theories of 'underdevelopment' and 'dependency' (Warren,
110-185), For Warren, neither Lenin's formulation concerning
capitalism's decay in the advanced countries, nor the debili
tating effects of imperialism on the less developed countries
implied by his theory have been borne out (WTarren, 70-81 &
187-255). Although the latter case may be debated, the
former is indisputably correct:, capitalism in the advanced
countries has hardly 'decayed* since Lenin's formulation.
This fact has necessitated a reformulation of Lenin's
characterization of capitalism by both Frank and Cardoso.
For Franx, it necessitated postulating two capitalisms - a
progressive one in the advanced countries and a regressive
one in the underdeveloped countires. Cardoso, however, breaks
with both Lenin and Frank here by arguing a progressive
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capitalism in both, the advanced and the underdeveloped coun
tries but, only after Lenin's Imperialist Stage. For Cardoso
a new stage has arrived in which, "...dependency, monopoly
capitalism and development are not contradictory terms: there
occurs a kind of dependent capitalist development in sectors
of the Third World integrated into the new forms of
monopolistic expansion" (Cardoso, 11).
18Kahl, 157.
*9Cardoso and Faletto, 15.
28Ibid. xvi.
2iwilliam P. Glade, The Latin American Economies
(N.Y.: Van Nostrand, 1969), 271-273.
22Cardoso and Faletto, 29-31;
and Underdevelopment, 30-32.

and Frank, Dependence

23Frank, Lumpenbourgeoisie, 46-62; and Cardoso and
Faletto, 35-73.
2^Cardoso and Faletto, 35.
2^Karl Marx, Capital, 3 Vols. (N.Y.: International Pub.,
1967), 1:244-245. Also see Martin Murray, "Recent Views on
the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism” Socialist
Revolution, (Spring 1976), 83.
28Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of
the World Capitalist System," Comparative Studies in Society
and History, XVI, Number 4 (September 1974), 399.
2^Many of Marx's most pointed criticisms of the classi
cal economists' focus on trade may be found in Karl Marx, A
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Moscow:
Progress Pub., 1970); Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844 (N.Y.: International Pub., 1964): and
Karl Marx, Grundrisse (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1973).
28This debate arose with the publication of Maurice Dobb,
Studies in the Development of Capitalism (International Pub.,
1947). The debate was fought out, for the most part, in the
pages of Science and Society during the 1950's. The whole
debate can be found in Rodney Hilton, ed.. The Transition
From Feudalism to Capitalism (London: New Left Pks,, 1976).
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29Marx, Capital, 111:337.
3<>Ibid. 791.
33Robert Brenner, "The Origins of Capitalist Development:
A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism," New Left R . , Number 104
{July-August 1977), 31-33. Also see Murray, 64-91.
32Ernest Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist
Theory (London: New Left Bks., 1977), 15-34.
33Ibid.
3^John Weeks, "Backwardness, Foreign Capital and Accumu
lation in the Manufacturing Sector of Peru: 1954-1975," Latin
American Perspectives, IV, Issues 14, Number 3 (Summer 1977),
126.
33Ibid.
36Marx, Capital, 111:331-333.
3?Geoffrey Kay, Development and Underdevelopment: A
Marxist Analysis (N.Y.: St. Martin's Pr., 1975), 95.
38Marx, Capital, 111:334-335.
38Marx, Grundrisse, p. 506.
^®Colin Leys, "Underdevelopment and Dependency: Critical
Notes," J. of Contemporary Asia, VII, Number 1 (1977), 94.
^Conquest is also no exception - as Marx argues.
Nothing is more common than the notion that history up till
now has only been a question of taking. The barbarians take
the Roman Empire, and this fact of taking is made to explain
the transition from the old world to the feudal system.
In
this taking by the barbarians, however, the question is,
whether the nation that is conquered has evolved industrial
productive forces, as is the case with modern peoples or
whether their productive forces are based for the most part
merely on their association and on the community. Taking is
further determined by the object taken. A banker's fortune
consisting of paper, cannot be taken at all, without the
taker's submitting to the conditions of production and inter
course of the country taken.
Similarly the total industrial
capital of a modern industrial country. And finally.
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everywhere there is very soon an end to taking, and when there
is nothing more to take, you have to set about producing.
From this necessity of producing, which very soon asserts
itself, it follows that the form of community adopted by the
settling conquerors must correspond to the stage of de
velopment of the productive forces they find in existence;
or, if this is not the case from the start, it must change
according to the productive forces. Karl Marx,
"The German
Ideology" Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works
3 Vols. (Moscow: Progress Pub., 1969), 1:72.
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CHAPTER II

THE STATE, CLASS CONFLICT
AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

In developing an alternative approach to the 'develop
ment of underdevelopment' in X9th century Spanish America I
will examine four factors;
(2)

(1) Economic class conflict;

Political conflict and the State;

(3) The State and

economic development; and (4) The world economy and economic
development.

Economic Class Conflict
The Marxist theory of class conflict offers an ex
planation of major historical change based upon the antago
nisms between and within classes within a socio-economic
formation, that is, an explanation internal to the society.
For Marx, classes are principally derived from the position
of individuals in the process of production.

In other words,

"The economic place of the social agents has a principle role
in detex*rr,3‘ning social classes".1

Relations between classes

are inherently ccnflictual because of their exploitative
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character as the class of owners of the means of production
extract, in various ways (economic, political, etc., according
to the particular mode of production), the economic surplus
produced by the direct producers.

Relations within classes

may also be conflictual as, for example, capitalists compete
with one another for markets, labor and financial resources,2
or feudal Lords compete with one another for land and serfs,3
or proletarians compete with one another in the labor market.^
For Marx, these structural antagonisms, internal to any
society divided by classes, create the tensions in the
economic, and ultimately political level of society that
create change or stability.
To understand either change or stability of a given mode
of production, one must analyze these conflicts in their
historical setting.

Robert Brenner, for example, follows

Marx in explaining the decline of feudalism and the rise of
capitalism in Western Europe by focusing on the changes in
the relations of production as a result of class conflict
between lord and serf.

For Brenner,5

.., the origins of capitalist economic development as
it first occurred in England, are to be found in the
specific historical process by which, on the one hand,
serfdom was dissolved (thus precluding forceful
squeezing as the normal form of surplus extraction)
and, on the other hand, peasant property was short
circuited or undermined (thus opening the way for
the accumulation of land, labor and means of pro
duction.

These two conditions were met, on the one hand, by peasant
resistance to increased surplus extraction by the lord based
on the direct appropriation of the peasants surplus, and on
the other hand, the success of the lords and/or rising
capitalist farmers in defeating the peasant's attempt to
appropriate the means of production (land) for themselves.
The result was, on the one side, the free laborer, and on
the other, the capitalist farmer who, by innovation in pro
duction could dramatically increase his surplus through the
use of free wage labor.^

Elsewhere, the results of similar

class conflicts may be different.

In France, for example,

the peasantry won control of the land, impeding the develop
ment of a developed capitalist agriculture as in England.^
Economic class conflicts in 19th century Spanish
America have largely been ignored by observers of that period
because they rarely broke out into open, and thus observable,
violence.

These conflicts though, can be inferred from the

structural position of individuals in the production
process.

o

The overall structure of early 19th century Spanish
American economies was largely pre-given by the needs of the
Imperial Spanish State.

In the antecedent colonial period,

the economy was geared to provide the Spanish State with
revenue from the silver mines (the royal fifth) to enable it
27

to continue its territorial wars in Europe.

Economic

activities other than mining were largely ancillaries to the
mines - trading, agriculture, stock raising, artisanal
crafts - or, necessary for the support of outlying defense
posts, as in the River Plate area.

The distribution of land,

labor and trading rights was firmly set in the hands of the
imperial colonial bureaucracy which tended to regulate these
in the interest of the crown.®

Although in competition for

these resources Creoles were potentially in conflict with
one another, their efforts were directed more towards the
Spanish colonial bureaucracy which could affect a change in
their distribution.

Given that these economic distributions

were made by the political authorities, Creoles, Spaniards
and Indians were more than willing to bribe, patronize, or
in any other way influence bureaucratic officials to make
distributions in their favor.

Corruption thus became

institutionalized within colonial society, from the local
corregidor to the viceroy, both as a means of affecting the
distribution of scarce economic factors and as a way for local
crown representatives to augment their meager remuneration.
Relations between Creoles and their laborers (Indians,
mestizos and slaves) were generally exploitative but also
severely circumscribed by the policies of the Crown.

Royal

bureaucrats regulated the supply and the uses of much of the

available labor.

Spanish State policy restricting the uses

and the supply of labor to the Creoles was directly related
to the Crown's interest in conserving labor for and directing
labor to the mines and needed support activities.

Creoles

were further restricted in merchant activities by State
policies.

The lucrative trade between the colonies and

Spain was made the official preserve of Peninsular Spaniards,
leaving Creoles only the intra-colonial and contraband
trades, both largely illegal,
A change in dynasty, from Hapsburg to Bourbon in 1700,
brought gradual change in Spanish State policy towards the
colonies in the latter half of the 18th century.

The new

policies, while promoting a more general economic growth
throughout the colonies, increased tensions and conflict
between Creoles and the bureaucracy, Creoles and Creoles,
and Creoles and their laborers.

The Bourbons, attempting

to re-invigorate the depressed Spanish economy along the
lines of France, sought to re-integrate the Spanish American
colonies into Spain's economy as mercantilist colonies.
The policy of 'freer1 trade attempted to produce a colonial
trade advantageous to the development of industry in Spain.
Rather than remaining content to receive declining revenues
from the depleted silver mines, the Bourbon administration
sought to increase crown revenues by taxing agricultural
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production and trade for export.3-2

Some hard pressed Creoles

increased their exactions from their laborers, legally or
illegally3-2 contributing fuel to rural and urban revolts
from below, the two most celebrated being the rural revolt
in Peru under Tupac Amaru II in lVSO3-^, and the urban revolt
of the Communeros in Colombia in 1781.25

Others, particu

larly those involved in trade, profited through the reduction
of impediments to their participation in trade with Spain
while Spanish merchants and bureaucrats suffered the loss of
their monopoly.^
The Wars of Independence removed the mediation of the
Spanish State in the conflicts between Creoles and
Peninsulares, Creoles and Creoles, and Creoles and their
laborers.

These groups now stood in direct confrontation

to each other as each sought its own advantage.

Many

Peninsular Spaniards gathered up what wealth they could and
left for Spain creating a severe capital shortage and disor
ganization of credit in the new nations.

Creoles, standing

now in direct competition with one another over the distribu
tion of land, labor and trade began creating petty alliances,
generally based on kin relations, which later formed the basis
for caudillism.17

Conflicts arose over the control of avail

able labor as the methods of control and renumeration
(relations of production) differed amongst agricultural
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landowners, stock raising landowners, miners and urban
employers.
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where those who relied on coercive methods of

labor recruitment prevailed, those who depended on the sale
of labor power in a free market suffered*
The Wars of Independence severely damaged the caste
system which prevented the social rise of the mestizos during
the colonial era.

The wars had armed the mestizos and

released them from their base subservience to the creoles.
They entered the scramble for control over land and labor
either under their military mestizo leader or in the retinue
of competing creole landowners.

Though the mestizos pro

vided the manpower for intra-Creole warfare, they also
represented a potential threat from below.

Thus, creole

landowners sometimes allied with and sometimes opposed this
force.
The Wars of Independence seriously disrupted landowner
control over the Indian masses who constituted the main
laboring force in Spanish America.

Much of the administration

and distribution of labor had been performed by the Spanish
colonial bureaucracy which had now either disappeared or was
in disarray.

The wars and the breakdown of the labor control

administration dispersed much of the labor force from the
mining and agricultural regions.

The disruption of trade

and transport, and the difficulty of acquiring funds and

tools led many agricultural regions to fall back into sub
sistence production which tended to the advantage of the
Indian laborers.2®

During the colonial era, the Spanish

colonial administration protected creole landowners from the
rise of a competing Indian landowning elite by redistributing
Indian lands amongst displaced Indians.

This policy also

assisted the crown in that the creation of new Indian villages
increased the tribute rolls and thus, crown revenue.

With the

abandonment of this policy by liberal governments in the 19th
century, hacendados tried to grab as much land as they could
to prevent the rise of such an Indian elite that might.com
pete with them.21

it is also in this period that the local

Indian elite, the caciques, who recruited Indian labor for
the haciendas disappeared.

The encroachment of Indian sub

sistence agriculture on hacienda lands put the Indians in
possession of much of the land and, the history of the
hacienda, from this period until the early 20th century, is
a history of the hacendado's struggle to reappropriate this
land and the Indian's resistance.22

The intense competition

between landlords for this labor and the availability of
alternative labor systems for the laborers (wage labor,
sharecropping, urban employment) put the landlords in a
precarious position.
Thus, in the aftermath of the Wars of Independence,
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serious economic conflicts existed between sectors of the
dominant owning classes and between the dominant owning
classes and their subordinate laboring classes.

Though

these conflicts formed the material basis for Spanish
America's turn towards agro/mineral export economic growth,
and will be analyzed in their national settings later in
this study, they themselves do not explain that development.

Political Conflict And The State
Focusing on economic class conflict as an explanation
for the 'development of underdevelopment' is clearly inade
quate in itself.

To attempt to explain so complex a

phenomenon in this way would simply substitute one form of
economic determinism - that of the social relations of
production, for the economic determinism of the dependency
model - the capitalist world market.

Economic conflicts

between and within classes are but one factor, albeit an
important one, in analyzing the development of any society.
They are not immediately translated in their economic form
to other important arenas of conflict and struggle.
In most cases, although classes may be defined at the
economic level - social relations of production - the main
arena of inter- and intra-class conflict will be the State.
Political conflicts in general arc directed at the State
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Political conflicts in general are directed at the State
because of the central position of the political system not
only in legitimating, but in maintaining or transforming
social, economic and political relationships between classes,
regions and cultures within a nation.23

Through law and

coercion, the political system performs a 'regulatory1 role
which can either preserve economic, social and political
relations as they are or substantially transform them.24

For

Marx, this is why State power is the object of all revolu
tions .
The most common error in attempting to relate politi
cal conflicts to economic class conflicts is the dissolving
of the former into the lattei*.

Marxist studies have

notoriously reduced the State and politics to mere
epiphenomena of the economy.

For some Marxists, the state

and political conflicts are simply a reflection of the
economy.

Thus, in explaining a political conflict or issue,

one is required to always refer directly back to the economic
conflict or issue 'behind it.'25

Structuralist political

scientists tend to dissolve the State and politics in a
similar manner, though in their case, into the whole of
society's conflicts. As Roy Macridis and Bernard Brown
critically observe,2^
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... the government is at best a filter mechanism
through which interests themselves and at its
worst a simple transmission mechanism. The role
of the State is reduced to the narrow confines of
an organization that channels, reflects and ex
presses commands and instructions that come from
'elsewhere'.
Both therefore reject the specificity of the State and
politics.

The State and politics remain superfluous to what

are essentially economic or societal conflicts.
To reduce the State and politics to economics or
sociology is to entirely miss the point that, while social
and technical economic relations condition and set limits to
political conflicts, the one does not exactly correspond to
the other.

This is because the role of the State in repro

ducing or transforming economic and social relations is
specifically political.27

Once economic antagonisms, both

between and within classes, are translated into the political
level of the State they become 'political' issues and are
expressed and defined by the individuals involved as politi
cal issues.

Although the basis for these issues, and the

parameters within which they will be fought out, are ulti
mately set by the economic level - social relations of
production - they in themselves have a 'relative autonomy'
and may develop on an other than economic basis.
Hall suggests,2®
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As Stuart

The level of the political class struggle, then, has
its own efficacy, its own forms, its specific condi
tions of existence, its own momentum, tempo and
direction, its own contradictions internal to it, its
'peculiar' outcomes and results.
To a greater or lesser extent, the State provides the
political requisites or preconditions for the reproduction
or transformation of economic relations.

For example, under

feudalism the political Estates system provided the basis
for the reproduction of the lord-serf relationship, aud
under capitalism, the legal-political definition, and the
State's protection of private property rights and the wage
labor contract, provide the requisites for the capital-wage
labor relationship.

Thus, the struggle against feudalism

and capitalism are always essentially political struggles,
the one against the Estates system, the other against abso
lute private property rights.

It is not difficult to see

then, how John Locke could have seen absolute private
property rights, the basis of bourgeois economic power, as
the basis of liberty, that is, freedom from the domination
of the nobility whose basis of economic power was the Estates
system.
Political struggles then seek to affect the State's
role in reproducing or transforming social, economic and
political relations.

They seek to affect the very organiza

tion of the State, its constitution, and the balance of
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forces which form its supports.

They seek to affect the very

relationship of the State to society in general in contending
over the very definition of the public and private spheres.
How these are defined, as a result of political conflict,
will determine whether the State reproduces or transforms
the economic and social relations that are presupposed by
politico-legal relations.
Although the dependentistas may view the history of
19th century Spanish America as its integration into the
international economy, for the Spanish Americans it was the
intense political conflict of that century.

In Spanish

America during the colonial era economic and political power
were fused, not in a decentralized nobility as with feudalism,
but in the royal bureaucratic apparatus.

Royal officials

controlled the distribution of land and labor, while legal
corporate entities controlled trade.

The Bourbon reforms

of the late 18th century were, in large parr, an attempt to
change this system, disassociating direct political control
from the economic sphere.29

The political conflicts within

the new Spanish American nations in the 19th century were,
to a great degree, over the continuation of this movement.
Whether one's position in society was to be defined politi
cally, as in a caste or Estates system, or economically, as
in a class system, was a major facet of these conflicts.
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There were miners, merchants, landowners, bureaucrats
(particularly lawyers), artisans, and clerics whose position
in society required a political definition of their place.
Other merchants, miners, landowners, bureaucrats, artisans
and clerics, those whose political status prevented them
from rising in the social structure, found that a change to
a class definition could greatly improve their position.^®
This change had economic effects but, was, in the
last instance, the result of political change and was fought
out primarily in a political context.
conflict was the State and its role.

The object of the
I will here briefly

outline the four major political conflicts in 19th century
Spanish America that will be examined later in their national
context;
tives;

(A)

the conflict between liberals and conserva

(B) the conflict between Church and State;

(C) the

conflict of regionalism (or federalism vs. centralism);
and (D) the issue of caudillismo.
(A) Liberals vs. Conservatives:

The major conflict in 19th

century Spanish America is generally regarded as the struggle
between liberals and

conservatives.
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This conflict is seen

as either the result of the clash between the ideas of the
Enlightenment and Spanish Scholasticism3? or, as in most re
cent accounts, over strictly economic issues.

In the latter

view, conservatives represented the old colonial landowners
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who struggled against the commercialization and open politics
of liberal merchants, intellectuals and bureaucrats.33

This

view has rightly been challenged, as no clear polarization
of political forces based on occupation can be established.3*
Conservatives included within their ranks not only landowners
but merchants, intellectuals and bureaucrats.

Liberal ranks

similarly included individuals representing all groups.

As

Frank Safford states, "Their differences [the conservatives]
with liberals tended to be not over the desirability of capi
talism but over the role that the State and Church might
play... "35
It would, perhaps, be better to approach the conflicts
between liberals and conservatives from their respective
positions on the role of the State in regulating class con
flict and the maintenance of the position of the elite
vis-3k-vis the lower classes and thus, as a continuation of the
conflicts over the Bourbon reforms.36

From this view, con

servatives generally favored the direct intervention of the
State in inter-class relations.

They preferred State regu

lation of the relations between classes through the legal
and police systems.

Liberals, on theother hand, generally

favored the indirect intervention of the State, preferring
to have the State legalize their own regulation.of the rela
tions between themselves and their working classes, with the

State acting in a 'nightwatchman' capacity.
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Though these positions were generally held, their
complexity in actual political practice cannot be minimized.
In Colombia, for example, artisans, organized in closed
corporate guilds, were courted by, and provided a good deal
of support for, the liberals between 1851 and 1854.

The

liberal strategy in courting a 'feudal caste* was actually
not in contradiction to its opposition to a monopolisticcorporatist society, but rather an attempt to countervail the
strength of rural conservatives who could muster a superior
numerical force in their dependent peasants.

Thus, as

Urrutia argues,38
In theory, the Liberals were being inconsistent when
they defended the colonial form of economic organi
zation in Cauca, but in practice they were consistent
since they only wanted to destroy the colonial
institutions that created a barrier to bourgeois
accumulation of wealth.
But, when the democratization fostered by the liberal regime
became obviously threatening to all the owning classes, a
large faction of the Liberals split from the Liberal govern
ment and crossed over to the Conservatives.

This alliance

of a fraction of the Liberals, known as golgotas, and Con
servatives made use of the Liberal enacted universal suffrage
to mobilize the peasantry in a conservative reaction.
alliance gained State power and crushed the democratic
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This

artisan movement and its Liberal supporters.39
(B)

Church v s . state:

The issue of secularization formed a

three way political conflict.

The Church itself had acted as

a political arm of the absolutist monarch in the colonial
era.

Creoles were kept in line by the Church administered

Inquisition^0 and the Church's restrictions on their use of
servile labor.

With the coming of Independence, the Church

was freed from the patronato of the Spanish crown (the Pope
had ceded control over the Spanish colonial Church in the
16th century) and became the object of intense political
struggle.

In the main, the struggle revolved around whether

or not the Church would function in its traditional political
role.
Conservatives generally favored the re-integration of
the Church into the State apparatus as a social control
mechanism and ideological prop, thus they favored retention
of Church control over education and the exclusivity of the
Roman Catholic Church in the nation.

Liberals generally

called for the reduction of the Church to political impo
tence, favoring secular mechanisms of social control and
ideology which they could control directly or through the
State.

These positions were not, of course, hard and fast,

many times conservatives would favor an independent Church
to protect it from the liberals when they were in power.
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Within the Church itself, there were those who wished to
continue the colonial Church-State relationship, albeit
with the Church having greater control over its own internal
organization, and those who felt that internal autonomy
could only be achieved through some kind of Church-State
separation.4^
The attacks against the Church usually took the form of
the appropriation of Church lands, the abolition of its cor
porate privileges and role in the control over and protection
of the Indian.

Although these attacks have been interpreted

as having been motivated by economic gain4^, their essential
aim was political.

As J. Lloyd Mecham argues,'*3

The basis of this early opposition to the Roman Catholic
organization - not the Roman Catholic religion - was
largely political. The abolition of tithes, suppres
sion of religious orders, confiscation of ecclesiastical
property, and like measures, were as a rule, acts of
vengence wreaked upon the clergy their political
opponents
and, "... if they regarded clerical wealth as an evil, it
was because this wealth made the Church powerful
politically".44

The weakening of the Church's political

power, thus, had the aim of weakening a major prop of the
conservative vision of society.45
(C)

Centralism vs. Federalism;

The conflict between cen

tralists and federalists causes great consternation for those
who opt for an economic or ideological analysis.
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Though

liberals generally favored political de-centralization and
conservatives favored political centralization, these were
political rather than economic or ideological positions.
The shift of some liberals to centralism and some conserva
tives to federalism (most notably in Argentina and Colombia) ^6
should be related to their political aims rather than their
economic opportunism or ideological confusion.
The initial attack of. the liberals against centralism
derived from their desire to reduce the reach of the State
in terms of its regulation of social and economic life*
Their triumph, usually short lived, created the basis for
conservative resistence in the form of semi-sovereign
regional or department governments which, with conservatives
in control of many of them, acted as centralized states
within their own borders*

Liberals switched over to cen

tralism in order to reverse this trend.

The reduction of

direct State intervention through the setting up of Federal
type administrations did not, therefore, guarantee that the
role of the centralized State would not reappear in regional
governments.47
(D)

The Rise of the Caudil.lo;

The emergence of the caudillo,

a local political boss at the head of an armed retinue of men,
in 19th century Spanish America was the result of three sepa
rate but related political problems.
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1) The arming of

mestizos during the Wars for Independence created a general
breakdown of the caste system which had been slowly dying out
in the crisis ridden late colonial era.^®

A few mestizos

actually rose to great social and political heights as a re
sult of their participation in the armies of independence.
The problem of de-mobilizing this mass of armed and war ex
perienced men in an era of contracting economic resources (a
difficulty in paying for war service and re-integrating them
into the productive system) plagued those areas which had
provided the bulk of armed forces for the wars (Argentina,
Gran Colombia, and later Peru)
2)

Local conflicts between landowners, merchants and mine

owners gave the caudillo led bands of armed men lucrative
employment and a means of rising in the social system
through the confiscation of opposition held lands.50
3)

The lack of owning class political hegemony allowed the

caudillo to use his control over the masses as a fulcrum in
inserting himself into elite conflicts.

Caudillos served

in the employ of liberals and conservatives, frequently
gaining control over the State apparatus, plundering the
treasuries, confiscating the property of some rich creoles,
but rarely solving the political crisis.

Caudillism of this

type receded and became the subject of derision once owning
clasn hegemony was created in the. late 19th century.
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The State and Economic Development
It is clear from the preceeding discussion that the
major conflicts in Spanish America in the 19th century were
essentially political and focused on the problem of State
building.

Yet, even though political conflicts are directed

at the State, the State is rarely the tool of any class or
class fraction.

The State has a 'relative autonomy' from

warring classes and derives from this fact an independent
economic role and economic effect.51
As Marx and Engels recognized, the State arises with
the development of class society.51

The irreconcilable

conflict between producer and non-producer requires an agency
which is above the struggle and can manage it in the interest
of the ruling sector of that society.

The State, thus, is

always a class State which, while tending to the interest of
the dominant class, is not always slavish in its service.53
The State receives its role from its structural position in
society rather than from the social class position of those
who occupy its institutions.54

Though a pre-given set of

conflictual relationships must be managed, and civil order
or peace maintained,55 how those who occupy the institutions
of the State will achieve this depends on the given histori
cal setting.56
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In assuming the role of wielding public power in a
class divided society, the State normally achieves a
'relative autonomy* not only from the dominated classes but
from the dominant classes as w e l l . 57

This autonomy may

approach absolute autonomy as with the Absolutist State in
Western Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries, the State
under the two Bonapartes in France and the Bismarkian State
in Germany.
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Relative state autonomy occurs in both normal

and exceptional or crisis periods.

For Marx, greater state

autonomy occurred when the formation of a dominant ruling
class was impossible or impeded by the disunity and conflict
within the dominant class.

Concretely, this occurred when,

(1) classes representing more than one mode of production5®
created a rough oppositional balance in a society.

The

failure of any class to impose its vision of society on the
State leads to the greater independence of the State
vis-li-vis these classes.

Thus, both Marx and Engels

described Absolutism in the West as the result of a balance
between the feudal Aristocracy and the rising bourgeoisie.5®
Though the Absolutist State was the class State of the
Aristocracy, it could not and did not base its power on the
Aristocracy.5^

And (2) a situation where a heterogeneous

ruling class cannot raise itself to the level of hegemonic
political power.

Here the hegemonic crisis results from

the structurally determined conflicts between members of the
same class.

For example, Marx believed that the bourgeoisie

was itself so rift by internal conflicts (this because of the
greater economic differentiation produced by capitalism mercantile capital, manufacturing capital, finance capital,
etc.) that it was impossible for it to rule without the State
organizing its hegemony.®^

Thus, he could explain the State

of Louis Bonaparte as the result of the inability of any
sector of the French bourgeoisie to provide hegemonic leader
ship for their class rule.

Louis Bonaparte could step in as

the representative of the peasantry, which was not a party
to the conflict, circumvent the conflict ridden bourgeoisie,
and impose political stability which was ultimately in the
interest of the

b o u r g e o i s i e .

Thus, while the State may be

'for' the ruling clas3, it may not be 'of' the ruling class.
Thus, in performing its major tasks - creating inter
nal order and competing with other States internationally,
the State maintains a 'relative autonomy1 from dominated
and dominant classes.

As Theda Skocpol argues, "Indeed,

attempts of State rulers merely to perform the state's 'own*
functions may create conflicts of interest with the dominant
class".64

Further, it is in performing these State functions

which, while they are not directly economic, that the basis
for the State's crucial economic role is laid.
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The State’s economic role i 3 an effect of, and secon
dary to, its purely political role.

This can best be illus

trated by the role of the Absolutist State in the development
of capitalism in Western Europe.

While in some cases its

policies stimulated trade, manufacturing and the acquisition
of colonies, its objective was primarily the enhancement of
State power vis-a-vis the internal classes and other, com
peting States .65

In the era of the rise of the Absolutist

States, the conflicts at the dynastic level were, for the
most part, still feudal, given the level of the development
of economic technology and organization.

In effect, the

conflicts were territorial, attempts to increase the amount
of land and the number of people under one's jurisdiction in
a world where these resources were seen as finite.

Intra

class conflicts over the control of land and people within
the aristocracy in many cases led to inter-class warfare
between the aristocracy and the peasantry who rose in re
bellion against the rising exactions of the nobility caused
by the increasing costs of wa r .**6

This general turmoil had

the effect of freeing the monarchies from their subser
vience to the nobility.

The monarchies used this 'relative

autonomy* to build strong Absolutist States which managed
these conflicts in the interest of the nobility, raising them
(the intra-claas conflicts) from regional to international

conflicts, and clamping down hard on the peasantry.

While

the State was managed in the interest of the nobility, its
policies in doing so were often a boon to the class of town
burghers.
Where territorial conquest failed as a policy for
increasing toe internal and external power of the Absolutist
State, Absolutist monarchies attempted to appropriate the
•finite* resources of their enemies through trade and
manufacture.6^

Thus, though the aim of the Absolutist

monarchies was political - to reduce intra- and inter-class
conflict under the aegis of a strong central State - the
effects of this policy, in some cases, was to move their
economies along the road to capitalist development.
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That

the same political goal could have just the opposite eco
nomic effect is apparent in the case of Spain.

Successful

in its territorial conquests which were fueled by the great
3 pecie

wealth of its American colonies, the Absolutist State

there had no need to stimulate home production and trade.
Spain's bourgeoisie and economy withered away under the
Hapsburgs while the class position of the. aristocracy remained
secure .69
State policies encouraging trade and, more importantly,
manufacturing in the interest of State power, some analysts
argue, has not been atypical in the development of capitalism
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worldwide.

The bourgeoisie itself, it seems, has not created

capitalist economies without State aid or interest.

John

Merrington for example notes the reluctance of the commercial
bourgeoisie in 17th century Europe to invest in industry,
opting rather for 'usurious forms of rent and tax farming*
which simply reinforced feudal forms of production, albeit
on a commercial basis .70

Frances Moulder agrees and adds

that ,71
... the commercial bourgeoisie has repeatedly shown
itself reluctant to invest in modern industry without
government prodding and encouragment.
In Japan after*
the Restoration, there was little interest by
bourgeois investors in investing in large scale
modern industry.
Industrial investment was forthcoming
only after vigorous state effort to prove its potential
profitability and to eliminate risk, it appears that
Japan's bourgeoisie would have remained commercially
oriented in the absence of government interest and
would have doomed the nation to industrial backwardness.
while Stuart Bruchey claims that in the case of the United

States,^2
... if growth depended on industrialization, the latter
depended on the national market, and a national market
upon large capital sums for improved transportation.
If these are valid assessments, I cannot see how a
place of central importance in American economic growth
can be denied the role of government, because of its
contribution to the formation of a national market ...
This is one reason I have emphasized the 'American
Revolution* which permitted the development of an
independent state that could further national capi
talist development.
A similar dynamic of class conflict and 'relative State
autonomy 1,1 will argue, created the export economies of late
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19th century Spanish America.

How this occurred in specific

Spanish American countries will be the subject of a later
section, but the general outlines of the analysis can be
pointed out here.
The failure to resolve the basic political disputes,
mentioned earlier, in Spanish America in the aftermath of
the wars of independence, was the failure of the political
process and the State to fashion out of the various political
positions held by sectors of the owning classes, a common
principle on which the State could be based.

The initial

base of most of the new Spanish American States was external,
as recognition of the State by other States in the inter
national community generally "preceded the institutionaliza
tion of a State power acknowledged within the national
territory itself ".73
Chile and Paraguay.

Two notable exceptions, of course, were
In Chile, Portales created a unity in

the owning classes in the late 1820's that was to provide
Chile with early political and social stability .74

While in

Paraguay, the absence of a strong landowning and/or merchant
class gave Dr. Francia free reign to create a stable, though
isolated, autarkic r e g i m e . B o t h though, rejoined the
general flow of Spanish American history by polar opposite
paths, Chile through victory in war, Paraguay through defeat.
Elsewhere throughout Spanish America a succession of
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liberal, conservative and caudillo regimes failed to create
civil order amongst the owning classes.

Shortly after each

faction had captured power, difficulties appeared as its
vision of social organization, its social and economic
policies, its position on the role of the State was found by
the opposition to be untenable.

The problem for each faction

that took power was how to reconcile the interests for whom
they had taken power with the structural position of the
State.

Effective functioning of the State called for unity

amongst the various fractions of the dominant class.

Yet

with each fraction considering its differences with the others
irreconcilable, the State became the focus of disunity, not
class unity and rule.

If the State was to guarantee the

interest of any fraction of the owning class, it had to be
considered legitimate by all, or a large balance, of those
fractions.

Armed force was rarely a safe alternative to

agreement.

Assurance had to be made to the opposition that

it would not be eradicated, that the State would guarantee
its social and economic position too.
The early Independence governments found agreement
among the owning classes only at the most general level.
Each fraction sought the protection, if not the enhancement,
of its position.

Those, who like miners and plantation

owners, relied on coerced or slave labor sought a strong.

highly centralized State.

Those who relied on less trouble

some methods of labor control and recruitment, favored a less
powerful, less expensive, less centralized S t a t e . S i n c e
control over taxable wealth and people (Indian tribute was
collected by the landowner) was the club with which some
owning classes attempted to bludgeon their governments, many
governments tried to free themselves of this influence by
borrowing a b r o a d . ^

Thus, in the period immediately after

the wars of independence, many Spanish American governments
became deeply indebted to foreign (mainly English) creditors,
adding international pressures to their already considerable
internal pressures .?8

In Peru, the State's control of the

guano mines substantially freed it from landowner pressure
and allowed it to build up an independent (though contentious)
political support among merchants involved in that trade.
Revenues from guano even allowed the State to declare an end
to Indian tribute, substantially weakening the national
political power of the recalcitrant Sierra landowners.
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9

Borrowing abroad and government production monopolies
were, in the long run, relatively poor solutions.

Borrowing

brought only debt which led back to the problem of internal
taxation, while a government production monopoly, as in Peru,
created its own tensions .®8

Thus, throughout most of Spanish

America between 1C25 and 1890, civil war, authoritarian
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Ct-dillo government, regional secession and political insta
bility were the rule rather than the exception.

General

anarchy and instability prevailed until a solution could be
found to intra-class conflict within the owning classes.
Such a solution was found ('found 1 not in the sense
that there was any conscious 'looking for it* but in the
sense that it presented itself as the path of least resis
tance) in the active encouragement of export production by
Spanish American States.

Rather than continuing to attempt

to create a unity based upon the economic integration of the
owning classes which would exacerbate an already violent con
frontation, the policy of export expansion tended to insure
their social and economic isolation at the level of produc
tion.

Linking each sector (growth sector) of the economy

to an external market, reduced tensions between owning
classes and created a basis for their unity and political
hegemony.

Even a few industrialists could be integrated

into the new order if, as in Argentina, their markets were
protected by the relatively high transport cost for heavy
imported lower class consumption goods and, their import of
manufacturing machinery was assisted by low import tariffs.®"*'
The State itself did not have to upset owning class relations
over the issue of internal taxation as it derived most of its
revenues from its control over the customs house.82
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Thus, the export expansion of late 19th century Spanish
American nations emerged as a political solution to owning
class cohesion,

its effect - creating what later have been

characterized as underdeveloped or dependent economies,
though recognized by some in Spanish America in the period
1880-1930, was generally ignored until the collapse of
foreign markets in the 1930's also brought about the collapse
of oligarchic unity.

Spanish America And The World Economy
In rejecting dependency theory's focus on a single
explanatory variable - the international capitalist economy I am not, however, discounting its effects on Spanish
American development in the 19th century.

There is broad

agreement in the literature on Spanish American development
that the export economies would not have emerged without the
creation of world market demand for their agro/mineral
products .83

Some writers even go as far as explaining the

movement for Independence as having been chiefly motivated
by the desire to form export links with the dynamic center
of v/orld trade in that period, England .84

While I agree that

it is indisputable that by the end of the 19th century the
Spanish American economies were firmly integrated into the
world economy as raw agro/mineral product suppliers and
manufactured goods consumers, I question whether the v/orld
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economy is the main explanatory variable.
That the Spanish American nations would orient their
economies toward agro/mineral export growth exclusively was
not a forgone conclusion in the immediate aftermath of the
independence struggles.

Upon independence, most Spanish

American governments attempted to follow a path of balanced
economic development.

Although it was accepted that agri

culture and mining were the most important activities in the
nations (as they were in most of the world in the early 19th
century - the industrializing European nations was well),
and, an export trade was desireable, the establishment of
modern industry was seen as an important, if not crucial
goal.

The view of Manuel Camilo Vial, Minister of Finance

in the Bulnes administration in Chile (1841-1851), expresses
what many in Spanish American governments believed,®'*
1 am far from believing...that in order to be rich
a people must produce everything; but I am persuaded
that to be prosperous, free and civilized, it has to
possess an extensive industry and, if possible a
varied one. What have been the purely agricultural
peoples, and in the present time, what are they? There
is no nation in which agriculture dominates everything,
and in which slavery or feudalism shows its odious
face, which does not follow the march of humanity among
the stragglers.
In Europe, for example, what figure
does Poland or Ireland cut?
That future threatens
us also, if we do not promote industry with a firm
hand and constant will.

Thus, in this period, many Spanish American States
actively aided the establisliment of manufacturing.
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In

Colombia, tariff protection of artisan production, loans to
manufacturing enterprises and limited industrial monopolies
only ended in the

1 8 5 0 *5.86

in Mexico, a national credit

and loan bank was established in 1830 which financed the
development of a modern textile industry whose production
soon outdistanced internal demand.

The development bank

soon began financing woolen mills, carpet factories and iron
and paper manufacture.
By 1860, most Spanish American States had abandoned, or
were quickly abandoning the goal of industrial development.
Rather than attempting to foster the growth of agro/mineral
export development and industrialization, the States snifted
to the encouragement of agro/mineral export production exclu
sively.

Protective tariffs were, for the most part, dis

mantled, colonization schemes aimed at creating a sector of
small capitalist farmers/consumers were abandoned, capital
.available from State revenues or foreign borrowings were made
available only to activities which expanded export production,
and labor supplies were directed by the State to the export
sectors .88

The attempt to create an integrated, balanced

economic development was, thus, abandoned.
This shift in State policy could not have occurred with
out the expansion of world economy demand for agro/mineral
products or the means to transport them yet, it equally could

not have occurred without the active encouragement of export
production through trade liberalization, monetary policies,
*

infrastructure investment and land and labor policies of the
Spanish American States.

These policies can only be explained

through an examination of the Spanish American political
scene.

Thesis Restated
State Adminstrations in the latter half of the 19th
century in Spanish America encouraged the growth of agro/
mineral export economies in order to solve two political
problems.

First, political conflicts between sectors of

the dominant class had created a condition of intermittent
civil war which heightened the threat of challenges from
the subordinate lower classes and social revolutions.
Second, the dependence of the State administrations on the
warring dominant classes for revenue, and local mestizo and
caudillo-led armies for a military force, made the State a
prize of the political battles.

In such a dependent

position, the States could not perform a role in mediating
the disputes within the dominant classes and thus secure
political and social peace.
State policies encouraging agro/mineral export develop
ment solved both of these problems to a great extent.
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On the

one hand, it minimized the conflicts within the dominant
classes by externalizing their economic interests, and on the
other, it freed the State administrations from fiscal and
military dependence on the warring classes and factions,
enabling them to organize dominant class unity from a
'relatively autonomous' position vis-^-vis those classes.
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PART H i

COLONIALISM, CAPITALISM AND THE STATEi SPANISH
AMERICA IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD
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CHAPTER III

STATE AND ECONOMY IN COLONIAL SPANISH AMERICA

If the heritage of Spanish colonialism weighed heavy on
the emerging republics of 19th century Spanish America, capi
talism was not one of its legacies.

A chief error of the

dependency theorists has been their assertion that Spanish
America has been 'capitalist* since the 16th century.-*

To

argue thus, is to discount the true imprint of the Spanish
colonial enterprise which, as I will show presently, had
little to do with the instituting of capitalism in the
Americas.

Rather, the colonial period laid the foundation for

Spanish American underdevelopment by instituting and main
taining distinctly non-capitalist forms of production.
Further, these non-capitalist forms of production,
largely maintained and reproduced by the policies and repre
sentatives of the Spanish State for the benefit of that State,
created the basis for major constitutional crises throughout
Spanish America in the independence period.

The struggles

thau ensued over the role of the State in the societies,
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economies, and polities of the new Spanish American countries,
not the effects of the international economy as the dependentistas claim, were chiefly responsible for the creation of
the export economies in the late 19th century.
Although it is not within the scope of this study to
present a comprehensive review of the colonial era, this very
brief review is offered with the aim of highlighting two im
portant aspects of colonial society;

Cl) its non-capitalist

origin and nature, and (2 ) the important role of the State in
the regulation and maintenance of these non-capitalist forms
of production.

The Colonial Enterprise; Capitalist
Or Non-Capitalist?
If the British Empire can be said to have arisen in a
fit of absentmindedness, as much can be said of Spanish
colonial expansion in the 15th and 16th centuries.

Spain,

emerging from a seven centuries long reconguest of the
Iberian Peninsula, and consolidating the first Absolutist
State in Europe, was an expansionist power in the tradition
of the late middle ages.^

Neither Spain itself, nor the

society it ruled over in America were ever capitalist.

No

doubt, in the case of both some capitalist elements were
present, yet they were hardly dominant and, in the case of
Spain in the 16tb century, were under severe attack.

VO

Capitalism, as discussed earlier, is a system of produc
tion in which the free laborer has access to the means of production only through capital.

The means of appropriating the

surplus of the laborer is purely economic as the laborer is
forced to work for the capitalist because he has no other means
of providing for his subsistence.

The lack of a formally

*feudal 1system in either 16th century Spain or colonial
America should not immediately define them as capitalist.
Non-capitalist systems do not all conform to the characteris
tics of European feudalism, although they are certainly closer
to that form than the capitalist.

Manfred Kossok, for example,

claims that Spain and colonial America were of a feudal
'type1.^

The existence of commercialization and the absence of

formal serfdom, for him, does not indicate a transition to
capitalist forms of production.

Commercialization is rather

an indication of the rise of merchant capitalism which, as we
have seen, rarely affects the form of production.

Similarly,

Witold Kula, in his study of Polish feudalism, found that the
commercialization of a large part of production in no way
destroyed feudalism and, in Eastern Europe, became an integral
part of it.”

For Kossok, even che abolition of serfdom only

indicates, ".. ,nov. the elimination of feudalism as a system,
but only of certain forms of feudal domination."®

The insti

tution of equally, if different, extra-economic means of labor.
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exploitation such as arose in colonial Spanish America# for
him# indicate the absence of capitalist relations of produc
tion .7

Jaime Vicens Vives in his major study of Spanish

economic development# concludes similarly that Spain was not
’capitalist' but also argues that it was not formally feudal .8
The many trappings of Western European feudalism that abounded
in Spain during the medieval period were in all likelihood
borrowed from the French who# at various points, assisted the
Spanish militarily during the reconquest .8

Rather than feuda

lism or capitalism# the combination of social and historical
elements of Spain's unique medieval history created (except
in Catalonia which may be characterised as 'feudal') what
Vicens Vives calls a 'seigniorial' society .*8
The uniqueness of Spanish Seigniorialism derives from
the Christian Spaniards' long struggle to re-conquer the
Iberian peninsula from the Moors.

Political power became,

from the first# more centralized in the monarchy (although
there were several) than under feudalism proper, as greater
coordination was needed under a constant war footing for the
national/religious enterprise.1*

This centralism must however

be seen as only a 'relative' centralism in that the realms of
Spain were not unified until the reign of Isabel and
Ferdinand.I 2

More importantly, this centralism was also con

ditioned and limited by the decentralized nature of the actual

12

re-conquest.

Individual knights, groups of knights, untitled

persons, religious orders, town militias and foreign adventu
rers, receiving authorization from the monarchs, had a great
part in re-conquering the peninsula in exchange for certain
rights, privileges, grants of land and most importantly
booty.13

The monarchs received ultimate sovereignty and owner

ship of the conquered lands but granted all that had been con
quered, less, most times, a 'guinto* or royal fifth of the
booty captured.14

as

Mario Gongora notes, "The Reconquest led

to the formulation of a system of political justice which
placed great emphasis on the concepts derived from the royal
duty of rewarding and granting favors to men who had dis
tinguished themselves in war".!^

Though these, especially in

Castile, became 'lords of the land* their jurisdiction over
the land and its people was 'a jurisdiction limited by the
power of the monarchy".16
At the same time, although the conditions of labor
during the re-conquest were fluid in that Castile was under
populated and the need to re-populate newly captured lands
gave the ordinary peasant the opportunity to escape the most
onerous servile conditions of labor, by the period of the
Spanish conquest of America Spain was still a predominantly
agrarian nation with more than 80% of the population peasants
working under servile conditions of labor on land owned
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largely by the aristocracy and Church.

17

Thus, the hallmark of

this 'seigniorial system' was the non-alienation of ultimate
political sovereignty by the monarchs, while the social conditions of labor remained predominantly non-capitalist.

18

The town middle classes or bourgeoisie were always rela
tively weak owing to their small numbers (not more than 3-5%
of the population) and to the fact that many were Jews or
conversos

(Jews or their forbears who had 'converted' to

Christianity) who were either persecuted or emigrated during
this p e r i o d . ^

Their traditional historical role as an ally

of the monarch against the aristocracy in the consolidation of
pA

the Absolutist State

led, in the Spanish version of that

alliance, to the destruction of the autonomy of the cities and
towns and led to the predominance of the aristocracy under the
auspices of the Absolutist S t a t e . W i t h the growing pre
dominance of the aristocracy economically and socially, the
remains of the bourgeoisie in the 16th century took on aristo
cratic values and ceased to be an enterprising, ascending
bourgeoisie .22

Industry, which had made some gains in the

early 16th century with the advent of the American trade, fell
back into ruin under the weight of a seigniorial economic
structure .22

The discovery of the great riches in America

gave the final blow to the Spanish bourgeoisie, as
Ronald Glassman relates ,24
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...at precisely the point when other European kings
fell back upon the merchant classes in their need for
monetary wealth for internal and external expansion,
the Spanish kingship got a miracle, the delivery of
unbelievably enormous and endless sources of wealth,
with no strings attached.
Therefore, the Spanish kings did not have to en
courage the development of the internal economy,
for they had been blessed with an external source
of wealth. Not only did they not have to develop
and encourage internal economic development, but
they preferred not to develop it (as all other
European kings would have preferred not to), for ...
this meant that the only remaining class of po
tential political foes to the kingship could be
reduced or ignored...
Thus the Spanish internal economy was allowed
to disintegrate, and the Spanish commercial classes
slowly and imperceptibly began to disappear as a
force in the realm.
It is within the context of this type of political,
economic and social structure that the Spanish conquest of
America

must be understood.

The original aim of the monarchy

in this age of conquest was not colonization (Spain was still
relatively underpopulated) but conquest and trade - the crown
would share with the individual conqueror the booty or trade
secured,

upon the discovery of the Indies, the objective of

the State, according to Gongora was, "...to establish in the
Indies entrepots for the trade of gold, on the Portuguese model
and as a crown monopoly, keeping overseas only a small garrison
of soldiers and the indispensible minimum of settlers...
If the intent of the crown was fairly traditional, so
too were the intentions and organization of the
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1conyuista-

dores'.

These conquistadores came to the New World with rela

tively the same social and political organization under which
they had fought the re-conquest in Spain - " a nucleus of
conqueror - the caudillo or military leader, and his compania,
or followers ” .26

The conquistador, holding in his hand a

capitulacfon, or grant from the monarch stipulating his rights
and rewards for the conquest, rewarded his followers and paid
due homage to the monarch by giving each their rightful share
of the booty.2?

The conquests of America were not *private'

enterprises, although they may have been financed as such.
They required the permission of the crown and were required
to conform to the goals of the State.2®
The conquistador was under no illusion that he was there
to create a 'new* society.

Most were members of the lower

aristocracy who claimed the social prestige of their class but
lacked the economic means to enjoy it because of the system of
primogeniture.^

These relatively impoverished knights sought

a way back into the upper reaches of CastiIlian society
through success in plunder.

As James Lang argues,

This was not a movement of a counter culture.
Cortes and Pizarro came to the New World to
acquire the resources to re-enter the old one
with enhanced status and prestige.
and,
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These men are not institutional entrepreneurs
or the harbingers of social change. They are
attuned to the aristocratic, seigrieurial ideal.
In fact, the conquest of America can be seen as a rebirth of
the reconquest of Spain itself in that it revived conquest as
the principal means of upward social mobility.

As Glassman

relates,32
In Spanish America, as in the reconquest of Spain, the
possibility of (1 ) heroism in battle (2 ) conquest of
Indian controlled lands and treasures (Moslem land and
treasure in Spain), and piratical and bandit acquisition
of wealth reproduced a situation in which everyman could
become enobled, and where enormous numbers of men did
received titles or the power that comes from territorial
control. The spirit of 'hidalgo', and the would be
'hidalgo' re-emerged from the corpses of the Indian
aristocracy, as it once had emerged from those of the
Moslems.
Land, slaves and titles were available once
again. The New World had opened the door to the Old.
Given these roots, it is not surprising that neither
the crown nor the conquistadores instituted a capitalist
regime in America.

While a classically 'feudal' system was

not instituted, neither did they create small farmer settler
colonies.

What emerged as the pattern of social, economic

and political development unsurprisingly mirrored the
seigniorial system extant in Spain.
Spanish American society and economy was dominated,
throughout the colonial era, by the State.

Mercantilism, as

Magali Sarfatti notes, tended towards two varieties, one, a
"...monopolistic mercantilism, where the purely fiscal orien
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tation prevails and where new industries, based on the conces
sion of a

monopoly by the State, are submitted to strict State

control" and the other a "...national mercantilism, which
builds up a protectionist syste.m for the national industries
that already exist ."33

Spanish mercantilism tended towards

the first form, the most unlikely to produce industrial capi
talism. 34

Thus, while economic exploitation was entrusted to

private individuals, the remarkable achievement of the Spanish
crown in the opinion of Sarfatti "...was to superimpose
regulations on the system of production to control access to
the means of production and place a toll on the results ".33
Yet, although unprogressive in this sense, the State's
control over the society and economy of Spanish America did
secure the crown's goal of directing a large part of the
enormous bullion wealth of the colonies into its coffers.
Direct bureaucratic intervention into the society and economy
also had the benefit of reducing tension between competitors
for the resources available - land,r labor and trade.*

The

bureaucracy itself became the focus of that competition.

While

corruption and poor administration were the result of such a
policy, the benefits were many in terms of creole attachment
to the Imperial system and the providing of the social control
mechanisms necessary for the exploitation of servile labor.

78

Encomienda And Its Antecedents
Immediately upon their arrival in the Indies, the con
quistadores set to imposing servile labor conditions upon the
native inhabitants.

From this it is immediately apparent that

the men who came to America had no intention of working the
land themselves.

The Spaniards, after surviving for a while

on the hospitality of the natives of Hispanola, enslaved them
after the natives revolted against the increasing demands of
their 'guests'.

Columbus imposed a tribute tax upon the whole

native population over the age of fourteen, and those unable
to pay (of which there was a large majority) were forced to
provide labor service free.^ 6

By 1499, the 'choice' of tribute

tax or labor service had effectively been suppressed in favor
of labor service, parcelled out to individual Spaniards as this
batter assured them control over the fruits of native labor.37
Although the crown did initially halt the practice of
private compulsory labor due3 (compulsory labor in crown mines
was never questioned), this would have left the Spaniards to
fend for themselves, a position which, given the aristocratic
values they had left Spain with and to which status they as
pired, they violently protested.

Thus, the crown's re-evalua

tion of its policies towards the conquistadores led to the
formal legalization of compulsory forced labor in 1503.38
Under Governor Ovando, this began to take the form of
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Under Governor Ov&ndo, this began to take the form of
encomienda, that is a conditional grant of native forced labor
to particularly meritorious conquistadores.

The encomendero

was obliged to 'take care' of his native charges, instructing
them in Christianity and civilization, and protecting their
persons and properties. 39
The grossly increasing exploitation of the native
population of Hispanola quickly led to depopulation and a
cry by the Spaniards for new sources of labor.

Estimates of

native population decline on the island of Hispanola cite a
drop from a high of one million when the Spanish arrived to
scarcely five hundred by 1570.40

Expeditions to neighboring

islands were sent out in order to secure the needed labor
leading to the rapid depopulation of many of the Caribbean
Islands.^

The continuing decline of available forced labor

then led to expeditions to the mainland in search of both
labor and riches as new 'conquistadores* arrived from the
peninsula regularly only to find colonial society now closed.
These new 'conquistadores', seeking lucrative positions,
clamored for new conquests.^
This medieval Spanish form of conquest and colonization
did not radically alter with the conquest of the mainland.
There, in the Andes and the Valley of Mexico, the Spaniards
found relatively developed native empires lording over fairly
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complex systems of production.

In Peru, the Inca Empire ruled

over an estimated sixteen million people stretching from
southern Colombia to northern Chile along the Andean
cordillera.43

^he Incan social, economic and political system

was characterized by groups of independent village communities
or ayllus, organized by lineage, and linked to the central
Incan authority through a complex bureaucracy subordinate to
that, and only that authority.

The independent villages pro

duced communally on lands designated for the village, the sun
god and local gods.

Indian villages also owed the State a

certain amount of labor service, predominantly for public
works, e.g. roads, temple building and irrigation projects.
Much of the surplus collected by the central authorities (that
not used for the support of the royal family, the bureaucracy,
the priests or to feed, house and clothe laborers doing public
service) was re-distributed to the villages in the form of
largesse from the I n c a .44
The Aztecs of Mexico were, at the village level, simi
larly organized.

Differences though existed in their politi

cal, social and economic system.

Central administration was

fairly lax as compared to the Incas.

Local authorities

(chiefs, village headman etc.) held power in the absence of an
Imperial bureaucracy.

All that was required of the local

authorities was that they deliver their share of the tribute

demanded by the Aztec aristocracy.

Economically the system

was not redistributive, at least not at the Imperial level
as with the Incas and trade and economic differentiation had
begun to appear before the arrival of the Spanish conquista
dores. 4 5
Two factors greatly facilitated the relatively easy
conquest of these two advanced Indian Empires.

First, in

both empires, internal dissension greatly assisted the
Spaniards.

The Aztecs had only recently militarily con

quered many tribes on their periphery and, groaning under
the heavy tribute exactions of the Aztecs these tribes
gladly assisted Cort/s' attack of the Aztec eapitol.

In

Peru, a dynastic struggle within the Inca royal family per
mitted a small band of Spaniards under Pizarro's leadership
to play both sides against each.other, allowing them to
defeat both.46

Second, the apparent absence of popular up

risings (except in the very centers of both Empires - Cuzco
and Tenochitlan) which was a result of the sedentary nature
of both populations and the insularity of the villages
vis-a-vis the Empires themselves.

These independent villages

had been the object of conquerors before the Incas and Aztec 3
and regarded the Spaniards at first as deliverers and later,
simply new overlords to bear.
Marx's assertion that the conqueror must conform to the
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forms of production and exchange of the conquered was never
so borne out than in the Spanish conquest of the Inca and
Aztec

Empires.

47

After the Spaniards had stripped the

American Indian Empires of all the precious metals they had
lying around, they had to confront their own survival in their
new land.

Rather than changing the modes of surplus extrac

tion extant, the Spaniards inserted themselves at the pinnacle
of the hierachic structure of tribute distribution through the
use of

encomienda,
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The encomienda^ was, in the early

stages of Spanish colonialism, the primary method of ex
tracting the surplus wealth and labor of the native popula
tion.

It was a conditional grant of Indian communities to a

particularly meritorious Spaniard who received the tribute
(inkind and later cash) that the Indians were required to
pay the Spanish King (before him the Inca or Aztec King) as
their overlord.^0

Certain kinds of direct labor services

were also extracted by the encomendero although such practices
were not condoned by the crown and were ultimately outlawed.
In some areas, particularly Chile, which suffered from extreme
labor shortage, encomienda was extremely harsh in that tribute
was extracted mainly through labor services.

Arnold Bauer

relates how Haurpe Indians from Cuyo "...were brought in chains
through Andean passes and assigned to various agricultural
tasks around Santiago.

Often the indios huarpes were rented
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by their encomenderos to other S p a n i a r d s . ,."51
The encomienda was not a grant of land nor did it form
the legal basis for the large landed estates or haciendas
that were to arise in the 17th century.52

Grants of land

(merced) were made by the Spanish towns upon their founding
according to the status of the individual settler.

Land was

also granted and sold by the crown in the 16th and 17th cen
turies. 53

Encomenderos were forbidden to own land or to live

within the confines of their encomienda.

Encomiendas could

include Indians who lived on their own community lands, crown
lands, or lands owned by other Spaniards.54

Although

usurptions of Indian lands by encomenderos and others
occurred throughout the colonial period, control of land,
except that in the immediate vicinity of Spanish towns (for
the provisioning of those towns) was less important than the
control of labor in the first century and a half of coloniza
tion .55
The encomenderos* aim was not to institute a new system
of production but to live well off of the old Indian system .55
The encomendero was still, in a sense, a military leader who
provided for his retinue of soldiers through the tribute he
received from his encomienda Indians .57

His responsibilities

to the crown were military, social and economic - further
conquest, the Catholization of his Indian charges and the
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provisioning of the crown with as much gold and silver wealth
as he could find.5®

He. was not an independent ’lord1, as

Claudio Veliz notes, although the Indians were commended to
the Spaniard he did not therefore receive jurisdictional
authority over them as a feudal overlord.

The encomenderos

were "...informal civil servants representing the monarch,
acting on behalf of the central government with limited tenure,
and liable to have their duties terminated at the royal
will ".59
The encomienda form was geared to the survival of the
indigenous non-capitalist mode of production and social and
political organization (relations within the village and
between the village and the Spaniards was mediated through
the village headman or curaca).

First, the crown did not want

the American conquerors to become an hereditary aristocracy
(the one it had to contend with in Spain was already one too
many) and thus restricted the encomendero in his tenure and
use of Indian labor.5®

Second, the crown had an interest in

the survival of the indigenous system which produced the labor
for the silver mines and tribute for the State and church.6”*But, the encomienda system, this hybrid public/private system
of surplus extraction, did not survive past the early 1700’s
(for various reasons it lasted well into the 18th century in
Chile and Paraguay) and divided into the 'private 1 hacienda
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and

1public 1

corregimiento.62

By the end of the 16th century and throughout the 17th
century the encomienda form of surplus extraction began to
change radically until it was finally abolished in 1718.
This change did not include a transformation to capitalist
forms of surplus extraction but rather was a reorganization
of non-capitalist forms.

Several developments led to this

unplanned reorganization#

(1 ) the dramatic decrease in the

Indian population throughout the 16th century,

(2) the

development of a large market for agricultural produce with
the development of silver mining on a grand scale, and
(3) the crown's policy of decreasing both the power and
profitability of encomienda.
Perhaps of all of these, the dramatic decline of the
Indian population was most important.

A number of factors

have been cited as the cause for this demographic disaster
but it is generally agreed that the introduction of European
diseases, particularly small pox, typhus, malaria and yellow
fever, to which the Indians had little immunity was the chief
cause.
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Compounding the decline by disease was the intensi

fied labor requirements in the silver and mercury mines and
in producing agricultural products for Spanish consumption
which took time away from their own subsistence production.
According to Rolando Mellafe, it seems th2t Indian labor
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drafts for the building of new Spanish towns and the usurption
of some of the best Indian agricultural lands for the building
sites of these towns also greatly contributed to the demogra
phic decline .64

Although there is some dispute as to the

loss in actual numbers, recent research has put the decline
in Mexico from a high of 25-30 million at the time of the
conquest to about lJs million by the middle of the 17th cen
tury.

The decline in Peru appears to have been somewhat

less dramatic as the population of the isolated altiplano
communities of Upper Peru seem to have fared much better.6^
Thus, with such a great decline of population and thus pro
duction, encomenderos were finding it more and more difficult
to support themselves and their numerous dependents solely
on the basis of Indian tribute.
The dramatic increase of mining activity in both
Mexico and Peru had a twofold effect in hastening the decline
of encomienda.

First the mines not only caused a decline of

encomienda Indians available to encomenderos because of the
deaths within the mines, but also because Indians subject to
mining drafts fled their communities to reside on the proper
ties of Spaniards (and the church) who, in return for their
labor, would shield them from such labor drafts .66

Second,

as the mines created greater demand for foodstuffs, transport
and mining r.ools, private farms or haciendas arose to which
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encomienda Indians, subject to mine labor, could escape and
find security .67
Nevertheless, royal policy was a most important factor
in the demise of the encomienda system.

The crown very early

sought to control the aristocratic pretensions of encomenderos
by first restricting their use of encomienda Indians and
second, restricting their tenure as encomenderos and their
ownership of land.

The encomendero was further restricted

in not being allowed to administer justice to his Indians, a
function which the crown delegated to

local corregidores or

alcaldes mayores who were not allowed to be encomenderos.
More effective than any of these was the crown imposed de
cline in encomendero tribute income.

In 1568, the crown ruled

that large encomiendas were to be limited to an income of
2,000 pesos per year, the remainder going to the crown.6**
constantly increasing the State's share of the tribute
collected by the encomendero, the crown made the holding of
an encomienda in the highly populated regions extremely
unattractive.

In Peru, encomienda was abolished - "all

encomiendas began to revert to the crown upon the death of
the owner" - in 1718.6^

The best an encomendero could hope

for now was a pension from the crown.

Corregimiento, Hacienda, Repartimiento Or Mita
Actually, encomienda type surplus extraction did not
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By

disappear with the end of encomienda.

The crown's purpose

was not to destroy the system, but to preserve it by gaining
greater control over it as it was the basis of the bulk of
revenue the crown extracted from the colonies.

As Robert

Keith has noted, the system of corregimiento was simply
encomienda by another name - with one important difference.
Rather than a private Spaniard holding it, the corregimiento
was an encomienda held by the crown and administered by its
representative.^

Corregidores de indios (or alcaldes

mayores in Mexico), appointed for a relatively short term of
office, it was felt by the crown, would ensure the survival
of the indigenous population and the social and economic
organization v/hich preserved it.
tainod in the long run.
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This however was not ob-

The office of corregidor, as most

offices during the latter Hapsburg period, was sold by the
crown in an effort to fill a treasury impoverished by war.
Those who bought the offices were usually poorer Spaniards
or creoles who borrowed heavily from local merchants in order
to pay the fee.

To recoup this debt and make their sinecure

pay, corregidores initiated the repartimiento de mercancias,
or forced distribution of goods, whereby Indians were forced
to purchase a certain amount of goods (useful or useless)
from the corregidor.^

In order to pay for these goods the

Indians were forced to produce goods that they could sell in
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Spanish markets or to the corregidor.

A good deal of the

commodities circulating in Spanish markets were thus produced
in this manner.73
Corregidores, while serving as a conduit for both mer
chants in the sale and collection of goods, and the State in
the collection of tribute, were the chief distributors of
justice and administration to the Indians and acted as labor
recruiters for local haciendas (although this practice was
illegal).

As the King's administrative and judicial repre

sentative, the corregidor dispensed justice to the Indians in
his district and was responsible for maintaining the separa
tion of the Indians from Spaniards and mestizos who, the
crown felt, would (and did) abuse the Indians.^

But, while

charged with protecting their Indians from Spaniard and
mestizo freebooters, corregidores were not averse to handing
over any number of their charges to local hacendados who re
quired additional labor on their lands - for a p r i c e . ^
The hacienda, a large private estate-farm, received
its impetus with the decline of encomienda.

As the Indian

population declined, and opportunities for gain in the pro
visioning of the mines which were often, like Potosi in Upper
Peru, in areas where agriculture could not flourish, land
ownership became important.
Land itself uas a concession given away or sold by the
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the political authorities.

From the first, grants of land

were made by the founder of a Spanish town and later, the town
council or cabildo .76

All ultimate ownership of land in

America was held to belong to the crown.

At various periods,

viceroys, governors and audencias were authorized to either
grant or sell land for the benefit of the crown.

Ownership

of land gave rise to all sorts of disputes as gaining clear
title, given the counter claims of Indians whose lands were
usually being usurped and competing hacendados (or the
church), complicated matters.

Thus, the colonial courts,

officials and lawyers (letrados) were enormously important
to any landlord (or aspiring landJord ) .77

Obviously, having

connections to or the ability to bribe royal officials was
extremely important.

Further, the instituting by the State

of entail and primogeniture ensured the reproduction of the
system of large landholding.
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Although now more 'free* in relation to encomienda
Indians, hacienda Indians produced for the hacendado in much
the same way they had produced for the encomendero.

Although

the hacienda was more market oriented, particularly those that
provisioned large urban areas or mining centers, they were
nevertheless in no way harbingers of an emerging capitalist
economy.

Each hacienda, regardless of its connection to the

market, strove for the ideal of self sufficiency.
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Diversification was striven for in order to take advantage of
many small markets which they sought to monopolize and thereby
control supply and price.

Even the most highly commercialized

sugar plantations grew their own food - maize, vegetables,
wheat and cattle - with an eye towards monopolizing the
79

entire production process.

The hacendados attracted labor to the hacienda by
offering the Indians a better situation than they could ob
tain either as encomienda or/and community Indians.

In

Peru especially, with the dramatic rise in cost of tribute
(in Peru tribute was assessed to villages and thus, the de
crease of the Indian population only increased the per capita
tribute the remaining Indians had to pay; in Mexico, tribute
was an individual responsibility) many sought succor on
haciendas.

The hacendado offered the Indian a small plot of

land to work in exchange for his labor.

Even later, when the

crown required the hacendados to pay their Indians a 'wage'
in addition to a plot of land, wages were paid (if they were
paid at all) in kind .80
Labor relations on haciendas were varied.

For the most

part, the hacendado required a small permanent work force
which, at harvest times, could be expanded fairly easily.
The permanent work force, those attracted to year round
residence on the hacienda, were either serf-like yancononas
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as in southern Peru, sharecroppers who owed the hacienda cer
tain portion of their harvest, or wage laborers (though very
few permanent workers) who were paid a wage well below sub
sistence and therefore had to depend on support outside the
hacienda.

Much of the seasonal labor the hacienda required

was provided through the 'mita' or 'repartimiento 1 - forced
labor (though 'paid') directed to the haciendas by repre
sentatives of the c r o w n . 81

Even in the later colonial period,

according to James Lockhart, resident and non-resident labor
was provided through the pre-colombian system of periodic
obligatory work,

Hacendados continued to enjoy the free

personal services of Indians in having their produce de
livered to market and in the provision of house servants .®2
The hacienda, for the most part, was able to attract
labor, particularly additional seasonal labor, in two ways.
One, which seems to have been more predominant in Mexico,
was to put pressure on Indian villages in their vicinity
by usurping their lands and thus forcing the Indians to send
labor to the hacienda to supplement the decreased community
resources.

The other, was by the State putting pressure on

Indian villages through tribute, payment required by the
church, labor drafts for the mines and forced sale of goods
by corregidores.

All of these exactions forced Indians to

seek added income in seasonal labor on haciendas.
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In fact

Karen Spalding claims that it was the State which "... forced
the Indians to sell their labor to the Spaniards", though
only cheap below-subsistence labor for, it was not in the
interest of the hacendados, who could not fully support such
a large labor force, or the State, which needed the Indians'
labor and tribute, to fully destroy indigenous systems of
social reproduction.8^

Mita And Repartimiento
Obviously, forms of enforced labor did not end with
encomienda.

In both major areas of Indian population,

systems of forced labor recruitment lasted will into the
18th century.

Forced labor, generally called mita in Peru

and repartimiento in Mexico, was distributed by royal
officials, corregidores or jeuces repartidoes, to mines,
haciendas, textile 'factories', churches and church lands,
and towns .84

Thus, some degree of influence with the politi

cal authorities was necessary to acquire this form of labor.
Though nominally 'wage labor', the need to make such employ
ment obligatory indicates that proletarianization, that is,
the inability of the worker to survive without selling his
labor, had not really gone very far.
In Peru especially, the mita was a labor draft in which
certain Indian villages were required to send a given number
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mitayos to the mines, haciendas or public works - such as
roads, irrigation, town building, etc.8®

Until 1609, mitayos

were unpaid, but thereafter they received a small daily pay
ment for their forced labor.8®

Forced labor in the silver

mines of Pot-osi* and the mercury mine at Huancalevica was
especially onerous as thousands died from work in these
mines.8^

Given unrelaxed mita conscription in the same

geographic area, it has been estimated that the mita produced
11,199 laborers in 1573 but only 1,674 one hundred years
later .88

Of course this decimation was not entirely the

fault of work in the mines but it nevertheless was the reason
so many Indians also fled these particular areas to seek
shelter on Spanish haciendas.
In Mexico, such forced labor was milder, as a reparti
miento for the mines was not the fashion.

Yet, Indians,

Negroes, vagabonds and all people of color were required to
make themselves available daily for labor drafts.

The laborer

could in theory 'choose 1 his employer but he nevertheless had
to work .88

Debt peonage also seems to have appeared earlier

and been more widespread in Mexico, as hacendados sought to
acquire a fixed labor force by making the Indians legally
bound to theni through debt.

As the Indians attempted to pay

off their debts, the small below subsistence 'wage' they re
ceived only sent them deeper in debt .80
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However, as recent

research into this aspect of colonial (and 19th century) social
relations indicates, to the Indians, their debt slavery was
relatively unimportant in that being a permanent tenant on a
hacienda may have been the best possible existence for an
91
Indian.'

Mines, Obrajes And Guilds
The silver mines of Peru and Mexico were of chief
importance to the Spanish crown and therefore received
careful attention by the colonial bureaucracy.

Although

bullion remittances to the crown never exceeded the revenue
raised through taxation in Castile, it was of great value
because of its liquidity and therefore useful in the crown's
international adventurism.92

The crown sought, therefore,

not only to increase its production but also to assure
that the resources necessary for the exploitation of the
mines were available.
The mines, though worked by private individuals were
rarely sold outright to these entrepreneurs.

Usually, they

were granted as concessions to Spaniards and creoles, the
crown retaining ultimate o w n e r s h i p . C o n c e s s i o n s were of
relatively short duration and thus the exploitation of the
mines, particularly in the early flush days, was rapacious
while investment was minimal.
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The crown held ultimate con-

trol over mining not through ownership of the mines but by
monopolizing the production and distribution of one essential
input - mercury.

Mercury, needed in the amalgamation process

which reduced silver bearing ores to relatively pure silver
(thus its appellation 'quicksilver') was produced and distri
buted as a crown monopoly.9^

In addition, all bullion had to

be delivered to government smelters to be assayed, cast into
bars, stamped and taxed,

A small tax of 1-1%% was assessed

for the costs of this service while 1/5 or the quinto v/as
assessed and collected for the crown.9^

Although much of

the silver produced in America never reached government
offices to be taxed, being hidden or leaving as contraband,
much that did reverted to the crown during its periodic
financial crises when it simply confiscated all private
bullion coming from America .96
Mining itself was a precarious industry.

A concession

aire might get rich very quickly, but many more ended in
ruin.

Miners were notoriously short of capital and were

usually at the mercy of merchant money lenders or aviadores
who advanced them just enough to buy necessary equipment
and mercury, but not enough to expand or modernize produc
tion .97

The aviadores were of course, only middlemen who

linked the mining economy to the large Lima and Mexico City
merchants .98
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Given the importance of the mines to the crown, they
were granted preferential treatment in the distribution of la
bor by royal officials.

The mita in Peru, as discussed above,

provided the bulk of the labor for the mercury mine in
/

Huancavelica and the silver mines in Potosi during the 16th
and early 17th centuries, while in Mexico, it seems reparti
miento did not provide the needed workforce and thus a combin
ation of slave labor and 'free* wage labor was utilized.99

It

should be noted that while the crown progressively limited the
types of industries allowed to use mita or repartimiento labor,
the last to lose this privilege was

m i n i n g . 100

What manufacturing existed in America during the colonial
era was mainly in the manufacture of coarse textiles, usually
destined for Indian workers in the mines.

Textiles were pro

duced in workhouses called obrajes which were found everywhere
throughout the colonies (although Queretaro in Mexico and
Quito in Peru were centers of production) and worked for the
most part by servile labor.

Exploitation of Indian labor in

the obrajes was particularly brutal and, although steps were
taken early to reduce or abolish Indian servitude in them, all
regulations were ineffective .101

Indians, including women and

children six to eight years of age were kidnapped and forced
to work long hours in dark unhealthy textile m i l l s . F o r
Gongora, miners and obraje operators were virtually in the
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same boat, they were "...fundamentally dependent on the power
of the State" for access to the labor inputs of their
industries.lQ3
Most other kinds of manufacturing in the colonies, if
they did not use servile labor, did not alternatively take
capitalist form.
State regulation.

Neither did they escape (or v;ant to escape)
Most manufacturing (except cottage industry

in the countryside) was organized into graft guilds or
gremios.IQ4

craftsmen producing shoes, furniture, glass,

leather goods, pots, candles etc., organized into guilds in
order to prevent competition.1 °5

Guild labor as well as the

production process was meticulously regulated by guild
ordinances which were given the force of law by the State.
Economic and political at the same time, guilds represented
the monopolistic corporatist pattern of Spanish colonial
society. 10<*

Slavery
The slave plantation is often cited as a capitalist,
institution by those who misunderstand the difference between
commercialization and capitalism.10^

Capitalism, it should be

remembered, is a form of production constituting the combina
tion of capital and free wage labor, of which slavery forms no
part.

Slave systems however, enjoyed great stimulus under the
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dominance of the commercial bourgeoisie which, as Genovese
observes "...supported the existing system of production ".108
Its relationship to the growth of capitalism is ambiguous.
Slavery, as Marx showed, fed the 'original accumulation of
capital' in Western Europe, though not exclusively or pre
dominantly .108

As soon though, as industrial capitalism

becomes dominant, we find everywhere forces attempting to
abolish the slave trade e.g. Britain 110 or/and slavery itself, e.g. the United States.U J '
Slavery was an early institution of labor in colonial
Spanish America and it certainly did not presage the coming
development of capitalist relations of production.

Columbus'

first inclination was to enslave the Indians he found on tl:?.
Caribbean Islands, although the crown quickly eliminated this
practice except for Indians taken in a 'just war".

Thus,

Indian slavery existed only in Chile, Argentina and Northern
Mexico where hostile Indian tribes could provide justifica
tion.11^

For the most part though, slavery meant Black

slavery and was closely regulated by the Imperial bureaucracy.
Black slavery was not without precedent in Spain itself.
In fact, Black slaves seem to have accompanied the second vo
yage of Columbus and were prohibited, unsuccessfully, by the
crown from migrating to America in the Instrucciones of
1501.

The importation of Black slaves was extremely impor
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tant to the colonization of the Caribbean Islands as Spaniards
sought servile replacement labor for their enterprises, par
ticularly sugar and gold production, when the Indian popula
tion d w i n d l e d . O n

the mainland, the tropical and coastal

areas received the bulk of imported slaves as the highland
areas of both Peru and Mexico were fairly densly populated and
thus did not present labor shortage p r o b l e m s . s t r a n g e l y
enough, the greatest advocate for the introduction of Black
slavery into Spanish America was the crown which sought to
protect the Indian from the more onerous types of labor.
The slave trade to America began originally as a crown
monopoly, although concessions for the importation of small
numbers of slaves were made to individual colonists as
payment for some meritorious a c t . ^ ^

The crown administered

monopoly was soon abandoned and, until the late 16th century,
the supplying of slaves was contracted out by the crown through
the sale of licences.

This form became successful not only as

a means of supplying all the colonies with slaves but also as
an added source of income for the

c r o w n .

I***

Even after the

asiento or monopoly form of provisioning slaves was revived
in 1580, the crown found that it could profit from the trade
by collecting import duties and a bonus for every slave im
ported.

This form was not abandoned until 1 773.^®

Although Black slaves could be found throughout the
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colonies, their concentration in particular areas, generally
of cash crop production (and often coastal cities), put the
onus of social control on the lower Spanish bureaucracy.
Any system of production in which the laborers* position in
the social relations of production is juridically defined,
as in slavery, requires an active role for the State.

As

Mellafe notes, the regulation of the relations between freeman
and slave was a chief occupation of the State bureaucrats in
Spanish America who maintained "...strict social controls,
aimed at maximum economic yield and the preservation of a
stratified, hierarchical society. . . " . Laws regulating
slavery were promulgated by the crown and administered by
its representative.

Purchase and sale of slaves, legal

ownership, manumission, the rights of slaves and their
punishment for crimes, including running away and/or becoming
renegades or cimarrones, were all within the purview of the
State bureaucracy, -^l
Regulation and social control by the State and its
agencies here, as in many other areas, deteriorated as the
colonial period wore on.

As slave revolts became more and

more common by the 18th century, slaveowners had to fall back
upon their own resources in order to control their workforces.
At the same time, a growing floating population of vagabond
mestizos and escaped slaves made rural colonial Ame 3:ica
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particularly u n s a f e . T h e s e were to create political
tensions and problems of social control throughout the late
Bourbon and into the independence period.
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Estate, Corporation and Castas
Spanish American colonial society, like that of Spain,
was organized in a hierarchy of estates and corporations,
not social classes.

Social class, in which social status is

derived from one's economic' position, differs from
societies based on estate and corporation in which social
status is derived through politico-legal definition.

The

implications of each are important in understanding the role
and place of the State in society.

In the former type of

society, ownership of property, wealth, and/or success in
economic pursuits denote social status, while the State's
role is in simply guaranteeing these founts of social status.
In the latter, the State holds a central position in the
ascription and recognition of social status.

In order to

maintain or increase one's social status, recognition by the
State is indispensable.

Therefore, in the case of the estate/

corporate society the role of the State is direct, while in
class society it is indirect.

125

Colonial Spanish America never had an 'estate system'
proper in that the political-representational function of
estate was absent.*26

But, as Lyle McAlister argues, the
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ethnic-cultural groups of the American colonies tended to
constitute an estates system.127

por McAlister, the fact that

social status was juridically defined in the case of Spaniards
(white peninsulares and creoles), Indians and castas can be
recognized as an estate system even though it developed in an
IPS
"ad hoc fashion". *

This hierarchic system was accepted

throughout the colonial period as the natural order of things
so, as McAlister argues, "Social unrest took the form of
drives to improve the status of the individual and the group,
not efforts to change the system".129
Spaniards were accorded specific rights or fueros
including exemption from tribute and the right to hold
positions in the higher corporations, bureaucracy, clergy
and military.

Similarly, Indians were accorded a specific

juridical status in that they were subject to the tribute
while exempt from other taxes such as the sales tax or
alcabala, the inquisition, and the regular courts.

Castas,

who I will deal with below, similarly had a juridically defined
status.^ 0

In addition, a corporate structure was superimposed

upon the system of estates, as it was in medieval Europe.
Social status and one's 'place' in society was often defined
by one's corporate membership in guilds, the church,
universities, the army or militia, and the municipalities which
conferred on its members a special juridical status.131
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The social hierarchy of early colonial days quickly be
came problematic with the rapid intermingling of the races and
called out for State regulation.

Although it was the policy

of the crown to prevent this intermixing, it was impossible
to halt. ^

2

women formed a very small part of the white

emigration to the colonies in the early years*-^, ana only
approximately one-third of the Slack slaves imported were
womeni341 intermixing was inevitable on the part of both
Black and white men with Indian women.
Although these were not the only forms of race mixture,
given the various combinations that could occur once race
mixture got underway, they did form the basis of a society
graded hierarchically in terms of 'whiteness'.135

a

quite

complex formal-legal system of discrimination based on caste
was instituted which existed until the end of the colonial
era (and informally, up to this day).136

This 'pigmentocracy’

received official sanction which included restrictions on the
right to wear certain clothing, membership in guilds and other
corporations, positions in the bureaucracy, access to schools
and universities and the holding of ecclesiatic positions.137
Far and away the largest group of castas were the mesti
zos who were, for the. most part, a complex mixture of the
white, Indian and sometimes black races.

Mestizos fairly soon

became the majority of the. population throughout the colonies

105

as the white population did not grow as dramatically, the In
dian population declined and the Black population was re
stricted by the slave trade .^

Having literally no place in

8

colonial society - being neither white and having the privi
leges of that status, nor Indian and having the protection
(for what it was worth) of the crown and access to communal
lands, the mestizos were seen by both Spaniards and Indians as
degraded.^ 9
dangerous.

por the white creoles, they were both useful and
Useful as intermediaries between them and their

slaves or Indians in the capacity of foremen or slavedrivers,
and dangerous because of their unrootedness and tendency to
wards vagrancy and unlawfulness.^40

Mestizos aspired to white

creole status and thus shunned 'legitimate' work in a society
that always seemed labor poor.

This disgruntled mass was

later to form the backbone of the armies of Independence, and
the basis of support for the caudillos of the early 19th
century.^41

The Church
The Roman Catholic Church in colonial Spanish America
served, up till the middle of the 18th century, as the crown's
chief agency of social control and as adjunct to the colonial
bureaucracy.

In fact, since the Spanish crown acquired the

patronato (a concession granted by the Pope giving the Spanish
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monarch the right to appoint individuals to ecclesiastical
positions, collect church tithes, and review and approve all
church policy - including that emanating from the Pope

him

self) , the church in Spanish America had always been an arm
of the State.
The chief contribution of the church to Spanish rule in
America was its role in identifying obedience to the State
with obedience to religion.

For the Indians of Peru and

Mexico this was particularly potent for their own indigenous
State organizations evinced a similar combination of State and
religion.

Their 'conversion' to Christianity by the church

did much to legitimize the authority of the secular Spanish
administration.

Where the authority of the secular adminis

tration was often rebelled against by the Indians, the
clergy's authority always stood firm.

Always the representa

tive of the crown, the clergy was given the responsibility of
protecting the Indians from rapacious Spaniards and creoles,
even though these often complained that the clergy monopolized
the services of the Indians for their own purposes.143
To a large degree, where State authority and church
authority began and ended was fuzzy.

The role of the church as

an arm of the Imperial bureaucracy infused secular authority
with religious justification and s a n c t i o n s . S o identified
was religion with the State that "treason against the State
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was equated with heresy..."145

The Inquisition, exported from

Spain by the crown, and under its sole direction, acted as a de
fender of the State, censoring not only religious materials, but
political and philosophical ideas found dangerous to the politi
cal order.146

While hardly the heinous institution history has

branded it (at least in America)14^ , the Inquisition did pro
vide the crown with an effective deterrent to creole opposi
tion.

Useless and counterproductive as Henry Charles Lea may

characterize it148, the Inquisition was extremely effective.
Even if it did nothing, its presence and occasional actions
were enough to cause Spaniards and creoles (who were solely
under its jurisdiction) to walk the straight and narrow.
The church performed many social functions that ingra
tiated all classes to it.

Almost all education in the colonies

was administered by the church through its monastaries,
colegios, universities and schools of the regular and secular
clergy.150

In addition, the church was the chief founder of

hospitals, poorhouses and other charitable institutions.151
But of all the important social functions of the church,
nothing compared with its role as colonial banker.

The

church grew to be the richest institution in America from
years of receiving donations of,land and money from the faith
ful,

Charles Gibson estimating that its ownership of one half

the land in the colonies would not seem unreasonable.152
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The

church, with its enormous income from its haciendas, planta
tions and sale of services, was able to lend out money,
usually to landowners living well beyond their incomes, and
thus came to hold mortgages on an enormous amount of land.153
By these mortgages, much land was encumbered by dues to the
church (a certain portion of the loan was to be repaid out of
the operating income of the hacienda) while creoles v;ere en
abled to live in an 'aristocratic1 style.-*-54

Thus the rela-* ~

tionship between the hacienda and the church was symbiotic the hacienda provided incomes for the church in the form of
annuities, mortgages, gifts, and tithes, while the church
provided the hacendado with social control and ready cash in
the forms of loans.1^5

when, in the late 18th century, the

Bourbon State took over these mortgages and attempted to li
quidate them in order to fill the royal coffers, panic struck
the colonies and many hacendados were ruined.156

Commerce
Trade between Spain and the colonies, it is well known,
was a monopoly of the crown.

The function, of trading with

the colonies was delegated to the consulado of Seville, a
corporate merchants guild which served as another bureaucratic
arm of the monarchy, while at the same time profiting from
holding the trade monopoly.
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Similar merchant guilds were

organized in Lima and Mexico City.157

In addition to the

merchant guilds, the crown set up the Casa de Contratacion
{Board of Trade) which regulated trade in the interest of
the monarchy and restricted it to the privileged few.

All

trade was routed through a very few ports, as to allow tight
control of who traded and what they traded in order to
facilitate the collection of royal taxes and to prevent the
illegal export of bullion.

Only official ports could receive

ships and goods from Spain and send ships and goods back.
Veracruz (an entrepot for Mexico City), Portobello ( a transfer
point for goods on their way to the west coast), Callao
(entrepot for Lima), and Cartegena (another transfer point for
goods proceeding to or from Lima) were the only cities duly
authorized.

In effect, trade could be officially conducted

only through the Lima and Mexico City consulados.15®

This

monopoly of the larger merchants of the consulados, usually
peninsulares, discriminated against local creole merchants
and consumers who were gouged by the high prices they were
required to pay for goods from Spain.

High prices and high

profits were built into the system as these merchants
profited by keeping supply short and prices high.15®
Merchant groups in America and Spain were not two
separate groups.

Having personal contacts, preferably

familial, with members of the Seville consulado was generally
110

a pre-requisite to membership in the American consulados.
These trading families maintained their privileged position
by financing loans to the crown and jobs for colonial bureau
crats who either had to buy their office or were required to
leave a security payment with the crown.
the other hand, was fairly open.
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Local trade, on

It seems that almost every

one, hacendados, bureaucrats and clergy, in the upper reaches
of colonial society engaged or invested in trade, even though
many may not have wanted to be identified as merchants.
While the Spanish colonies were highly commercialized
for this era, the fact that buying and selling was engaged in
to such an extent should not seduce the observer into the
belief that a bourgeois society was emerging.

As Gongora

argues, in the case of the particularly enterprising new
Basque, Cantabrian and Navarrese merchants, they "...were
passionately interested in acquiring titles of nobility and
were full of enthusiasm for genealogy, ...and they frequently
acquired titles of nobility or the habits of the military
orders.

The 'bourgeois' life style was still alien to their

collective consciouness.

Their habits of thrift and diligence

were at all times typical for an immigrant class, and never
in our opinion, developed the characteristics which would
make it possible for us to describe, these merchants as a
'bourgeois c l a s s ' " , T h e y ,
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like all others in colonial

society, aspired to the seigniorial idea.

Bureaucracy
The fact that so much of the economic and social life of
the Spanish American colonies was regulated by the crown
created a society that was highly politicized and thus made
the State bureaucracy the focal point of all attention.
Practice, however, rarely followed form in the colonial
bureaucracy.

But, whether it was corrupt, influenced by

Spaniards or colonials, followed or did not follow royal
instructions and decrees is immaterial.
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What must never

be lost sight of is that this bureaucracy mediated social
relations throughout the colonial era.

Regardless of what

individuals thought of the practices of various members of
the bureaucracy, they still recognized its legitimacy through
the crown.
Prior to the Bourbon raforms, the colonial bureaucracy
was a system of hierarchic yet overlapping authority.

A

common structure of authority was reproduced at all levels
of administration in an executive and judicial body melded
together - King and Council of the Indies; Viceroy and
Audencia; Governor or Corregidor and Cabildo.
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^

Each

nominally judicial body shared power with the executive but,
the executive was always superior and the ultimate decisions
were his.

All decisions, however, even those of the viceroy
112

were required to be submitted to the Council of the Indies
and needed the ultimate approval of the King.^6^

Although

the viceroys were the superordinate authorities in the
colonies, many other officials were not chosen by them and
thus, could not be removed by them.

The fact that any

official could independently petition the King directly,
created havoc with the authority of the viceroys^^®, while
the great deal of overlapping of administrative responsibility
created conflict that could only be solved by appeal to the
King and Council.^67
Of more interest here is the local administration which
had to deal with the everyday life of colonial America.
Provincial governors and corregidores (they were generally
synonymous if not in title, then in function and powers) were
appointed either by the monarch or viceroy, with the consent
of the Council.

These administrators combined in their hands

the distribution of local justice and the local police
ICO

power.

The corregidor of both Spanish and Indian towns

presided over the cabildo and was given the authority to
intervene in its affairs.
Although originally appointed by the viceroy and audencia,
corregidores and other local officials were later appointed
predominantly by the monarch as, in an attempt to supplement
the hard pressed treasury, more and more colonial offices were
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sold.

169

As such offices were sold, they came to be seen more

and more as means to grow rich.

Favoritism towards certain

colonists who could pay grew rampant as it was local officials
who could help or hinder one's access to the great resources
controlled by the bureaucracy.

Higher bureaucrats */ere not

immune from this sort of corruption as, according to Stanley
and Barbara Stein, "...they strove for consensus among con
flicting groups on the basis of bribery not equity.

In this

fashion powerful interests in effect manipulated viceroys who
found in colonial office economic opportunities lacking in the
metropolis."17 0
Two important points should now be clear from the above
brief description of the Spanish American colonial regime.
One is the absence of capitalist production.

The other is

the important role played by the Imperial bureaucracy in the
regulation and distribution of land, labor and trade.
The goals of the crown in the settling of the Americas
were always geared towards the needs of the Spanish State.
From the earliest settlement of the Caribbean islands as
simple trading entrepots to the discovery and exploitation of
the vast silver mines of New Spain and Peru, there was no
intention on the part of the Spanish State to create in
America, or Spain for that matter, a capitalist economy.
Many commentators have, in fact, pointed to the debilitating
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effects of the large bullion infusions on the nascent capi
talist sectors in Spain after the American discoveries.1?1
For the varied forms of social relations of production tribute, unpaid personal service (or serf) labor, forced
'wage labor', slave labor, debt peonage and guild labor coupled with economic monopoly in land, trade and manufacture
based on political privilege obtained legally or through
graft - to be considered 'capitalist' is to define capitalism
as a useful concept out of existence.

As Gongora points out,

"...eighteenth century society (in Spanish America) cannot be
described as 'bourgeois' in any sense of the word, if one
bears in mind, for example, that in addition to this more or
less compulsory attachment to the land Negro slavery still
persisted as an i n s t i t u t i o n . .172
For those who point to the highly commercialized nature
of Spanish colonial society as an indication of the presence
of capitalism, we need only to point out the conditions of
production under which the commodities traded were produced
and the limited extent of exchange.

As indicated above, the

bulk of goods produced in Spanish America for trade either
to Spain or within the colonies were produced under non
capitalist relations of production.

Legal trade, and a good

deal of contraband trade, dealt in the transfer of bullion
for European goods, while internal trade dealt '
, in the
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provisioning of mines, or cities which were basically adminis
trative centers devoid of any production t h e m s e l v e s . M o s t
people in fact provided for themselves and had access to the
means subsistence, no matter how tenuous or inadequate.

The

reports from various areas in the colonies of labor shortages
in the 18th century, coupled with reports of widespread
1

*7 A

vagrancy indicate a very low level of proletarianization.
Although large numbers of Indians were tied to the market
economy* through the need to raise cash for taxes and goods
forced upon them by corregidores, and/or by producing goods
sold in Spanish markets, they always maintained, in some
measure, their own communal social relations of production.
They became 'market creatures' only to the extent that
they had t o .
Spaniards and creoles were interested in profit and
becoming wealthy, yet the compulsion to profit was dramatically
different than would appear in a capitalist economy.

In a

society in which a seigniorial ideal prevailed, to make it,
to be successful required one to approximate the aristocratic
ideal of becoming a lord of the l a n d . ^ ^

Wealth acquired in

trade, mining, farming, graft, tribute and bureaucratic
employment went into the purchase of land and titles of
nobility to enhance one's social status, or the purchase of
bureaucratic positions as a naans to the other two.
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The logic

of interminable accumulation as an end in itself, the hallmark
of a capitalist ethic, never pervaded Spanish colonial society.
The varied systems of social relations of production and
land tenure which existed in the colonial era were made
possible by the Spanish Imperial bureaucracy.

The regulation

and distribution of privileged access to the important
resources and trade of the colonies prevented competition for
these from breaking out into open conflict between the various
owning classes by displacing it to one between the colonists
and the bureaucracy.

Further, the reproduction of the various

labor systems required the intervention of the State at some
point.

It must be remembered that the colonial elite was

always relatively small in numbers in relation to the large,
mostly alien, population and thus force and ideology were the
primary means of extracting surplus labor.

These were provided

by the bureaucracy through law, the church, and police
(militia and army).
Regardless of how corruptand tied to creole interests
the bureaucracy became during the 17t.h century, the legitimacy
of the bureaucracy was never challenged by colonials or
Spaniards.

Disputes with and within the bureaucracy occurred

quite naturally in a system in which overlapping hierarchies,
shared jurisdiction and a combination of subservience and
autonomy prevailed*^ and where redress was sought by appeal
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to another or higher authority, or the paying off of crown
officials to look the other way.1-^

As John Leddy Phelan

suggests, the flexibility inspired in the expression 'I obey
but do not execute' permitted the bureaucracy wide latitude
in adjusting their actions to local conditions without,
however, de-legitimizing the system.1-^8
This flexibility was, in fact, the secret to the longev
ity of Spanish rule in America.

Its undermining by Bourbon

reformism in the late 18th century was to create much of the
tension that vented itself in the Wars of Independence and
upheavals of the first half of the 19t.h c e n t u r y . T h i s
flexibility created a highly centralized bureaucratic regime,
which overlaid a regional power structure that retained a
good deal of autonomy within it.

As 0. Carlos Stoetzer

claims, "The Spanish Empire in America was actually built on
the federative basis of its many towns and provinces".1-80
Regional autonomy was not alien to the Spanish political
experience.

Spain, the first of the centralized Absolutist

States, was itself only nominally centralized.

As the Steins

relate, "The marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, often con
sidered the birth of the modern Spanish State, resulted not
in the unification of the Kingdoms of Aragon and Castile but
in condominium in which the two parts of the 'Spanish Crown'
co-existed as separate entites with separate laws, taxation
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systems, coinage and trading patterns".1®!

Similarly the

Basque provinces, although associated with Castile, retained,
"...recognition of local privileges including freedom from
Castilian taxation and military recruitment and most striking
of all, maintenance of a customs frontier which gave the 'tax
exempt provinces' the status of foreign nation in trade with
Spain".I®2
What made this regionalism possible for so long, accord
ing to Perry Anderson, was "The supply of huge quantities of
silver from the Americas..."!®2

The Spanish State, unlike

other Absolutisms in Western Europe could "...dispense with
the slow fiscal and administrative unification which was a
pre-condition for absolutism elsewhere.

The stubborn recalci

trance of Aragon was compensated by the limitless compliance
of Peru".1®4

Herein lies the secret to the Spanish State's

relative autonomy from powerful, geographically based, classes.
The basis for this regionalism in the Spanish American
colonies, as in Spain, was the cabildo.

The town has always

been central to Spanish development and the same is true of
the colonies.185

Urban development in Spain has its origins

not as in Northern Europe with trade and the rise of the
bourgeoisie, but in conquest and the need to administer newly
acquired areas.

The town was the outpost of the central

power and its liberties were sanctioned as privileges

119

deriving from the King who permitted some amount of self
government.188

indeed, this balance of central State and

local autonomy crystalized only in the Spanish town.

In the

colonies, the first act of the conquistadors was to establish a
town and municipal government from which to administer the
newly conquered territory.

All social, political and economic

life revolved around the town as it provided the basis for the
exploitation of the surrounding countryside.18?

Much like

medieval Italian City States, the colonial town included more
than just the town proper as its administrative and economic
authority extended deep into the surrounding area.
During the first half of the 16th century, the cabildos
wielded enormous power.188

Their decline in the subsequent

period, usually associated with the sale of offices and the
system of corregimiento,189 does not necessarily indicate the
triumph of the central bureaucratic administration in con
trolling regional autonomy but rather the co-opting of the
bureaucracy to regional interests.

It is no surprise therefore

that cabildos re-generated in the latter half of the 18th
century when the collusion of powerful local interests and the
colonial bureaucracy was attacked and reformed by the Bourbon
monarchy.190
The 17th century decline in mining and trade with Spain,
coupled with the rise of fairly self-sufficient and prosperous

1?0

economies in the colonies, is often cited as an indication that
the colonies wrested their economies from the clutches of the
Spanish crown.^91

Such conclusions misunderstand the objec

tives of the Spanish State.

The colonial economies and their

relationship to Spain were always the result of the interest
of the Spanish State.

That interest in the 16th century was

the quest for European imperium.

When that failed in the 17th

century, it became holding (unsuccessfully) what it had won
in the previous century.^®**

War was expensive and, although

the burden of taxation was felt most in Castile, the bullion
from America made these adventures possible.^93
With hindsight, it is easy to see disaster in these
policies but, according to the assumptions of the State, they
were undeniably in its interest.

First, in the exploitation

of the colonies for its benefit the State contracted out the
resources of the colonies to individuals and groups, satisfied
that through their efforts it would be able to skim sufficient
revenues off the top.

This technique had worked admirably

during the re-conquest and, in America, closer crown super
vision never allowed the rise of an aristocracy as had occurred
in Spain.

The Stats was uninterested in all occupations but

mining and the wealth that could be accrued from it and thus
kept tight control over that sector.-^4

Its indifference to

all other production and areas of the Empire is clear.
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In the

Caribbean and other strategic-defensive areas of the Empire
no effort was made to develop the resources or substantially
halt the development of resources in those areas.

Paraguay

was, for the most part, given over tothe administration of
Jesuit missionaries, much to the chagrin of the other
colonists and bureaucrats alike.

Chile provided Peru with a

buffer against the hostile Indian tribes to the south.
Argentina held Spanish claims to the Atlantic coast against
the Portuguese while serving as a dam to prevent Peruvian
silver from illegally leaving America.

The Caribbean Islands

served as strategic way stations for the silver flotilas.
The fact that prosperous economies grew in these neglected
areas as a result of inattentiveness or, in the main areas
of colonization by supporting the mining economy, was a
result of crown policies, not their abrogation.
That Spain did not participate in this prosperity
through colonial imperialism is related more to the fact that
it could not, given the underdevelopment of its own economy
which itself had been ravished by the bullionist policies of
the State, than to the colonials wresting control of their
economies themselves.

This becomes clear in the 18th century

when, through the Bourbon economic and administrative reforms
in Spain, Spain began to develop the kind of economy that
could take advantage of its colonies.
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With the adjustment

of the Spanish economy through the actions of the Bourbon
State, Spain began to institute a new policy of imperialism
in America based, not on the extraction of precious metals,
but rather a more modern trade imperialism.
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CHAPTER IV

THE BOURBON REFORM ERA:

THE MODERN ABSOLUTIST

STATE IN COLONIAL SPANISH AMERICA

The Eourbon reforms of the latter half of the 3 8th
century and che Wars of Independence are crucial to an
understanding of the origin of the underdevelopment in
ISth century Spanish America.

A re-invigorated Spanish

State, now under the direction of a modernizing Bourbon
dynasty attempting to readjust the relationship between
Spain and America on a basis of 'trade imperialism'
intensified old tensions and conflicts held in check by the
Imperial bureaucracy and, at the same time, introduced new
tensions and conflicts.

The new policies of the Bourbons

not only called for a readjustment of the economic relation
ship berween Spain and America but, more importantly, a
political readjustment.

In order to give the State adminis

tration greater extractive capability, the balance between
central State bureaucracy and local interests had to be done
away with.

Bourbon re-centralization in the form of the

Intendencies destroyed that balance and led to a crisis of
136

legitimacy which was only worsened by the fall of the Royal
government in Spain during the Napoleonic Wars.

This crisis

of legitimcy, characterized as it was by tensions and con
flicts between elements of the old Hapsburg bureaucracy and
the new Bourbon bureaucracy, and compounded by tensions and
conflicts caused by economic reforms (particularly trade and
taxation), could not be contained once the basis of the
regime, the monarchy, was removed with the abdications of
Charles IV and Ferdinand VII.
The Wars of Independence were less liberation struggles
against Spain than they were civil wars between the elites in
Spanish America.

With the legitimacy the Crown conferred

upon the bureaucracy in Spanish America removed, the admin
istration itself became a battleground for contending economic
and political interests.

This fact explains the more con

fusing aspects of the 'liberation* struggle in Spanish America.
On the one hand it has been seen as progressive, as an attempt
to go further in the direction of the Enlightenment both
politically and economically.

According to this view, the

Bourbon reforms only whetted the appetites of the creoles
for economic development2 and their contact with the political
ideas of the Enlightenment only spurred them on to seek
greater political freedom, ultimately moving them in the
direction of political independence.^
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On the other hand,

the struggle has also been seen as reactionary, a revolt
against the 'new Absolutism* of the Bourbons which destroyed
the symbiotic relationship between the Spanish colonial
bureaucracy and local interests.

This of course included

economic interests which, hurt by Bourbon economic reforms,
sought a return to the previous restricted system of trade
and labor control by which they had profited.
The conflict

and instability of 19th

America had its origin

in the breakdown of

4

century Spanish
the legitimacy

of the State during the Bourbon reform period and the civil
warfare of the Wars of Independence.

Nineteenth century

conflict and instability were indications that the civil war
had not ended with

the winning of independence.

was exacerbated by

the fact that the State

prize of political conflict.

In fact, it

itself was the

Neither the Hapsburgs nor the

Bourbons left to the Spanish Americans any workable formula
for the creation of the class solidarity necessary to create
a legitimate State.

How these conflicts were worked out and

the State re-built in the various Spanish American countries
bears more on the origin of underdevelopment in Spanish Amer
ica than any recourse to explanations which emphasize inter
national trade.

A brief analysis of the Bourbon reforms here,

and the Wars of Independence in the subsequent chapter, will
lay the foundation for a discussion of the 19th century
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origins of Spanish American underdevelopment.

The Bourbon Reforms & Spanish Americas Response
The 17th century decline of Spain in relation to coun
tries which had become more powerful, not by sitting on a
lode of silver, but by encouraging capitalistic development,
reached its nadir by the turn of the century.

The decadence

and infertility of the latter Hapsburgs mirrored the similar
fate of Spain as more powerful neighbors, principally France
and England, stripped it of its European Empire and imposed
a new dynasty upon the State.

The new Bourbon monarchy how

ever began a process of reform which it hoped would reverse
the decline.

This reform program closely followed the ex

perience of French Bourbon absolutism, centralizing political
power in a unitary bureaucratic system and stimulating trade
and production within and between Spain and Spanish America.^
Although a discussion of the Bourbon reforms in Spain itself
is beyond the scope of this study, some mention of them is in
order as their seeming success in Spain led to some of them
being transferred to America.
Most important among the reforms was political reform.
The Administrative and political confusion caused by early
unification was rectified.

Local autonomy, which had been

an important aspnot of Kapsburg absolutism, was obliterated
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by the incorporation of all the kingdoms of Spain (except for
the Basque Provinces) into one centralized bureaucracy.

Sep

arate administrations were suppressed in Valencia in 1707,
Aragon in 1711, Catalonia in 1716, and Majorca in 1715.
Bureaucratic direction was centralized in the Council of
Castile in 1707 and, at the local level, in regional Intendents in 1749.6

The Intendents were anned with broad fiscal

and military authority and, it was hoped, would stimulate
trade and production by reducing internal trade barriers.?
During the reign of Charles III (1759-1788) the pace of
reform in Spain quickened and in America was begun in earnest.
As Spain suffered military and strategic reverses in its
alliance with France against Great Britain, the need for
economic reform with the aim of generating greater revenues
for the state became clearly apparent.

In Spain, the State

encouraged greater agricultural and manufacturing production
while loosening the bindings which held trade in the hands of
the Cadiz monopolists.

During the later half of the 18th

century, Spain's long moribundtextile industry revived and
began organizing production on a truly capitalist basis.9
Other manufacturing was encouragedlO while agriculture,
principally grains and Mediterranean crops, such as olive
oil, wine and fruits, were given impetus.H

Both internal

and external trade were encouraged, particularly with the
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American colonies, yet in neither case was the 19th century
type 'free trade' practiced.

Trade was highly protectionist,

geared towards the economic and industrial development of
Spain .12
As with all early capitalist development, the role of
the State was extremely important in Spain during this period.
Though hardly an example of a successful State induced trans
formation^, it was, nevertheless, a genuine effort within
the context of the aims of the State.

The Bourbon reforms

in America and Spain, it should be emphasized, were aimed at
shoring up the State in the face of internal and external
challenges, not economic development in itself or the greater
well being of the incipient bourgeoisie.

In fact, the

Spanish State under the Bourbons was invariably an aristo
cratic State.

Although the economic reforms encouraged the

formation and growth of the bourgeoisie and increased the
administrative and fiscal powers of the bureaucracy, the
aristocracy was not ignored.

Between 1768 and 1797 the

numbers who could claim nobility was reduced by the crown
by 43%, lending greater prestige and exclusivity to the
higher nobility .14

Its dominance in landownership, social

prestige and high bureaucratic position was never challenged .15
Although Bourbon political and economic reforms in
Spain may be interpreted as an effort to encourage capitalist
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development in the interest of the State a la the French
Bourbons, the reforms as applied to Spanish America must be
seen in a different light.

Only Spain was to form the basis

for a capitalist core nation - Spanish America was to be its
colony and fuel its growth.

The Bourbon reforms in Spanish

America were not its 'capitalist revolution' - they were its
introduction to capitalist colonialism.
The keystone of the whole Bourbon reform program then
was the policy to readjust the political and economic rela
tionship of Spain to her American possessions.

The Bourbons

sought to impose a capitalist colonial policy on the
Americans.

Spain’s economy would be stimulated by a trade in

which the Americans produced raw materials for 'factory' Spain
while providing her industries with a protected market.
Production and trade thus stimulated, the State's revenues,
through taxation, monopoly and investment, would expand.

Yet,

in order to achieve this result economic reform alone was not
enough.

Given the enormous role played by the bureaucratic

machinery in the economy, political administrative reform
became imperative.

Below, X shall examine these reforms in

broad outline, not in order to evaluate their success or
failure, as this does not affect the thesis presented here, but
rather to indicate the nature and degree of tensions and
conflicts they produced and which were to carry over into the
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early national period and exacerbate the formation of new
States in Spanish America.
Given the close connection between the State and the
economy in 18th century Spanish America it i 3 impossible to
separate political and economic reforms - all political re
forms had an economic content and all economic reforms had a
political content.

Chief among the reforms in South America

proper was the geo-administrative reorganising of the Empire.
Out of the Viceroyalty of Peru was carved two additional
major administrative centers - the Viceroyalty of New
Granada in 1739, and the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata
in 1776.

Of the two, the establishment of the latter was

more important both from the Crown's point of view and in
terms of the effect it had in creating conflict.

Peru not

only lost administrative and economic hegemony over the la
Plata region (modern day Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay)
which was virtually worthless, but also the valuable region
called Upper Peru (modern day Bolivia) which held the rich
silver producing mines at Potosi.1^

Not only was a good deal

of the silver of Upper Peru redirected towards Buenos Aires
but long established trade networks for the provisioning of
the mines and interregional trade between Lower Peru and
western Argentina were disrupted.

In addition, bureaucratic

posts, particularly lucrative spots in Upper Peru, were made
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more difficult to acquire by the scores of office seekers in
the once supreme Viceregal center at Lima.

In John Fisher's

words, "The double blow of commercial and territorial reor
ganization threatened the interests of the powerful merchant
and office holding groups as well as the general prosperity
of the Viceroyalty
The Crown's purpose in elevating the la Plata region to
Viceregal status was military-defensive as well as adminis
trative-economic.

Fearing attack of the rich interior pro/

vinces through the back door of the Rio de la Plata by
Portugal (Great Britain's ally) Charles III sent a large
military expedition with Pedro de Cevallos, the first Viceroy
of the Rio de la Plata, to dislodge the Portuguese from their
stronghold at Colonia del Sacramento directly across the
river from Buenos A i r e s . ^

The Viceroyalty was made to

include the rich provinces of Upper Peru because it obviously
would not have been viable otherwise.

Even as a small pre-

viceregal colony, Buenos Aires required a subsidy from the
Lima treasury.

With the increased expense of becoming a

Viceregal center, some tributary area had to be attached.
Herbert Klein has shown that fiscally, even with the increased
taxes imposed by the Bourbons and greater prosperity created
by the quickening of economic activity induced by 'comercio
libre', the province of Buenos Aires would never have been
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able to support a Viceregal administration without the reve
nues provided by Potosi.3-9

Yet, although not fiscally

profitable, a large amount of trade was funneled through
Buenos Aires which, presumably, stimulated the Spanish economy
and thus provided increased revenue to the Spanish State.20
Regardless of what other results they produced, the
Bourbon reforms in America were designed to increase revenue
for the Spanish State.

Fiscal and economic-trade reforms were

crucial and will be discussed presently, but more important,
if this goal was to be met, was administrative-political re
form.

The Crown perceived that if it was to be successful

in harnessing the wealth of America for the benefit of the
Spanish State, the close relationship between local interests
and its bureaucracy in America had to be broken.

The new

forms of surplus extraction required administrators who were
less tied to local interests than the Hapsburg type bureau
crats and thus, a bureaucratic reorganization of both
hierarchy and personnel was called for.
The creation of Intendencies throughout Spanish America
by 178623-, was designed to root out corruption in the Imperial
bureaucracy which the Bourbon reformers believed stood in the
way of the Spanish State's fuller exploitation of the colo
nies.

Juan de Ulloa, an early reform minded bureaucrat found,

in the Peru of the 1750's, that from the corregidores on up to
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the Viceroy a trail of corruption in which administrators were
paid off for favors was endemic and led to bad governemnt .22
Similar charges of corruption can be found, especially with
regard to the corregidores and alcaldes mayores, in the
visitas of Jos^ de Galvez to New Spain and Antonio de Areche
to Peru .23

Though modern historians have generally agreed with

the Bourbon reformers' characterizations of the relationship
between the Hapsburg bureaucracy and creole interests as being
corrupt, it is hardly a fair evaluation and gives the impres
sion that there was something 'wrong' with the system.

From

another perspective though, that of the Spanish American
creoles, there was a good deal that was 'right' with the'
system.

For them, it was functional and did not constitute

a corruption of the system - it was the system.24

James Scott

has observed this apparent paradox and has argued that such
'recurring acts of violence and corruption are thus more
successfully analyzed as normal channels of political activity
than as cases of deviant pathology ..."25

What the Crown would

find by attempting to close off this channel of political ex
pression and reduce the creoles to the status of subservient
colonials was grumbling, resistence, and the sabotaging of
its policies.
The major 'evil' the Intendents were supposed to rectify
was the corregimiento.

They were also to tighten up on the
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collection of taxes and to stimulate production and trade in
their provinces.

The corregidores (alcaldes mayores in New

Spain) were royal officials who supplemented their meager
salaries (when they were paid at all) through repartimiento
or the forced sale of goods, to Indians in their districts.26
In order to pay for these goods the Indians were forced either
to work the lands of local hacendados to whom the corregidor
would distribute such labor, or to grow cash crops on their
own land which could be sold in Spanish markets (these pro
ducts were of course not sold in the market by the Indians
themselves but by the corregidor, who acted as a middleman,
making profits for himself).27

The repartimiento served two

important functions in the colonial economy.

First, it con

nected the Indians to the Spanish economy and provided mer
chants with a ready market for their goods.

Second, it

forced the Indians to produce for the Spanish economy at
below subsistence renumeration ,ihus assuring Spaniards and
creoles any Indian produced surplus.

Connected to this

system were merchants, landowners and other bureaucrats who
may have had money tied up in this trade or who profited by
looking the other way.

It was in fact one of the major

surplus-appropriation tools of the colonial era.
Corregidores also collected Indian tribute due the
crown since it was established in 1579.
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Corregidores tended,

though, to cheat both the crown and the Indians by preparing
double tribute lists - one for themselves, and one for the
Crown.

The corregidor's list was much longer than the Crown's

and thus, the corregidor could skim off a good portion of what
was owed to the crown.28

in fact, in New Spain Gcflvez esti

mated that 50% of the Indian tribute was pocketed by alcaldes
mayores. 29
The instituting of the Intendencies which were designed
to end these abuses and provide greater revenue for the Crown
has been characterized by Stanley Stein as 'internal free
trade'.20

Through the elimination of the corregidores and

their repartimiento,trade with the Indians was to become open
for many small traders, reducing prices for the Indians and
stimulating greater production on their part.

The monopoly

of the corregidores was to be broken and the Indians
attached to the colonial economy directly through the market.31
The tribute tax would be collected for the benefit of the
Crown, not the corregidor and his cohorts.

In addition, all

other taxes, principally the Royal fifth and alcabala (sales
tax) would fall under the supervision of the Intendents with
the aim of eliminating

f r a u d

.32

The instituting of Intendencies in America was subjected
to resistence in both Spain and America.

In Spain, it is

clear that the reform was blocked at every step by those
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whose interests (both political and economic) would be ad
versely affected by it.33

Although Galvez first proposed

Intendencies for New Spain in 1768, it was not until 1782
that the reform was brought to America, and then only in the
new Viceroyalty of Bio de la Plata.

It was not until 1786

that the reform was established where Galvez had originally
proposed it - New Spain, the richest and most populous
colony.34
More important though, was the opposition the Inten
dencies engendered, and the tensions and conflicts they
created in Spanish America.

Resentment against this new

and powerful layer of bureaucracy was immediate within the
old Hapsburg bureaucracy.

Viceroys and Audencias did not

take the reduction of their powers and status

gracefully

.35

Disputes and conflicts arose immediately between Viceroys
and Superintendents who were to take over the fiscal adminis
tration of the Viceroyalties.36

This reduction of the fiscal

authority of the Viceroys was recinded and the Superinten
dencies abolished when the intransigence of the Viceroys
made the new system unworkable.3?

Conflicts between Viceroys

and Intendents over jurisdiction became endemic, with Viceroy
Croix of Peru recommending, in 1789, the abolition of the
Intendency and the restoration of the

Corregimiento.

38

The

Audencias, Royal law courts whose role included administra-
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tive and consultative functions, similarly resisted and sub
verted the reform.

John Lynch argues that, "The introduction

of the Intendents into Upper Peru provoked a reaction on the
part of the Audencia (of Charcas) which completely shattered
the united front of Spanish Government in this part of the
Empire, and created a tension which contributed in no small
way to the undermining of the colonial regime in Upper
Peru ".39

Since the Intendents had judicial jurisdiction at

the local level, it was inevitable that a clash between these
institutions would develop, especially when one saw in the
establishment of the other a diminution of its jurisdiction
and status.40
If the establishment of the Intendencies distressed
the older elements of the Spanish American bureaucracy, it
distressed merchants and large landowners even more.

With

the abolition of the corregimiento, these important elements
of colonial society could see only ruin.

Not being able to

legally compel them to pay or labor, merchants withdrew credit
from their trade with the Indians while landowners, who had
profited through labor distributions made to them by
corregidors, lost a source of free labor.4^

In New Spain, for

example, cochineal and cotton production and trade declined
dramatically with the abolition of the repartimiento .42
The crux of the problem was that the Indians would not
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work for the Spaniards or creoles without some compulsion
being exerted by the authorities.

True, tributes were raised

and better collected, but repartimiento directed Indian labor
into projects and production the Spaniards and creoles de
sired - abolition made this all the more difficult.

In the

colonies there was sustained protest throughout the last quater of the 18th century against the abolition.of repartimien
t o .43

It never really died out in the colonial era though.

Subdelegates, subordinates of the Intendents who often were
creoles {and many times former corregidores), continued the
practice of repartimiento although in a less formalized and
more intermitent way .44

These subdelegates, due to their

very low salaries (5% of tribute collected ),45 continued
repartimiento but, at least in the Peruvian sierra, they used
it simply as a means of supplementing their meager wages by
the forced sale of goods, not as a means of forcing Indian
labor into the colonial economy.

They therefore, in John

Fisher's words, "...contented themselves with making them
(the Indians) pay for goods without bothering about how they
obtained the money.

As a result, many communities which had

been relatively prosperous were now stripped of their wealth
and property"4®

In the end, the formal abolition of

repartimiento satisfied very few in Spanish America.

Rather,

it only worsened old tensions and conflicts and created new
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ones.

Merchants, landowners, Intendents, Subdelegates,

Indians and reformers found in the new situation only chaos.
The relationship between the Intendents and the cabildos
is more problematic than that between them and the Viceroys or
Audencias.

According to most observers, the cabildos were in

a state of decline and decadence when the Intendencies were
instituted.47

i*he Intendents are generally given credit for

reviving the cabildos and, by inference, giving them the
strength to perform a very important and leading role in the
independence struggles.

Intendents did have much to do with

the revival of the cabildos as important administrative and
political institutions.

Where town governments had dis

appeared, Intendents re-established them.

Where interest in

serving on them was weak, Intendents forced service upon the
citizens.

Where town revenues were sparse and inadequate,

Intendents found new sources of income.48
In the early years of the Intendencies evaluations of
Intendents by these newly revived cabildos were generally
favorable.

Town life had greatly improved with the greater

civic activity and revenues of municipal g o v e r n m e n t . A f t e r
about the first 15 years of the Intendency, though, the rela
tionship between the Intendents and the cabildos deteriorated
and became conflictual .50

The most common explanations of

this phenomena have been, on the one hand the poorer qualtiy
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of Intendents under the administration of Charles IV and
Godoy52, and on the other hand, the rising aspirations of the
cabildos once they had been revived by the Intendents .^2

In

both these explanations there is some truth, but there was
more to the revival of the cabildos than this.

Magali

Sarfatti and 0. Carlos Stoetzer have argued that the revival
of the cabildos has a great deal to do with the diminuation
of creole presence and influence in the Spanish colonial
bureaucracy proper.

As creoles lost influence and position

there, the cabildos once again became important as representa
tives of creole

interests.

53

in fact, Stoetzer sees a direct

relationship between creole exclusion from viceregal office
and the revival of the cabildos.54

There can be no doubt,

however, that Crown officials directed creole influence and
energies into the cabildos in order to better control them.
While creole influence increased within the authorityweak cabildos, it decreased in other, more powerful insti
tutions.

In Lima, for example, after having dominated the

Viceregal administration through an overwhelming majority on
the Audencia and in other offices, the creole share of offices
decreased throughout the Bourbon period.55

The Crown, its

other reforms apparently threatened by such dominance, began
a policy of exclusion against creoles for bureaucratic office
in America.

The newly formed Audencias of Buenos Aires and
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Cuzco were made up of peninsulares with one exception^® and
creole representation on the Audencias of Lima57 and Mexico
City58 was systematically reduced.

As the Bourbons:

tightened the screws on creole placemen, it became more and
more difficult to secure a bureaucratic position.

Few

creoles were allowed to become Intendents, and even access
to lower bureaucratic positions was denied the creoles.
Although Jacques Barbier has shown that, at least in Chile,
however, creole influence could survive and even thrive in
such an atmosphere given the peninsular and creole tendency
to create family alliances .59

Even though creoles still

held a preponderance of bureaucratic offices in the lower
ranks towards the end of the colonial era, the perception
that the tide had turned against them and that promotion
into the higher bureaucracy would be closed to them caused
deep resentments against peninsulares.

The introduction of

the Intendencies only hardened their displeasure as they saw
a new wave of peninsulares take posts which they felt they
should have by right .60

Creoles in fact were demanding they

get all the bureaucratic positions in America5^ and Juan Egaffa,
a contemporary, claimed that exclusion from high office was
one of the major reasons for the Wars of

Independence.

62

Administrative reforms under the Bourbons began a shift
away from the Church as a major prop of the colonial system
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in favor of the military.®-*

The first attack on the Church

was, of course, the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767.

The

Jesuits, who disputed the 'divine rights' doctrine of
absolutist kings, supported the universal monarchy concept
of the Pope and, resisted the secularizing of political power
in Spain.
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Their overwhelming influence in the Spanish

American society, economy and educational system thus made
them formidable competitiors to Charles Ill's drive for com
plete control of the colonies.®®

Their expulsion not only

removed this threat, it also freed up a great deal of Jesuit
owned land which the Crown sold for its own profit.®®
Reaction to the expulsion by most Spanish Americans
was outrage (although in Paraguay, because the Jesuits so
dominated the economy, the creoles supported the expulsion).
Of the 650 Jesuits expelled from New Spain, 450 were native
creoles ®7 and riots immediately broke out in Guanajuato,
San Luis Potosi and San Luis de la Paz
was widespread .69

while resentment

In New Spain D.A. Brading writes,

"...the Visitation (of Galvez) and the Expulsion marked a
turning-point in relations between the Spanish monarchy and
that small colonial establisment which had hitherto governed
Mexico " .70
Diminution of Church influence and power did not end
there.

Throughout the latter half of the 18th century, the
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Church saw itself subjected to greater ignomies.

In 1753,

the religious clergy lost the right to occupy parishes in
Indian villages?!, while in 1774, tithe collection in the
colonies was taken away from the Church and given to the Royal
bureaucracy .?2

The establishment; of the Intendencies also

diminished the status of the Church by subjecting it locally
to the patronato of the Intendents .?3

Intendents, directly

responsible for the construction and maintenance of Churches
and cemetaries, the conduct of the clergy and the collection
of tithes, created tensions not only between them and the
clergy, but also within the clergy between the lower clergy,
directly supervised by the Intendents, and the upper clergy,
supervised only by the Viceroys.?^
In addition to these affronts to the clergy, a con
scious policy of reducing their fueros (special privileges
which prevented their being brought before secular courts)
was undertaken.

For many of the lower clergy who suffered

on meager pay, the loss of the fuero was an outright attack
on the only social distinction they held .75
The reduction of the status of the clergy affected both
upper and lower clergymen but, for later developments, the
feelings of the lower clergy are more important.

Recruited

predominantly from creole families in economic adversity,
the lower clergy was filled with creoles who seethed at their
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misfortune.

Victims of downward social mobility, many creoles

found in the Church the last bulwark between them and social
oblivion.^

New attacks on the Church and its status only

made them more alienated from the system and ripe for
oppositional a c tion.^
The administrative reforms of the Bourbons were made
necessary by their attempt to create out of their American
possessions 'real colonies' which would benefit Spain.

The

administrative reforms though, were designed to work together
with commercial and fiscal reforms which were geared towards
the extraction of greater surpluses from the colonies.
These commercial and fiscal reforms have been viewed by
historians as the most important aspects of the Bourbon
reforms.

They were seen by contemporaries, on the one hand,

to have caused criticism and protest for disrupting a per
fectly well run system and, on the other to have not gone far
enough and thus, provided the impetus for the Wars of Inde
pendence.^®

This apparent paradox only indicates the very

real tensions and conflicts they created in Spanish colonial
society and points to the origin of conflicts within the
colonial elite which were to continue into the national
period.79
The thrust of the commercial reform - 'comercio libre'was to abolish restriction and monopoly in the Spanish trade
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with the American colonies.

Between 1765 and 1776 tariffs

were lowered, the monopoly of Cadiz and Seville abolished and
other Spanish ports allowed to trade with the Caribbean.
When, in 1778,

'comercio libre' was extended to the mainland

and formalized, Buenos Aires, Peru and Chile were added.

In

1789 Venezuela, whose trade had hitherto been the exclusive
monopoly of the Caracas Company, and New Spain, the wealthiest
colony in America, were integrated into the system,®®
Though by 1789,

'comercio libre' was geographically

unlimited within the Spanish Empire, trade between Spanish
America and foreign ports was strictly prohibited.

Although

a wide range of foreign goods were sold in Spanish America by
Spanish merchants, these were subject to high duties both on
arrival in Spain and then again in the colonies.®*

These

restrictions were, of course, little different from those of
other colonial powers.®2

As John Fisher argues, "...it was

typical of the general European pattern of the period ...".83
With 'comercio libre' no longer were Spanish merchants
and creole producers bound to the inefficient fleet system.
Goods could be shipped to and from America at any time and a
larger number of ports could send and receive goods.

Trade

between Spain and America expanded dramatically, though not
as dramatically as Baring's estimate of a 700% increase®4, and
Spanish goods, which at the end of the 17th century made up
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only 15% of the goods exported to America, rose to more than
50% of the goods sold by 1792.8^

The system though, did not

change overnight and, up till the end of the colonial era,
the traditional pattern of trade continued to survive.

In

Spain, c/diz continued to dominate the export traded, while
in America, although Buenos Aires did become a major port,
Vera Cruz (Mexico City) and Callao (Lima) still remained the
major import and export c e n t e r s . 8?
In America,

'comercio libre* had differing effects on

the various classes and geographic areas but, in all cases,
it was to cause controversy, tension, and conflict.

In Peru

and New Spain which had been the chief beneficiaries of the
old monopoly system, the Consulados of Mexico City and Lima
were loud in their denunciation of the new system of trade .88
Few were, however, ruined by 'comercio libre* because the
bulk of trade still passed through the large merchant houses
in Cadiz where the Mexico City and Lima merchants had superior
contacts.8®

Nevertheless, these merchants who had once

monopolized all of the American trade now had to put up with
competition from new men who geared their operations to the
new market conditions .®8
In New Spain, the crown established new Consuldados
in Vera Cruz and Guadalajara, and Vera Cruz became a new
major center of trade.®^

As the New Spain trade fell more
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and more into the hands of Vera Cruz merchants who expected
a smaller return on capital, the larger Mexico City merchants
accelerated their transformation into landowners and miners .92
The enormous increase of silver production in New Spain at
this time can, in large part, be attributed to the dramatic
rise of investment capital made available by merchants getting
out of commerce.

In Peru, competition came principally

from the merchant communities in Chile and Buenos Aires as
merchants in these colonies were granted their own Consulados

and thus captured a good deal of the trade that would have
been funneled through Lima.
Obviously the new conditions of trade tended to serve
the interests of some while hurting those of others.

The new

men of commerce, principally Basques and Montaneses, saw the
opening up of commerce as a great opportunity to get ahead
while the monopoly merchants found that the markets now con
stantly flooded with cheap goods undercut their previous
QA

practices and high profits.

’Commercio libre’ though, had

other, maybe more serious, effects in disrupting the American
economy and creating tensions and conflicts.

Many local

industries which had grown up in the colonies during the 16th
and 17th century period of mercantile neglect by Spain saw
themselves ruined by the competition from imported goods from

160

Spain.

In New Spain and Peru, the textile industry was hit

hard by the influx of Spanish textiles.

In Peru, the number

of textile obrajes was reduced by half by the end of the 18th
century, victims, to a large degree, of Spanish textiles
brought overland from Buenos Aires."

Textile production in

Quito and Tucuman similarly suffered.96

New Spain, by the

end of the 18th century, the textile industry in Queretaro
and Puebla was 'suffering crippling competition from exports
from E u r o p e " . W i n e production in western Argentina was all
but eliminated with the influx of Spanish aguardiente, and
any internal production which directly competed with goods
from Spain declined."
Other industries, particularly agricultural cash crops cacao, indigo, tobacco, coffee, cotton and hides, saw a
dramatic rise in their fortunes.

Yet, none was more impor

tant, as always, than silver mining.

Both of the principal

mining centers, Peru (also Upper Peru now in the Viceroyalty

s

of Rio de la Plata) and New Spain, saw a dramatic rise in
silver production in the last half of the 18th century.
fact,

In

'comercio libre' and colonial silver production fed

off one another as the main export of the colonies - used to
pay for the enormous rise in imports - was s i l v e r . "

Even

Buenos Aires, whose economy some argue rose on the basis of
the export of hides!", really lived off the silver it
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extracted from Upper Peru through its monopoly of trade .101
If commercial reforms were not enough to disrupt the
colonial economies, the Crown, following its plan of expanding
its extractive capability in America, increased the number,
rate and classes of people subject to Imperial taxes.

Not

only did the Spanish State seek to reap the bounty of mer
cantilist trade, it also sought the benefits of direct taxa
tion.

While many of the taxes and imposts which had held

back trade between Spain and America were lowered or
abolished^^, sales taxes, and tribute from the Indians and
castas were increased and better collected.

In the colonies,

Indian tribute rolls were reformed, adding many more tributees
and thus increasing total revenues.^03

in Peru, during the

Areche visitation (1777-1782), tribute collections jumped
1,000,000 pesos a year by 1778 to about 4,000,000 pesos and
to 5,838,852 pesos in

1 7 7 9^04

and capitation taxes were ex

tended, although unsuccessfully, to free blacks on the
coast.105

In New Spain, tribute which had averaged about

596,220 pesos a year during the 1760's jumped to 955,813
pesos in 1779.^06
The alcabala, or sales tax, which had hitherto been
farmed out to private individuals, was, in all the colonies
by 1776, collected by an army of Royal officials who, once
the Intendencies were established, were supervised
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exclusively by Peninsular Spaniards.10^

Customs houses,

staffed by paid Royal officials, now dramatically increased
the revenues taken in by the Crown through sales taxes.

108

In New Spain alone, total receipts rose from 1,488,690 pesos
in 1775 to 2,360,252 pesos in 1779 and later to about
3,000,000 pesos .109

In Peru, the alcabala was increased

from four to six per cent and, with the increasing efficiency
of the fiscal system, many merchants, landowners and miners
who had once escaped taxation found themselves forced to
pay .110
The commercial reforms and taxation policy of the
Bourbons clearly agitated social, economic and political
life in the Spanish American colonies.

Greater taxation

touched off tax revolts throughout the colonies, and a com
mercial system, through which the colonies were drained of
their surpluses, only exacerbated social relations between
all groups in colonial society.

In societies primarily

based upon subsistence production, where no fundamental
change in the mode of production had occurred but more sur
plus was extracted, it is not surprising that fairly violent
revolts by all classes would ensue.
Revolts, particularly of the lower classes, were cer
tainly not unknown in the period before 1750.

In fact, they

were quite common and understandable given the rigid class
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system of the colonial era.^^-

But, after 1700, and partic

ularly after 1750, the number of revolts grew with 32% of all
the revolts in the colonies occurring after 1750.

112

After

1750, tax revolts were endemic throughout the colonies.

In

1776 riots broke out in Santiago de Chile with the publica
tion of decrees reforming the tax system and these protests
ultimately led to the recinding of the decrees and the removal
of the Contador, Gonzalez B l a n c o , j n

1779,

free Pardos in

Lambayeque, Peru resisted the 'military contribution' imposed
upon them by Visitor Areche .114

Anti-tax revolts

also broke

out in New Spain^^, bUt were generally low pressure affairs
compared with those in the poorer colonies of South America.116
The most serious of the revolts occurred in the Vice
royalties of Peru and New Granada.

The more important of the

two revolts, the Tupac Amaru revolt in Peru, clearly indi
cated the pressures put upon the system of production by
Bourbon commercial and tax reforms.

The revolt, which burst

out on November 4, 1780 when Jos/ Gabriel Condorcanqui
(Tupac Amaru II), a curaca of Tinta, seized the Corregidor,
Antonio de Arriaga, charging him with extorting excess
repartimiento from the Indians and, ten days later, had him
executed.

117

The revolt spread rapidly throughout the sierra

and melded in with other revolts which were going on contem
poraneously.

On January 1, 1780 revolt broke out in
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Arequipa, while conspiricies were discovered in Cuzco,
Moquegua, Huancavelica, Huaraz

Pasco and La Plata.
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In

December 1780, Oruro in Upper Peru was taken over by Indians
*
and half-castes led by Jacincto Rodriguez, a wealthy Spanish
miner, while by January 1781 the Puno area was also in revolt*
In the La Paz region, an Aymara''Indian, Julian Apaza who took
the name Tupac Catari, initiated a seige of La Paz in the
middle of March 1781 and to the North, Tupac Amaru's nephew,
119

Andres, led a revolt in the corregiwiento of Larecaja .4"^3
Revolt spread elsewhere in the Viceroyalty, from Cuzco to
Tucuman and, by the end of 1781, it seemed that the whole
sierra was in revolt.

Though the Tupac Amaru revolt had

specific grievances against the system which included the
repartimiento, the corregidores, the mita, and the alcabala,
its extent and social make-up makes it more complex and indi
cates the wide dissatisfaction caused by the commercial and
fiscal measures taken by the Bourbons.12®
The Tupac Amaru revolt was not just a tax rebillion .121
The economy of the whole area of rebellion had been hit par
ticularly hard by administrative, commercial and fiscal re
forms.

By separating Upper Peru and Lower Peru which had,

up to the creation of the Viceroyalty of Rxo de la Plata in
1776, been one economic/commercial region, hardships were
created for all classes

122

while commercial reforms coupled
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with higher taxation siphoned the life blood out of the pro
ductive heart of Peru.

As tribute and taxes rose and were

sent to Lima, less and less of the surplus produced remained
in the sierra which must have caused merchants, landowners,
miners and corregidores to extract a greater surplus from
their laborers.

This explains the vacillation cf creoles

and Spaniards within and without the Tupac Amaru rebellion.
While the revolt addressed the grievances of all those ad
versely affected by the Bourbon reforms - the owning classes,
poor mestizos of some property, and Indians, - the movement
impossibly tried to hold such a contentious alliance together.
As the revolt strengthened and moved from success to success,
those who relied upon the State to insure their superior
economic and/or social position over the Indians, including
Indian curacas, very quickly moved from support or neutrality
to open opposition to the movement.*23
The Spanish State's response to the rebellion was not
to adjust the system in favor of Indian or creole grievances.
Although repartimiento and mita were abolished (only to arise
surrepticiously in a more destructive form - see p.

150 - 1 5 2 )

tribute collections rose and tax relief was nonexistent.
Imposed upon the sierra was the Intendent system while creoles,
now considered unreliable and potentially rebellious, were
watched over by regular Spanish troops .124
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In the Crown's

opinion, the creoles could no longer be trusted to administer
or protect its interests in the colonies.
The reaction o£ the Crown to the Tupac Amaru revolt
which was early abandoned by the sierra elite and became a
predominantly Indian rebellion was in sharp contrast to its
reaction to the Comunero Revolt which broke out in Socorro,
New Granada in March-April 1781.^25
revolt which brought an army of

^he impetus for the

20,000

creoles, mestizos and

Indians to threaten the capital of the Viceroyalty at Bogota*
was very similar to that of the Tupac Amaru revolt - taxes.
The grievances of the comuneros revolved around the imposi
tion of higher taxes, higher prices for tobacco and aguar
diente which had become Crown monopolies, and restrictions on
the growing of tobacco imposed by Visitor Gutierrez de
Pineres.

The alcabala was raised from four to six percent

with the addition of a sales tax for the Armada de Barlovento
(Windward Island Fleet) and was better collected with the
switch from tax farming to direct collection by royal offi
cials.

For the comuneros though, the reform of the tobacco

and aguardiente monopolies were a greater source of discon
tent,

The tobacco monopoly not only raised the price of

the good, outraging consumers, it also restricted its
growing throughout the colony.

Many small property owners

(who made up the bulk of the comuneros), therefore, lost the
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only cash crop they had.

Although restrictions on the pro

duction of aguardiente was not an issue, its price rise
coupled with that of tobacco was a main focus of popular
rage.
The Comunero Revolt began in March 1781 with tax riots
by the lower class people of Soccoro.

By April, a good por

tion of the elite of Soccoro had joined the rebellion and had
become its leadership.

The participation of the elite tempered

the riotous activities of the lower orders and made the re
bellion, in terms of property damage and loss of life, a low
gauge affair.

Under elite leadership, the Comunero Movement

became a coalition of upper class creoles, mestizos and
Indians (although the Indian component was infinitesimally
less important than in the Tupac Amaru revolt).

Uniting

the towns and villages along the road to Bogota* to the cause,
the Comunero leadership was able to get the Viceregal
authorities to capitulate to all their demands - fundamentally
the dismantling of the Bourbon reforms.
Once back in control though, the new Viceregal authori
ties, principally in the person of the new Viceroy Archbishop
Antonio Caballero y Gongora (who had negotiated the capitula
tion as Archbishop of Bogota*) began a process of pacification
which was in sharp contrast to the draconian measures taken
by the authorities in Lima in the wake of the Tupac Amaru
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rebellion.

The capitulations were annuled and the ringleaders

either exiled or made politically impotent, but tax relief was
granted in a reduction of the price of tobacco and aguardiente
and the suppression of the sales tax for the Armada de
Barlovento.

Because the elite of Socorro was so heavily in

volved in the rebellion, the new Viceroy's policy was aimed
at separating the elite from the lower classes so that such
a dangerous coalition never form again.

Harsh in its treat

ment of lower class leaders - the only one executed was
Jose*Antonio Galan a lower class leader - the Viceregal
authorities attempted to shepherd the creole elite back into
the Spanish fold through conciliation and compromise.
The Spanish State's distrust of American creoles led
it to seek a de facto alliance with groups it felt could
countervail the pretensions of the creoles.

Mestizos and

pardos who, under the 'society of castas', found themselves
locked into subordinate social positions began to be favored
by a new policy of the State.126
enough and

Though one had to be wealthy

few were so, a cedula de gracias al sacar which

conferred legal 'whiteness' on the bearer could be pur
chased.12^

in 1795, pardos who were granted cedulas de

gracias al sacar were authorized to receive an education, hold
public office and enter the Church.12®

Reaction to this

policy by creoles, especially in Venezuela where the black
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population clearly overwhelmed the white, was predictably
hostile.^ 9

Even though the 'society of castas' had been

breaking down through large numbers of mestizos and pardos
'passing', legalizing and encouraging the social mobility of
these groups was a threat to creole domination of the laboring
classes.1 ^

Bourbon alienation of Spanish American creoles con
tinued unabated into the begining of the 19th century when,
in 1804, pressed for revenues with which to fight his war
against Great Britain, Charles IV decreed the amortization of
Church held mortgages in the American colonies.

Known as the

rConsolidac.ion de Vales Reales', this policy sought to appro
priate the funds of pious foundations and chantries, paying
these funds 5% interest for the money 'borrowed'.131

The

calling in of these loans by the State had disastrous effects
on creole landowners, merchants and miners and had a depressing
effect on the whole colonial economy.^**2

As the Church had

been a major creditor for the colonials^^, few owners of
property were not affected.

Although the Crown did attempt

to soften the blow by requiring only 40-50% of the loan im
mediately, with the rest in installments over a 10 year
p e r i o d ! 3 4 f many landowners found it impossible to pay back

their loans on such short notice and many lost their
property.

To make matters worse, there were so many selling

property in search of hard cash that most properties were
sold for only a fraction of their real worth and a good deal
of property could find no buyers at all, ^ 5

In New Spain,

the richest colony, 12,000,000 pesos were siphoned out, with
smaller amounts from the other colonies

^he levy was so

onerous that while other colonies were beginning to revolt
against Spain with the abdications of Charles IV and
Ferdinand VII, the most loyal colony, Peru, asked only that
the amortization decree be recinded.^^
The revolts, protests and dissatisfaction with the
Bourbon reforms were not only with the reforms per se but also
with the style of rule which the new Bourbon administrators
brought with them.

Throughout the Hapsburg period and up to

the reign of Charles III, Spanish rule had always been media
ted through a bureaucracy in which creoles had some input.
As John Leddy Phelan has argued in the case of New Granada,
"Until the arrival of the regent visitor general, Gutierrez
de Pineres, the creoles were accustomed to a government of
compromise, concilliation and accomodation in which some
creoles actively participated in the decision making pro
cess" .13®

The, what Phelan calls, "Hapsburg system with its

complex blending of centralization and decentralization... "3-39
was abrogated by the Bourbon State by its uncompromising de
meanor .
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This change was indicative of the change in the philos
ophy of government brought about under the Bourbon rulers.
The Hapsburg Absolutist State's political philosophy, true
to its medieval origins, mirrored the later medieval thinkers,
principally Francisco sdarez who, following St. Thomas,
stressed the limitations on political power, the popular
origin of sovereignty, a kind of 'social contract' between
the people and their King, resistance to unjust rule and
government by consent under the rule of Natural Law.140
Thus, the King sought to be just to all of his subjects
and if his policies were unjust it was because they were
badly administered or the King did not understand local con
ditions.

If any of these conditions held, the King, intent

only on ruling justly, would adjust these policies.

In the

Spanish American context, during the Hapsburg era, if
colonial bureaucrats found great opposition to decrees or
policies of the Crown they would suspend them by 'obeying
but not executing1 them - acknowledging the legitimacy of the
King but recommending against the rules - and informing the
king as to the proper adjustments necessary to make them
just.141

Bourbon rule, on the other hand, reflected the idea

of the 'divine right of kings'.

According to this idea, of

which the regime of Louis XIV of France was the. consciously
emulated example fcr the Spanish Bourbons, the king's
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authority was derived from God, absolute, devoid of compromise
or consent.

All the orders of the king or his ministers re

quired unquestioning obedience, resistance to 'unjust*
policies forbidden as the aim of justice became secondary
to the achievment of order, peace and stability.^*2
This

constitutional innovation brought about by the

Bourbon reformers was to condition, more than any other
aspect of the reforms, the crisis brought about by the
Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the removal of the king from
authority.

For, in the midst of an ongoing constitutional

crisis in the American colonies, the only thing that held
together all of the contentious factions, the king, disap
peared .
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CHAPTER V

THE CRISIS OF THE COLONIAL STATE:

THE SPANISH

AMERICAN WARS OF INDEPENDENCE

For dependency writers the Wars of Independence expressed
the economic maturity of Spanish America.

Accordingly, the

independence movements were primarily movements for economic
freedom.

Andre Gunder Frank argues that,l

The driving force of the 1810 Revolution was the
complex of demands by a bourgeoisie determined to
seize power, to achieve self determination and to
control both economic power and the political
power vested in the state apparatus... The creole
bourgeoisie was aware that the colonial system
barred them from access to the political power
that was the key to a new economic policy designed
exclusively for their benefit.
while Juan E. Corradi believes that, 3
The growing disparity in the rate of economic
development between the various parts of the
Spanish empire was accompanied by a weakening
of the bonds that held them together. The politi
cal and social unity of the metropolis and the
colonies... became increasingly tenuous on account
of that uneven development.
and Fernando Henrigue Cardoso and Enzo Faletto claim that,3
The advances of modern capitalism had placed
Spain in the role of intermediary between the
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colonies and the new industrial Europe. As a result
of these political vicissitudes, merchants and es
pecially producers in Latin America came to view
colonial relations as an obstacle to be surmounted.
They wanted to establish direct links with Great
Britain...
and so, "The Wars of Independence

were

waged to achieve a

political order and a different 'pact' with the new metrop
olis. *

That this was the ultimate result of independence is

not in doubt, however, as Stanley and Barbara Stein argue,
"...it would be a gross simplification to state that this
was the principal goal of the early insurgents".^

In fact,

they justifiably fault the popularity of this interpretation
for "clouded" versions of the post-independence era.**
The economic grievances of the Spanish Americans dis
cussed in the previous chapter did not cause the final break
with Spain.

The movements for independence, rather, evolved

out of the conjunction of two crises; the crisis of the
American bureaucracy which began with the implementation of
the Bourbon reforms; and the crisis of the Spanish State
with the Napoleonic usurption of the Spanish crown.

It was

only once the king, the connective tissue of the empire, had
disappeared that tne bureaucratic crisis in America would
allow Spanish American grievances with the Bourbon reforms
to clearly affect the outcome of the crisis.
The independence movement in each colony had its own
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specific character even though the origin and outcome of the
movements was essentially the same.

The different character

istics themselves were a result of the particular grievances
of the colonial elite against the Bourbons fend amongst them
selves) and how these and the actual movements for autonomy
were worked out.

Although it is impossible to give a full

account of the independence movements throughout Spanish
America here, what follows will analyze the nature of the
movements in general with special attention given to a few
specific examples.
The movements for independence in Spanish America were
not, in their origin, independence movements at all.

When

the crisis of 1808 - the abdication of Charles IV and
Ferdinand VII, the overrunning of the Peninsula by Napoleon's
armies and the imposition of a new dynasty with the accession
to the throne of Joseph Bonaparte - unfolded, there were few
among the 'revolutionaries' in America who would have en
visioned an outcome that included a permanent break with the
Spanish Crown.7
With the news from Spain the Americans immediately
rejected the French usurption and declared their loyalty to
the Bourbon dynasty.**

The question that the French invasion

raised then was not loyalty to the monarch but rather where
sovereignty lay in his absence.
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The answer to the question

in Spain came about when the various town cabildos set up
juntas to lead the resistance against the French and they
ultimately joined together to form a Junta Central which
gave some semblance of central authority.9

A solution was

not so easily found in Spanish America though.

First, the

authorities who represented the King had not been unseated
by the invasion yet, the legal basis for their authority,
the king, had been.

Second, the Spanish Americans not only

questioned their authority, but were concerned as to the ac
tual loyalty of these officials to the 'legitimate* king,
Ferdinand VII, as these officials had been appointed by the
administration that had handed over the Crown to the French.
Third, the conflicts within the Spanish American colonial
bureaucracy created by Bourbon administrative re-organization
rose to the surface without the mediating hand of the Crown.
What ensued was a scramble by the various sectors of the
bureaucracy (now including the cabildos) for support
amongst the creoles, Spaniards and other elements of colonial
society in their internal disputes.

Finally, the revolution

in the relationship between Spain and the colonies initiated
by the Bourbons exploded upon the consciousness of the
Americans when the Junta Central took up where the Bourbons
had left off and demanded the obedience of the Spanish
Americans not on the basis of their representation of the
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Crown, but rather their being the legitimate authority of
the Spanish nation.

The Americans generally rejected this

formula, opting rather for the old Hapsburg formula which
defined their relationship to the other parts of the Empire,
including Spain, through the king and only the king.

The

movements thus sought, and generally accomplished, the un~
seating of the top Spanish administrators.

They ultimately

declared autonomy from the Junta Central (and later the
Regency) but generally declared in favor of Ferdinand VII.
The movements became genuinely independentist only after
the return of Ferdinand VII to the throne in 1814.

His un

compromising absolutism and repression of the American move
ments made an accomodation with the crown impossible.

The Movement In The R^o De La Plata
The Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata was the only
Spanish American colony in which the crisis of the colonial
bureaucracy came to the surface before the loss of legitimate
authority in Spain.

An unauthorized invasion of Buenos Aires

by the English General William C. Beresford in 1806 (and a
second invasion by General John Whitelocke in 1807) threw all
the Viceregal authorities into disarray and fundamentally
changed the balance of forces in the Viceroyalty by the time
of the crisis in Spain.
With the first invasion and occupation of Buenos Aires
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by Beresford, Viceroy Sobremonte and his administration fled
the city while the city's main corporations, including the cabildo and Consulado, swore their loyalty to the English King.11
Buenos Aires was re-conquered, not by the Viceroy who bided time
in Cordoba collecting a force he felt sufficient to expel the
British, but by a Frenchman in the service of the Spanish Crown,
Santiago Liniers, who, with a force of about 1,000 given to him
by Ruiz Huidobro, the Governor of Montevideo, defeated the
British.1^

w i t h the British defeated and the Viceregal admin

istration in disarray, the cabildo with the other city corpora
tions - civil, ecclesiastic and military, - organized a council
of war which forced the Viceroy to give military command of
the colony to Liniers.

Such a formula was preferable to the

Viceregal authorities - Viceroy and Audencia - to the full re
moval of the Viceroy from office and a further crisis of the
administration.11

It was at this point that the political ba

lance in Buenos Aires began to turn in favor of the creoles.
The threat of further invasion led to the great expan
sion of military forces dominated by creoles.

Although the

apprehension of the Spanish dominated cabildo to this develop
ment can be seen in their attempt to get control of this
force through Spanish born officers, there was general agree
ment in the colony as to the need for this force.14

When the

British attached again in 1807 and captured Montevideo from
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the hapless Viceroy Sobremonte, he was deposed by the council
of war and Viceregal authority was transferred to the reluc
tant Audencia.15

The subsequent British invasion of Buenos

Aires by General Whitelocke then went down to defeat at the
hands of the creole and Spanish military forces led by
Liniers and Martin Alzaga, alcalde and Spanish born leader of
the cabildo.16
Liniers ultimately became provisional Viceroy1?, but
he soon fell out with the Spanish dominated cabildo as he
moved towards an alliance with the Viceregal bureaucrats
and the military force he had created to repel the British.
With the turn of events in Spain in 1808, suspicions of dis
loyalty arose on both sides.

Liniers* French birth, his

admiration for Napoleon and his attachment to the Viceregal
officials of Charles IV made him suspect to both Spaniards
and creoles.

His acceptance of the Seville Junta Central

though, did not allay these suspicions.

Both Spaniards and

creoles began to suspect the Junta Central as, rather than
dismissing discredited Viceregal officials, it clung to them
as the surest way to uphold the continuity of the Empire.18
Into this mix of suspicions was thrown the intrigues of
Ferdinand's sister, Princess Carlota Joaquina of Portugal,
who took up residence in

r £o

de Janeiro to escape the French.

Princess Carlota represented a solution to the crisis for
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Viceregal officials in that the royal mantle would again
legitimize their rule.

In a similar fashion, some creoles

supported the cause of Carlota because they feared the
autonomist leanings of the Spanish dominated cabildo.
Recognition of Carlota, they felt, would check these designs
of the cabildo.

On the other hand, many opposed Carlota on

traditional grounds, opposing Portuguese expansionism in the
River Plate.19
The Spanish dominated cabildo brought matters to a
head in October 1808 when it attempted to depose Viceroy
Liniers and, in imitation of Montevideo, set up a local Junta
controlled by the Spaniards of Buenos Aires and loyal to the
Seville Junta Central.

The successful Spanish coup of

Montevideo was not repeated in Buenos Aires as the forces
of the Cabildo, led by Alzaga, were outmaneuvered by the
creole military force under the command of Cornelio Saavedra
who threw his support to Viceroy Liniers. ^

The leaders of

the coup attempt were exiled to Patagonia but tensions
between those who had supported the cabildo and those who had
supported Liniers did not ease.

The Junta Central sought to

solve the crisis by appointing Baltasa: Hidalgo de Cisneros
the new Viceroy in August 1809.
Cisneros very briefly united the warring parties in the
Viceroyalty, disbanding some of the creole military units,
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ressurecting some Spanish units defeated in the coup as
militia and readmitting Alzaga and his compatriots into
Buenos A i r e s . Y e t ,
peacemaking.

events in Spain undid all of Cisneros'

By May 1810, news arrived that French armies

had overrun Seville, the Junta Central was no more and the
prospects looked awfully dismal for Spanish resistance.

The

Viceroy attempted to suppress the news for as long as he
could, fearing the worst, but was forced to relent when events
in Spain became common knowledge.

On May 18, he officially

published the sad news from Spain.22
The creole military force created by Liniers for the
defense of the Viceroyalty now became the arbiter of its
future.

The creole elite officers forced the Viceroy and

cabildo to hold a cabildo abierto (open town meeting) which,
with the reluctance of the cabildo, deposed the Viceroy and
set up a local Junta, loyal to Ferdinand VII, to take over the
administration of the Viceroyalty.23

With the Spaniards cowed

by their defeat at the hands of Liniers, afraid of the mili
tary superiority of the creole elite and having no love
for Cisneros (he had opposed their interests by opening up
the port to British trade in order to fill his depleted
treasury with the resulting import taxes) the field was left
open to the creoles.24
Similar justifications for creole accession to power

were heard in every part of Spanish America where a junta
movement appeared.

It was argued that once the legitimate

government of Spain had fallen, sovereignty reverted back to
the people who could then confer it upon anyone they chose.
Since the Junta Central had argued the equality of Spanish
America with Spain, the Spanish Americans had the right to
set up their own juntas for their defense in the absence of
the King.

Although in the context of what this movement

was to become such views became revolutionary, they did not
break with traditional Spanish political and legal thought.25
With the legitimacy of the State in question, both creoles
and Spaniards sought to fill the vacuum in Spanish America in the case of Buenos Aires, the creoles won.25

The Movement In Chile
In Chile, the loss of the legitimizing hand of the
Crown brought to the surface conflicts based on the specific
grievances of the creoles in the colony against the Bourbon
regime.

As in Buenos Aires, once the authority of the Royal

officials began to be questioned, the various bureaucratic
institutions and creole and Spanish factions vied for control
over the colony.
The two chief grievances of the Chilean creoles were
first, the increased difficulty in obtaining positions and
advancement in the colonial bureaucracy upon which many less
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fortunate creole families depended2^, and second, Chile's
colonial status vis-a-vis the Viceregal capital at Lima
(since the decline of the agricultural regions in the vicinity
of Lima in the late 17th century, Chile became the major
source of wheat for Lima - the Lima merchants controlled this
trade, manipulated the price of Chilean wheat, keeping prices
artifically low to the detriment of Chilean producers).

In

fact, the Chilean Independence movement was always more
directed at Lima then it was at Spain.29
As in Buenos Aires, loyalty to the monarchy was un
questioned with no indications of disloyalty even after the
news of the abdications reached Chile.29

What was unfortunate

for the Royal bureaucracy in Chile, though, was that in the
same year the colony lost its king, its popular Governor,
Luis Munoz de Guzman, died and was replaced by the less com
petent Francisco Antonio Garcia Carrasco.

Garcia Carrasco

was either easily manipulated or understood the tenuous
position of Spanish authority in America with the loss of the
King, for he first fell under the influence of elements of
the creole elite and, when it seemed his administration was
tottering, gravitated towards the Spaniards.30

in his two

years in office, Garcfa Carrasco managed to alienate the
Royal Audencia, the cabildo of Santiago and the creole
aristocracy.^
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Garcia Carrasco alienated the Spaniards in Chile when
he came under the influence of Juan Martinez de Rozas, a
creole tied to the wealthy Mendiburo family of Concepcion.
Martinez de Rozas convinced Garcia Carrasco that, given the
crisis in Spain, the cabildo of Santiago was best suited to
direct the defenses of the colony and thus, its membership
should be increased by 12 regidores, including himself and
a disproportionate number of creoles.33

Spaniards were

further enraged when a representative of the Seville Junta
arrived in Santiago with a request for 100,000 pesos and
Garcia Carrasco had him sent to head the garrison at the
Chilean Indian frontier.33
Garcia Carrasco's fortunes truly declined when he
alienated all in the colony by his involvement in the
Scorpion Affair.

It seems that either Garcia Carrasco was

a partner with, or had been duped by Martinez de Rozas in a
scheme to seize a British merchant ship, the Scorpion, in
October 1808 under a letter of Margue rather than seizing
its goods as contraband.

The difference was that taken under

a letter of Marque, the cargo of the Scorpion was considered
spoils of war and the treasury was deprived of the 300,000
peso cargo which went to Martfnez de Rozas and his cohorts.31*
This incident upset every sector of opinion in the colony and
severely damaged the credibility and authority of Garcia
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Carrasco's administration.

Creoles and Spaniards began

agitating for his replacement, creoles though, for a junta.35
These agitations led Garcia Carrasco to interfere with
cabildo elections in Santiago and, when this tactic failed,
he had arrested three prominent Chilean creoles who he thought
were conspiring against his administration.

The protests of

the cabildo and ecclesiatic cabildo against this move, and
the Audencia's fear of revolt, convinced Garcia Carrasco
not to send the three to Lima for trial but rather to hold
them in Valpraiso.

News, which later turned out to be false,

that Spain had fallen to the French, led Garcia Carrasco,
on July 12, 1810, to send two of the alleged conspirators to
Lima for trial.

The uproar over this act led to his fall

and the events which were to lead to the formation of a local
•a e

Junta. °

/

As the creole cabildo plotted to overthrow Garcia

Carrasco, the Spanish Audencia diffused the situation by de
posing him themselves and designating the prominent creole,
Mateo de Toro Zambrano, Conde de la Conquista, as
Captain General. ^
The Audencia's move had a generally calming effect on
the agitated colony but this was not to last.

Pressure was

almost immediately brought to bear on Toro Zambrano by two
opposing groups.

One group, centered in the cabildo, was

made up of creoles who agitated for a local Junta because
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they distrusted the Royal officials (as in Buenos Aires, fear
that Royal officials would turn the colony over to the French
or Portuguese was prevalent).

The other, centered around the

Audencia and included the clergy, top Royal officials and
some creole aristocrats who sought to maintain Royal officials
in power.
Toro Zambrano was finally convinced to call for a
cabildo abierto after the agitation of the cabildo group
reached a high pitch with the impending arrival of the new
Governor, Francisco Javier Elio, who was noted for his anti
creole feelings (Elio had led the Spanish coup in Montevideo
against the creole supported Viceroy Liniers in the Rio de
39
la Plata).

In addition, news from Spain added to the high

level of suspicion and tension.

First, news arrived of the

fall of the Seville Junta Central and its replacement by a
Regency at Cadiz.

This Regency denounced past Spanish dis

crimination against the colonials, asked for their recognition
and suggested that they might set up their own local Juntas on
✓

the model of Cadiz.

Further news informed the Chileans of

Ferdinand's denunciation of Godoy (Charles IV's favorite),
and his appointments in the Royal bureaucracy for 'whoremongering, French sympathies and disloyalty".

Since many

Royal officials had received their appointments from that
administration, practically the whole colonial bureaucracy
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was suspect.4t*
The cabildo abierto installed a creole dominated Junta
to take over the administration of the colony with Toro
Zambrano as its life president.

A congress made up of repre

sentatives from the whole colony was called for while the
cabildo and the Audencia were retained.

All of this was

done with expressions of genuine loyalty to Ferdinand VII and
was ultimately recognized by the Regency in Cadiz and Viceroy
Abascal of Peru41 (it seems that Abascal was suspicious of
these developments and would have liked to have ended them
but Lima was too dependent on Chilean wheat and he was other
wise occupied putting down junta movements in Upper Peru and
Buenos Aires

42

).

The justification for the movement was, as

in Buenos Aires, not revolutionary but traditional sovereignty fell back to the people once the monarch could no
longer exercise it and they had a right to confer it on another
for their own well being.
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The Junta Movement Elsewhere In Spanish America
Elsewhere in Spanish America similar movements broke out.
In Upper Peru, junta movements, one in Chuquisaca led by the
Audencia and another in La Paz led by the cabildo, broke out
but were suppressed, the former by Viceroy Cisneros, the
latter by Viceroy Abascal.44
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In New Granada, the first junta appeared in Quito on
August 10, 1809 when creoles deposed the President of the
Audencia and placed the Marquis de Selva Alegre and the Bishop
of Quito at the head of the government.45

The Quitefios had

acted out of fear that the Napoleonic conquest of Spain
would be transferred to America and that the only solution
was for the Americans to declare their independence.

The

Quitenos also feared the Spaniards of the city who, they be
lieved, planned to assassinate the creole nobility on
August 19.46

The movement was, however, smashed, not by

the Viceregal capital at Bogota where the Quitenos had
sympathy among many creoles, but by the Viceroy of Peru who
unleashed a violent repression which only confirmed the
Quitenos worst fears.

'

In Caracas, the creoles reacted frightfully to Napoleon's
occupation of Spain fearing a French invasion of America would
unleash the forces which overturned the slave system in Haiti.
The creoles in Venezuela already suspected the Viceregal
authorities of trying to undermine white creole supremacy by
their administration of Bourbon reforms favorable to pardos
and slaves.

Creole attempts to set up a junta which they felt

would assure their security and predominance were met by
repression and the incitement of the pardos and slaves against
them by the Royal administration.
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When news of the fall of

the Seville Junta Central arrived, the creoles acted, deposing
the Captain General and instituting a junta loyal to
Ferdinand VII.48

By the end of 1810, most of the Viceroyalty

of Mew Granada was lost to the Spanish administration.
All junta movements, however, were not so successful.
In New Spain, the Audencia and Consulado short-circuited a
move by Viceroy Jos/* de Iturrigaray and his creole supporters
in the cabildo to install a junta in 1808.

The Spanish

Audencia deposed Iturrigaray, put in their own Viceroy, re
pressed the creole challengers, organized its own military
force and encouraged Spaniards in the Provinces to seize
power.48

The reaction to the Spanish coup led directly, by

1810, to the movements of Hidalgo and Morelos which reflected
the weakness and vaccilations of provincial Royal officials,
even though these movements were ultimately put down by the
50
capital.

Lima: Bulwark Of Spanish Administration
In America
The movement for local juntas arose in Peru also but
only at the provicial level and, it seems, never infected the
Viceregal center at Lima.8^

Few areas in Spanish America,

though, suffered the Bourbon reforms to the extent of Lima loss of territory and thus control over bureaucratic
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appointments when New Granada and Rio de la Plata became ad
ministratively independent under the Bourbons, loss of its
trade monopoly in South America, the imposition of higher
taxes, discrimination against creoles for high office, Indian
revolts and agricultural administration.52

Lima joined the

general movement for independence in Spanish America only
when San Martin's Army entered the city in 1821.53
Several factors contributed to the relative stability
of Lima when the balance of the Royal administration on the
continent was crumbling.

The Peruvian elite, both creole

and Spanish, was inordinately privileged in a veritable sea
of under-privilege.

On the coast, and particularly in Lima,

this elite was far outnumbered by blacks, morenos, mestizos
and Indians.

Out of a total population 63,809 in 1813,

whites comprised only 32% in Lima and, out of a population
which reached 1,115,207 for the entire Viceroyalty they com
prised a meager 12%.5^

Indian and slave revolts bred inse

curity which tended to attach this elite to the Viceregal
administration which, it felt, would maintain the social
hierarchy.55
Even with the loss of a great deal of the old viceregal
territory, Lima's position as the capital of the Viceroyalty
enabled it to drain resources from, and control the trade of,
the productive highland provinces.
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Bureaucratic control of

the provinces from Lima made this all possible and few who
benefited were in favor of innovations in government that
might have threatened the system.56

Further, the vast majority

of the Lima elite depended not on agriculture or even commerce
but on bureaucratic appointment.

Lima was a consumer/

administrative center par excellence.

Timothy Anna has esti

mated that only 26.3% of the elite could be considered pro
ducers (not of course that they themselves produced but that
their income and wealth were derived from the ownership of
productive establishments) while 41.7% were regular or
secular clergy, 18.2% were in the Royal service and the
balance were escribanos, lawyers, doctors or titled nobles,
bringing the occupational elite dependent upon the Viceregal
treasury to 67.2%.

cn

An elite so tied to the Royal adminis

tration would have to have been very sure that it was in its
interest to revolt, as Anna remarks, "The Peruvians would
not revolt until the Royal regime lost authority".58
Maintenance of the Spanish Administration in Lima also
had a good deal to do with the capable and politic hand of
Viceroy Abascal.

Abascal navigated the administration through

stormy periods of creole discontent and regional highland re
volts against the hegemony of Lima.

Though Lima and the

Viceroyalty were riven by the same sort of inter-bureaucratic
rivalries and creole discontent with the Bourbon reforms as
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the rest of Spanish America, a strong, determined hand at the
helm could hold things together.59

This was even more remark

able in that on top of provincial revolts, Chilean insurgency,
the challenge from the Rio de la Plata, bureaucratic infighting
and creole agitation for relief from Bourbon commercial and
fiscal reforms, Abascal had to maintain his authority and
calm in the colony with his position weakened by the authori
ties in Spain who announced to the Americans that 'your des
tinies no longer depend upon Viceroys, Governors and
ministers'60.

The colonists were also invited to send

representatives to the Spanish Cortes which drew up the
Constitution of 1812.

Under this constitution, the Viceroy's

authority was further undermined by the institution of elec
tive cabildos, freedom of the press, the abolition of Indian
tribute and Royal monopolies and the institution of a minicortes in the colony within which the Viceroy would be only
the 'superior political chief' sharing power with local
elected representatives.6^-

The Wars Of Independence And The Crisis
Of The State In America
Although the economic and social grievances of the
colonists in Spanish America were undoubtedly important con
ditioning factors in the junta movements, the success of
Abascal in holding together the Viceroyalty of Peru underscores
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the essentially political nature of the junta movements.
Bourbon reorganization of the Spanish American bureaucracy
not only destabilized internal relations within the bureaucra
cy,

but, at the same time, closed off traditional Hapsburg

avenues of redress which had inured the creole elite to the
system at a time when the creoles had mounting grievances
with Bourbon commercial and fiscal reforms.

As Jorge

Dominguez argues^^,
Traditional elite political participation, which
was neopatrimonial, had also been accommodated
within the empire. The elite sought access to
governmental jobs, military privileges or
economic advantage; it opposed governmental
efforts to set it free. Even under conditions
of economic growth, traditional elites sought
to increase access to government in traditional
ways....Goals were typically adjustive or back
ward looking. Many sought to restore lost rights
or circumstances.
Others resisted change or
sought to adjust their position within the
system.
Thus, it is not so surprising that once the Bourbon regime
had proved its incompetence to the Spanish American creoles
by not only mishandling colonial affairs but also Spanish
international affairs - in being instrumental in the loss of
Spanish Independence - they reacted in a very traditional
manner to protect their interests and what they felt were
the interests of the Crown,

Rather than seeking change,

creoles who took control of the colonies through the junta
movements attempted to maintain traditional patterns and
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policies of Spanish rule.

This intent, however, could not

reproduce the order and harmony of the Hapsburg era which
the creoles sought.

As discussed earlier®^, the Hapsburg

system made possible the existence of various forms of social
relations of production and land tenure - as well as a
system of trade - which were essentially contentious, only by
mediating the conflicts between and within them through the
colonial bureaucracy.

Not only did the legitimacy of the

Crown and the adjustive practices of a State that was rela
tively autonomous make these various interests harmonious,
it was a major aspect of their maintenance.

Thus, what was

considered by some creoles to be their traditional legitimate
rights and interests conflicted with what others felt to be
theirs.

As Frederick Stirton Weaver argues®^,

The differences in the local forms in which
production was organized and surplus appro
priated created a regional diversity far
more important than the superficial uni
formity that standardized colonial adminis
trative organization and selective aspects
of the Spanish culture lent to diverse
places.
Not only did fledgling creole States have to contend with and
try to harmonize such interests, they found it almost impos
sible to assert the interest of the State over those
contending interests and the interests of provinces which, for
all intents and purposes acted as States with their own State
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interests.

The junta movements removed the lid from a boiling

pot and conflict boiled over and engulfed Spanish America
until a new formula for elite harmony was worked out.
The conflicts which engulfed Spanish America from 1810
into the national period were not the result of innovations
which the creoles sought to introduce into the political,
economic and social systems of the colonies.

They were

rather the result of the clash of competing elites who sought
to impose their traditional rights and interests against one
another and, fledging States' attempts to assert the tra
ditional rights and interests of the State in societies in
which the State had lost its legitimacy.
The events in the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata sub
sequent to the installation of the junta on May 25, 1810
best illustrate how this complex of forces worked to create
the anarchy which engulfed much of Spanish America in the
first half of the 19th century.

Upon its accession, the

Junta of Buenos Aires attempted to assert its authority
throughout the Viceroyalty of Rxo de la Plata.

Assuming the

authority of the Spanish administration, the junta attempted
to hold together all the provinces which had made the Vice
royalty possible.

The junta expected change neither in the

political nor in the economic hegemony of Buenos Aires - but
the provinces were not to be very cooperative.
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Paraguay, which had been, since its incorporation into
the Viceroyalty, an unwilling tributary, sought to maintain
its own autonomy in the face of the rapid political changes
in Buenos A i r e s . ^

Under its Governor-Intendent, Colonel

Bernardo de Velazco, Paraguay met the call by the Buenos Aires
junta for submission and the sending of delegates to a general
congress with a careful and cautious response swearing
obedience to the Regency in Spain, for maintaining fraternal
solidarity with Buenos Aires (but not recognition of its
superiority) and the formation of a junta of war to defend
Paraguay.
The junta of Buenos Aires responded by sending a mili
tary force under the command of Manuel Belgrano to force the
Paraguayan authorities to submit.

He was unsuccessful,

having been defeated twice by a Paraguayan creole militia
force which, though it did depose Velazco for his incompe
tence in meeting the military challenge from Buenos Aires,
nevertheless maintained the policy of autonomy.

The

Paraguayans, under the leadership of Jo3e Gaspar Rodriguez
de Francia, thus began the process of creating a Paraguayan
State. ^
The junta was more successful, at least initially, in
asserting its authority in the interior and littoral pro
vinces, yet these ultimately revolted against it.
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By 1820^

the State thrown up by the junta movement of 1810 precariously
controlled only the province of Buenos Aires.

This disastrous

disintegration of the State which ended in its complete
collapse after the Battle of Cepeda was the direct outcome of
its attempt to re-establish traditional Viceregal hegemony in
Upper Peru.

The assertion of its authority in Upper Peru was

seen as crucial by Buenos Aires in its attempt to maintain
the traditional pattern of administration, finance and trade
that had existed since the founding of the Viceroyalty.

As

pointed out earlier68, Buenos Aires could not maintain its
large bureaucracy nor finance its external trade, except
with great difficulty, without the silver from Upper Peru.
More than in any other Viceregal center (except perhaps
Lima) the elite of Buenos Aires depended on bureaucratic
position and trade.69
The problem of the loss of Upper Peru (Buenos Aires'
military expedition was defeated by Abascal's troops) was
made immediately apparent when, in order to continue the war
against the Royalists in Upper Peru and Western Argentina,
urban wealth, acquired by the State through draconian forced
loans and 'contributions', was quickly exhausted.70

This

exhaustion of urban sources of revenue led the State to
shift its support, at least in the provinces, to those whose
wealth was generated directly by the land.
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The State needed

men, horses and food in order to prosecute the war and thus,
production finally asserted itself in a system in which it
had always been subservient to trade and political adminis
tration.^1

Perhaps the best example of this was State support

for the regime of Martin de Guemes in Salta.
This policy proved to have disastrous results for the
State when it was applied to the Banda Oriental (Uruguay).
First supporting the rural forces of J o s ^ Artigas against
an intransigent and Royalist Montevideo, Buenos Aires
created a formidable enemy in Artigas and his littoral
allies when it abandoned his movement to liberate the Banda
Oriental.

The reasons for the support given to the Artigas

movement by Buenos Aires and its eventual abandonment of it
conformed to the interests of the State at each specific
moment.

Yet, both positions were to set the stage for its

ultimate collapse.

Certainly the Royalist challenge just

across the River was one good reason for supporting Artigas.
But, more important was the need of the State at Buenos
Aires to eliminate the autonomy of Montevideo which had pre
sented itself as a direct threat to the hegemony of Buenos
Aires throughout the Viceregal era.^3

Buenos Aires' pre

eminence in the region was assured through its control of
internal and external trade accorded it through its political
position as the Viceregal capital.
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The better harbor on the

other side of the River at Montevideo was a constant source
of dismay (during the colonial era a good deal of contraband
trade - not subject to control or taxation by Buenos Aires wa3 funneled through Montevideo) during Viceregal days that
turned into outright fear and hostility with its self pro
claimed independence from the Junta of Buenos Aires in
1810.74

Buenos Aires only jettisoned Artigas and his move

ment when an even greater threat than the Royalists in
Montevideo appeared - a Portuguese army in Montevideo
threatening Buenos

Aires.

75

While the State at Buenos Aires encouraged the rise of
rural elites to influence in the urban administrations of
the provinces, it showed that it was not only rapacious in
its demands for the resources of the provinces but that it
would not protect their economic interests any better than did
the Bourbons.

In order to raise further revenue for the war,

the State opened up the port to British and American ships
which flooded interior markets with cheap goods and stole
the Buenos Aires market away from interior p r o d u c e r s . A f t e r
1815, the provinces began opting out of their union with the
State at Buenos A i r e s . 77

The response of Buenos Aires was

to attempt to impose a centralist form of State on the pro
vinces through the Constitution of 1819.

Ine State tried to

enforce it and the provinces reacted in kind.
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The ephemeral,

almost nonexistent now, authority of the State at Buenos
Aires collapsed when confronted with the defeat of its mili
tary forces at Cepeda on January 20, 1820 at the hands of
the combined forces of the littoral provinces.78
The ruralization of the bases of political power
fomented by the policies of the State at Buenos Aires affected
Buenos Aires itself after 1820.

Forced back upon the resources

of the province of Buenos Aires alone, the political elite of
Buenos Aires, who reconstituted the political system on a
provincial basis, made it possible for rural based elites to
rise in influence.

First, in order to reduce the cost of

the military (which had been the major drain on the revenues
of the State) the provincial authorities disbanded much of the
army and based the security of the Province on rural militia
under the control of the estancieros ( r a n c h e r s ) .7®

Second,

they proceeded with a policy of reconstructing the provincial
economy on the only basis now possible - the export of hides
and other cattle based products.80

This ruralization of the

bases of political support for the State was a process which
continued throughout the crisis of the 1820's and culminated
in the rise of Juan Manuel de Rosas in 1829.8^
Similar processes and forces were at work elsewhere
during the Spanish American Wars of Independence.

Lima, which

was reluctantly liberated by Argentine and Chilean troops
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became a quagmire for San Martin.

The Lima elite lent only

lackluster support, funds became extremely scarce and his army
fell apart while the Royalist army threatened it from its
highland retreat.8^

san Martin failed to liberate Peru because

he based himself in Lima which not only had been exhausted
financially by its support of the Royalist cause up till 1821
but was now cut off from the source of its wealth - the Andean
highlands.83
With San Martin's withdrawal in favor of Simon Bolivar who did not make the same mistakes and instead based his
forces in the northern province of Trujillo - Peru was finally
'liberated' and the Spanish Army in America

destroyed.

84

Yet,

as in Argentina, the war ruralized the political bases of
power.

The State administration organized at Lima was to

suffer a lack of legitimacy and authority and constant inva
sions from provincial/military caudillos until, with an in
dependent source of finance (guano), the capital under the
leadership of Ramon Castilla could again subdue the pro
vinces.85
The independence movement in New Granada was wracked,
from the begining, with regionalist sentiments which led to
the collapse of the movement in Colombia and Royalist resur
gence and invasions.85

In Venezuela, Royalist fomented a

race war against the creole insurgents and then crushed
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their movement with Murillo's invasion in 1815.8?

Although

New Granada was finally liberated under the leadership of
Simon Bolivar, and the various provinces united into the
State of Gran Colombia, the centrifugal forces which plagued
the other former colonies asserted themselves there too.
Gran Colombia disintegrated into Colombia, Venezuela and
Ecuador but, even this did not end political strife.88
Nor was the Spanish army in America immune from the
disintegration caused by political factionalism.

In both

New Spain and Peru, the last bastions of Imperial power in
4

America, the Viceroys were deposed by military revolts
initiated by political conflict.

In both colonies, ani

mosity between officers who supported the absolutism of
Ferdinand VII and those who supported the Constitution of
1812 'burst into the open'.89

in New Spain, Viceroy Juan

Ruiz de Apodaca was deposed and replaced with Field Marshall
Francisco Novella when he resisted the re-proraulagation of
the Constitution of 1812.90

The constitution was implemented

in earnest by the liberals but, conservative creoles and
Spaniards led by Colonel Augustin

Iturbide revolted,

destroying the Spanish regime in New Spain forever.91
In Peru, Viceroy Jocguin de la Pezuela was deposed under
very similar circumstances.

According to Margaret Woodward,

liberal constitutionalist officers in Pezuela's army
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revolted against him in 1821 when he delayed promulagating,
and showed little support for, the Constitution of 1812.92
Pezuela was replaced by General La Serna who was more
acceptable to the liberal officers but, when in 1823 the
constitution was again overthrown in Spain and the absolu
tists regained power, Viceroy La Serna's army was to receive
a blow from which it would not recover.

General Pedro

Antonio OlaSfeta, a creole who commanded the Royal army in
Upper Peru, received the news of the overthrow of the con
stitution before La Serna and revolted against the Viceroy,
overturned the constitutionalist authorities in Upper Peru
and declared to the King that he was the only truly loyal
officer in Spanish America for the three past years.
Confusion and demoralization pervaded La Serna's army when
the King supported Olaneta, even making him Viceroy of the
R^o de la Plata (a very hopeful appointment) over the objec
tions of La S e r n a . 94

Olaneta's revolt then drove the last

nail into the coffin of Spanish military power in America
because, with a demoralized and under strength army,
La Serna was forced to meet the insurgent armies at Ayacucho
and was defeated.95
In Richard Morse's words96f
The collapse of the supreme authority activated
the latent forces of local oligarchies,
municipalities, and extended family systems
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in a struggle for p o w e % a n d prestige in the
new, arbitrarily defined Republics...In the
absence of developed and interacting economic
interest groups having a stake in constitutional
process, the new countries were plunged into
alternating regimes of anarchy and personalist
tyranny.
The contest to seize a patrimonial
State apparatus, fragmented from the original
imperial one, became the driving force of public
life in each new country.
In Part III, the crisis of the State in Spanish
America and its effects on the new nations' integration
into the international economy will be discussed and
analyzed.
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PART III:

THE STATE ORIGINS OF DEPENDENCY IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY PERU AND ARGENTINA
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INTRODUCTION

SPANISH AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY IN
THE AFTERMATH OF THE WARS OF INDEPENDENCE

The aftermath of the Wars of Independence is presented
by dependency writers as a crucial period in the histories
of the Spanish American countries.

For dependentistas,

modern Spanish American underdevelopment really begins with
its incorporation into the world capitalist economy after
independence.*

Although a great deal of emphasis is often

placed by them on the creation of 'structures of dependency*
during the colonial era, independence is presented as a
critical historical break in which the opportunity for
autonomous economic development was lost until the world
capitalist crisis of the 1930's presented another.^

Indeed,

independence did offer the Spanish American countries the
opportunity for relatively autonomous economic development
but the dependentistas have essentially misread the process
and the struggle by which it was lost.
Following their insistence upon a purely economic in
terpretation of the Wars of Independence, dependency writers
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have carried this type of interpretation into the first half
of the 19th century insisting that the political instability
and civil warfare of that era revolved around the consolida
tion of power of an export oriented class.

Andre Gunder

Frank, whose interpretation is most emphatic on this count,
has argued that the civil wars of the first half of the 19th
century were essentially fought over 'nationalism' and 'free
trade *.5

Frank contends that,*

For half a century the two parties struggled
for control of the state and for the decision
as to which of the two policies would prevail.
The "European" party, which favored the closest
possible relations of dependence on the European
metropolis, and which therefore had the firm
political and military support from that quarter...
while the other, or "American" party's,5
...roots were in the interests of the provinces,
which sought: protection for local industries
struggling against the ruinous competition
imposed upon them by the "European" policy of
the cattle raising exporters (in Argentina)...
While Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto are more
realistic in arguing that political and social elements
had important effects on the struggles that wracked Spanish
America in the first half of the 19th century6 , they
essentially agree with Frank arguing that,^
After independence, the problem of national
organization in Latin America consisted in
keeping local control of an export-oriented
production system while creating a system of
internal political alliance that would permit
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the group that maintained relations with the
outside (the world market and national states
of the central countries) a minimum of internal
power to preserve stability and represent the
economic domination of the export-oriented
production sector.
While this was certainly the result, the struggle was not
expressed in these purely economic terms.

Rather, the crisis

of the post colonial era in Spanish America was essentially
political and it was not a foregone conclusion that Spanish
American countries would turn to the international economy
to solve it.
Although Cardoso and Faletto may argue that "...one of
the principal motives of the Independence movement was to
find a new link with the outside...”8, according to
D.C.M. Platt, independence did not transform Spanish America
into a major exporter of foodstuffs or raw materials or a
major market for importers.8

Although a period of intensive

exporting to Spanish America, principally by the British
whose export production was bottled up by Napoleon's control
of the continent, did ensue with the opening up of the ports
upon independence, it was short lived and highly speculative.
British traders came to Spanish America to sell their wares,
not to buy Spanish American products.

They were interested

in specie and only when that was unavailable did they search
for something else they could return to Britain.^-8
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The

market for European goods was, in any case, extremely limited.
For the most part, the population was involved in subsistence
production and even those who were involved in the money
economy had little excess income to spend on imported
manufacturers.

The needs of most people were, thus, still

met by local household and handicraft production.11
According to Platt, even native textile production, often
assumed to have been destroyed by the importation of cheap
British goods, hardly disappeared from local consumption.12
British traders had very little interest in the pro
ducts of Spanish America and, in fact, Spanish America had
very little to sell.

Most countries paid for the bulk of

their imports with specie or funds acquired through loans.13
In Argentina specie made up almost 28% of the value of its
exports in 18251 4 , while in Peru most imports were still
being paid for in silver in 1840.13

Those lucky few coun

tries that did have an export commodity with which to trade
for foreign goods found that the bonanza of dramatically in
creased markets was either short lived or subject to severe
slowdown once peace was restored in Europe.

Argentina, for

example, found that after a dramatic rise in demand for
cattle hides and tallow in Britain the market slowed for the
one and almost disappeared for the other when traditional
Russian exports of these products reappeared.1®
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Even though

Argentina wa3 relatively successful in cementing a link to
the international market it was a weak one with, exports in
1848 remaining at 1820's levels.1?
The fact is, Western Europe and its colonies with the
addition of Southern and Eastern Europe and the United
States, could supply themselves with food and most industrial
raw materials without Spanish

America.

18

in fact, Platt has

found that though Spanish American trade did shift its direc
tion from Spain to Northwestern Europe and the United States,
and some new products were traded, Spanish American external
trade remained fundamentally unchanged from the late colonial
era into the national

period.

19

in essence, for British

trade, Platt notes^O,
No reliable comparison can be made between the
volume of British manufacturers reaching Latin
America before or after emancipation.
But
what does emerge from such random estimates is
that the pattern and constituents of the trade
between Britain and Latin America were well
established long before the breakaway from
Spain. Once the excitement was over and the
needs created by a decade of interrupted
trade were satisfied, trade settled back into
a familiar pattern, expanded for British
cottons by their success in displacing
Spanish cottons and German linens, swollen
by new fashions and needs, supplemented by
the demand of resident foreign communities,
but not, in the final analysis so very dif
ferent in volume or content from the trade
with the Spanish Colonies.
The claim that merchants were a driving force behind
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Spanish America's opening up to the international economy2^
is difficult to sustain.

The majority of merchants in the

Spanish American colonies had been peninsulares who, if they
had not fled with their lives and what part of their wealth
they could carry, were mercilessly taxed by penurious inde
pendence governments in need of cash with which to carry on
the war against Spain.22

Creole merchants often did not

fare much better and, of course, had much less wealth.

In

international trade both were displaced by foreign merchants
who had vital connections with the centers of export in
Europe and the United States.

Domestic trade, however, re

mained in creole hands for the most part, although these
were not the, super wealthy merchants of colonial days.2^
In Argentina, domestic trade became speculative - the antithe
sis of the rigidly controlled mercantilism which dominated
the colonial era - and therefore fraught with risk.
one could become very rich, many were ruined.24

Although

The more

powerful merchants of the colonial consulados had been, from
the start, against the opening of trade with foreigners and
were willing to give the governments - rebel or royalist grants or loans to compensate for the needed revenues which,
it was thought, could only be raised through import taxes
on foreign trade.2^

Though merchants remained an important

part of the elites in Spanish America, their influence was
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never decisive.
Producers of export crops had never been very important
in the Spanish colonial regime given its principal reliance
on the export of specie rather than bulk agricultural pro
duce.

They suffered even further as the wars of independence

decimated vast agricultural areas which had been agro-export
oriented.

The slave based agriculture of Colombia and

Venezuela was severely disrupted by the wars, as was the
coastal agricultural zone of

Peru.

26

slaves were freed and

inducted into the various contending armies while these
armies fed off of the plantations and haciendas leaving them
in a state of r u i n . 27

The large cattle raising areas of

Venezuela and Uruguay were destroyed while the combination
of the Wars of Independence and civil war even created a
shortage of cattle in Buenos Aires province causing Director
Pueyrredon to order the closing of the saladeros (salting
plants) in 1817.

28

Indeed, agro-exporters of course became

powerful and influential in the Spanish American countries
in the 19th century, but not by their efforts alone.

As I

will show later, export interests were often brought to pre
dominance by Spanish American States or the conditions of
political crisis itself.
In reality, the effects of Spanish America's initial
contact with the international economic system was less pro-
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found than dependency writers would have us believe.

Granted,

some domestic production was adversely affected by competition
from foreign goods, but on the whole, much of it remained untouched by this new trade.
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If commerce and production

suffered, it suffered more from the effects of Bourbon eco
nomic and political reforms, the closure of traditional markets
due to new political boundaries and the devastation of the in
dependence and civil wars.'*0

Nevertheless, economic disputes

centered around the progress of the export sectors and its
effect on domestic manufacturing and agriculture did have
salience in some areas as Miron Burgin's work on Argentina
clearly shows.
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However, one has to question whether in

most of Spanish America, including Argentina, these disputes
themselves were determinative in the creation of the export
economies.
The evidence, as I will show, supports a rather different
interpretation of the origins of dependency and underdevelop
ment in Spanish America in the 19th century.

This interpre

tation holds that while having a decidedly economic basis,
the forces which created the export economies in Spanish
America were essentially political - tied to the creation of
new States and the political conflicts over the form they
would take.
The following chapters will explore the political
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conflicts between the various sectors of the owning classes,
their ultimate economic basis and the policies of the States
which led to the creation of the export economies as a
solution to political conflict.
primarily on Peru and Argentina.
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CHAPTER VI

ECONOMIC CLASS CONFLICT IN PERU AND ARGENTINA
THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF POLITICAL
CLASS CONFLICT

Although the conflicts that wracked Spanish American
countries in the first half of the 19th century had an
essentially political nature they also had an ultimately
economic basis.

The social relations of production within

Spanish America set the context within which the political
battles of the era would be fought.

That these conflicts

emerged in a political frame of reference only indicates the
non-capitalist nature of the economies themselves.

Had they

been capitalist economies we would expect the conflicts to
be expressed, as Frank would have them, economically.1

Yet,

Spanish America's heritage from the colonial period did not
bestow upon it capitalist social relations of production nor
did the 19th century bring with it substantial progress in
that direction.

Commercialization did make substantial

inroads but not capitalist social relations.
For the same reason that the War of Independence was
essentially a political struggle, so too were the conflicts
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between the owning classes in the 19th century.

The role of

the Spanish colonial State in regulating the access to and
use of the factors of production - land, labor and commerce politicized the economy and gave economic issues and con
flicts a decided political character.

This did not change

with the independence of the former colonies.

In fact, politi

cal independence served to direct conflicts, with a vengeance,
towards the nascent Spanish American States which, at this
juncture, were extremely weak and not up to the task of
regulating and harmonizing the conflictual interests that had
been bottled., up by the Spanish colonial State.
Yet, without firmly tying them to a material basis,
the political conflicts in Spanish America in the first half
of the 19th century appear as battles exclusively over ideas,
constitutions, beliefs and principles.

Of course

the pro

tagonists of the conflicts perceived them as such but, they
also reflected conflicts at the economic level 'which then
conditioned their political attitudes.
This Chapter will survey the economies and social rela
tions of production of Peru and Argentina in the first half
of the 19th century emphasizing how inter and intra economic
class conflicts shaped the political attitudes of various
sectors of the owning classes.
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Chapter VII will analyze the

political conflicts within the owning classes in these two
countries.

PERU
Peru emerged from the War of Independence with a severely
damaged system of labor control and surplus extraction.

The

role of the Spanish colonial State in the economy of Peru had
been decisive and its collapse placed the Peruvian elite both those involved in production and those not (bureaucrats,
merchants and soldiers) - in dire straits.
In the sierra, which had been a major theater of the
war, the decline of the commercial economy which had been
proceeding ever since Upper Peru (Bolivia) was juridically
separated from the Viceroyalty of Peru, moved apace as the
independence war destroyed the mines and thus, the markets
they provided sLerra agricultural.2

Production then, for the

most part, fell back into local and subsistence production
except for the one bright spot - wool production and export.3
The commercial and economic decline of the sierra
coupled with the disappearance of the Spanish colonial State
had serious repercussions on most landowners, miners and
merchants in the sierra.

Sierra landowners had never been

allowed to completely dominate the socio-economy of the high
lands owing to the Spanish State's fear of creating a landed
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aristocracy and need of Indian labor in the mines which
filled the imperial treasury.

Indian communidades were pro

tected (however poorly) by the Church and State^ and, even
with the decline of mining in the 18th century, only a few
hacendados were able to expand their holdings and control of
Indian labor given the reduced markets for their production.
As Karen Spalding a r g u e s , 5
The activity of the Indian villages limited the
possibilities of accumulation open to the
European landholder, forced to compete with the
village producers who had to unload their pro
duce in order to obtain money to meet their debts.
The available market was limited, and in the 18th
century, since the mines were in decline, it was
actually shrinking. There was space for the
emergence of a relatively few wealthy landowners,
whose wealth depended as much upon their relation
to the colonial bureaucracy as it did upon the
production of their estates.
In fact, Spalding claims that in the early 19th century, at
least in the Southern Peruvian highlands, landholding did not
become very concentrated and society was made up of large to
small landowners, petty merchants and traders and a growing
landless

labor force made up of Indians and mestizos.**

The foregoing gives a picture of the Peruvian sierra
as a relatively fluid society in which given the large number
of small and medium producers and the survival of Indian
communidades, a system of purely economic domination would
have been difficult.

It was.

The predominant position and

control of t.he labor force of the hacendados in the sierra,
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up until the end of the colonial era, had been maintained by
their relationship with the State bureaucratic apparatus and,
with its disappearance in the wake of the Wars of Indepen
dence, some alternative means had to be devised.
The process of re-establishing landowner domination
in the highlands was further complicated by the policies of
early independence governments which, with the idea of
winning the support of the Indian masses for the new regime,
attempted to turn the Indians into a class of yeoman farmers
who would form a major class support for the new Republican
States.?

In 1825 Bolivar decreed that,®

(1) the state could not require personal service,
direct or indirect, without drafting a contract
which established the wages of the Indians;
(2) provincial officials, judges, Church officials
at all levels, hacendados, and mine owners were
prohibited from employing Indians against their
will; (3) labor drafts for public works had to
affect all citizens equally: (4) the supplying
of the army could not be confined to the
Indian but had to fall on all citizens equally;
(5) all work in the mines, haciendas, and other
jobs had to be paid for in money unless the
employee desired otherwise; (6) article 5 was
to be enforced by local and provincial officials;
(7) the Church could not charge the Indian more
for services than it charged others; (8) the
civil authorities were to insure that the
Church did not take advantage of the Indian.
Bolivar further decreed that the communidades be disolved
and that their lands be distributed to their members as
freeholds.

The curacas, or Indian headmen, who Bolivar be

lieved oppressed the communidad Indians were to be stripped
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of their role as hereditary political leaders of the Indians
as well as lose much of their inflated landholdings.9
Had these decrees been promulagated in a vaccum they
might have produced their intended results.

But, in the

context of the Peruvian sierra where the power of the State
to enforce these decrees was almost non-existent, and the
landowning class was fearful of additional competition from
free Indian farmers and the loss of control over the high
land laboring population, the reforms were doomed to
failure.

However, Bolivar was not so wrong to think that if

hacendado control over Indian labor and the stifling effects
of the Indian communidades could be removed, the stagnant
sierra economy could be revived.

Indeed, in the case of the

Indian communidades, the interest of the Crown in the survival
of these archaic social forms had been geared to preventing
the rise of a class of independent Indian farmers.

The

Crown made sure that any economic differentiation amongst the
Indians would be eliminated by enforcing regulations requiring
periodic redistributions of community lands.

Rich Indians it

seems did not make up for the loss of tribute from Indians
who became too poor to pay it.^®
That these reforms were not successful is not surprising.
Though according to the original Bolivarian decree Indians
were not allowed to sell their lands until 1850, a good deal

242

was sold, or more often, stolen by virtue of hacendado con
trol of the highland politico-legal apparatus, well before
that date.11

The Constitution of 1828, in fact, made it

possible for literate Indians to sell their lands before
1850.3-2

This usurption of Indian lands though, did not

occur wholesale and proceeded throughout the 19th and 20th
centuries.

Landgrabbing in the first .half of the 19th cen

tury, however, indicated the weakness rather than the
strength of the highland landowning elite.

Lands were

taken not because the hacendados could use them for ex
panded production but rather so that the Indians could not
use them free of their control and thus become a challenge
to them.

In any case, very little changed except that more

Indians and communidades became tenants of the haciendas.
The hacendados by no means sought to proletarianize the
Indians as they had neither the markets nor the capital
for such a project.

Rather, they assured themselves a cheap

labor force which had at its disposal its own means of sub
sistence.

Rents, labor and personal services came free of

charge if only the hacendados could maintain their local
political predominance.
Yet, the hacendados had little advantage over the
Indians in the market place without political control of the
provinces and thus their preference for a decentralized
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national political system.

Though the hacendados owned the

land upon which the Indians lived and toiled, it was left in
the Indians' possession.

In some areas, particularly the

wool producing areas of the Southern highlands, communidad
as well as hacienda Indians competed directly with the
hacendados for markets.

Given that pastures were open and

Indian sheepherders tended both their own and hacienda
sheep together, the hacendados could not gain any advantage
over the Indians in the marketplace through greater efficiency
or more advanced technology.13

However, through their con

trol of the local political system, they could prevent this
equality in the market-place from creating a competing
Indian elite.

It is here that political control was indis

pensable to keep the Indian population on and off the
hacienda subservient.

Drafts of gang labor, or faenas,

called by local officials for 'public projects'

(which often

included the maintenance of hacienda gristmills or canal
systems), requirements of personal service to local officials,
fines, imprisonment, tribute collection and use of the legal
system against the persons or/and property of the Indians
assured that the dominance of the elite would be maintained.
That such elaborate political-legal mechanisms were necessary
to maintain the sierra landowning elite is evidence of their
still relatively weak economic control over the land in the
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first half of the 19th century.
Although the dominant impression of the regime in the
Andean highlands, at least from independence to the present,
has been of a harsh system of unrelenting social, political
and economic oppression directed at the Indian^, this may
have been more apparent than real.

Granted, some descrip

tions, such as that of Henri Favre who found that in Moya
and Cuenca during the 'good old days', "...it was sufficient
to throw a ten centavo piece at the feet of the first Indian
to come along to obtain all the labor needed to work the
fields.

If the Indian refused to work, he was thrown in

prison and kept there until he agreed to carry out the task
for which he had been 'paid'"16, starkly reveal the subser
vient position of the Indians in the sierra - but this was
not a completely one sided affair.

Although they were

generally able to move the Indians off of the fertile valley
lands and into the less agriculturally viable lands in the
mountains, the hacendados employed very little of the sierra
labor force.17

Where Indians did work on hacienda lands,

they often controlled production to the detriment of the
hacendados as, "In some cases, "tied” peasants were able to
build up considerable amounts of livestock and commercialize
them on their own account; likewise, on arable haciendas,
peasant colonos often had effective control over their
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production that could equal that of the hacienda itself."1®
Even in the early 20th century, as Juan Martfnez Alier has
found, hacienda owners had a great deal of difficulty getting
the Indians to use the land as they wished and in removing
the Indians from the land at all.*®

Indeed, as the resis

tance of the highland Indians to becoming coastal wage
workers in the latter half of the 19th century indicates,
the conditions of 'unfree' labor were to be more desirable
than 'free' wage labor.20
If landowners were in a precarious position in their
conflict with the highland laboring classes, the mine owners
were all but ruined.

Mining in the sierra, although it did

see a boom in the late colonial era, was moribund by the end
of the Wars of Independence.

Generally, miners had never

been particularly wealthy given the Crown's close control
and interest in this industry and the problems of inadequate
financing, technological backwardness, flooding of the mines
exhaustion of ore bodies and inadequate labor supply which
plagued the industry throughout much of the 18th century.2*
The infusion of British technology and capital in the early
19th century, though it breathed some life into the indus
try, also failed principally, at least in the estimation of
Shane Hunt, because of the small scale of production which
required that miners join together in a guild, or gremio,

for large scale projects (such as drainage) and the perpetual
lack of credit which forced miners to pay their workers in
ore rather than wages.22

In fact, it was perhaps because

mine owners did better when poor grades of ore were mined,
given that they had to pay their workers in ore, that raining
remained at so low a level of production and efficiency.22
The major problem for miners was in attracting a work
force.

With the mita abolished once in the 18th century2^

and then again by Bolivar in the 19th25, they competed for
labor in an environment in which most labor was either tied
to haciendas and communidades or not highly mobile.

The

haciendas could offer the Indians security and subsistence
whereas the mines, given their condition of continual failure
and penury, could only be of marginal interest to the Indians.
The association of mine work with the hated mita and the
fact that many mines were far from major areas of Indian
domicile condemned the mine owners to chronic labor short
ages.

In comparison to hacienda owners, mine owners remained

chronically weak politically, apparently unable to attain the
local power necessary to tip the scales of labor distribution
in their favor.
Coastal haciendas which had been in decline since the
late colonial period continued in a state of decline during
most of the first half of the 19th century.
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Mostly sugar and

cotton plantations based upon slave labor, they suffered
directly from the policy of liberation governments offering
slaves their freedom in return for service in the armies of
independence.2

In addition, a great deal of the hacienda

slave labor force simply disappeared in the confusion of
Bocial and political instability that commenced after the
War of Independence.27

The abolition of the slave trade in

1823 (slaves though were legally imported again between
1935 and 1839) dealt another blow to the coastal slavocracy
which found that it could not replace its losses through
massive re-importation.28

It is unclear though, given the

sorry state of their enterprises, whether they could have
afforded large slave imports in any case.
While slavery survived, it could not provide the amount
of cheap labor necessary to revive the industry.28

Sugar and

cotton production remained at low levels as coastal hacen
dados erected a precarious system of tenant farming based on
sharecropping, preferring the surety which dependable small
rents provided.28

This system of tenancy, called yanaconaje,

according to Jose' Matos Mar, "...represents an unequal union
between a capitalist system of exploitation which provides
land, water and capital, and a pattern of agricultural labor
operating within a pre-capitalist system of land tenure".
In essence, the yanacona performed as a sharecropper,
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reducing the risks of cultivation to the landowner, purchasing
his own seed and tools while handing over to the hacienda
owner a portion of his production.3^
In 1854, President Ramon Castilla formally abolished
slavery and thereby set the stage for the re-invigoration of
coastal commercial agriculture.

Castilla's government,

flush with massive revenues from the guano trade33, re
capitalized coastal agriculture by compensating slave owners
300 pesos per slave.

The State paid slaveowners for those

slaves they still had in their possession and for many who
had already left.

By 1850, 25,505 slaves were compensated

for at a cost of 7,651,000 pesos.34

Most of the former

slaves moved out of the coastal agricultural regions to
Lima or became brigands roaming the countryside while others
remained, becoming yanacona or overseers of Chinese
coolies.35
From the 1850's onwards, Chinese coolies filled the
perceived labor shortage on the coast.36

Coastal hacienda

owners flush with new wealth acquired in the guano trade or
through slave compensations began, in the 1850's, importing
large numbers of Chinese coolies who, although they came as
indentured servants, existed in conditions of servitude not
unlike, though sometimes worse than, the slaves they re
placed.3^

Paid in depreciated paper money which made it
249

almost impossible to pay back their debts and thus free them
selves, the Chinese labor force rebelled in a series of
bloody uprisings in the 1870's.^®

The Chinese trade was

finally abolished in 1874 chiefly because of pressure from
the British who, in addition, literally closed off this human
traffic at its source.39

At least part of the coastal agri

cultural depression of the late 1870's can be ascribed to
the ensuing shortage of cheap labor.40
Since no manufacturing industry proper arose in Peru
during the whole of the 19th century, no industrial proletariat
developed in the urban centers.

Manufacturers were either

acquired through foreign trade or produced in shops which had
not developed the production process much beyond the handi
craft stage.41

In the first half of the 19th century Lima,

the capital and largest city, actually lost people.

Between

1820 and 1836, Lima lost about 15% of its population.43
Pardos, mestizos and Indians carried the burden of what
manual labor there was in the urban areas.4^

As in the

coastal agricultural regions, in Lima it was believed that a
severe labor shortage existed and explained the relatively
high cost of labor.44
Peruvian social relations of production in the 19th
century remained, as we have seen, fundamentally precapitalist.
This fact was both a cause and effect of the perceived labor
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shortage which, in conditioning the views of the Peruvian
owning classes, formed the economic basis of their political
conflicts.

Peru, of course, was not labor short, rather it

lacked a free labor market.45

In the highlands, the hacen

dados could not, and did not want to proletariani 2e the
Indians and thus they sought to immobilize them by controlling
the land on which they worked and the socio-political environ
ment in which they lived.

The Indians, preferring to remain

if not the owners, at least the possessors of the land were
accommodated by the strategy of the hacendados.

Where land

was seen as the only sure means of subsistence, the Indians
fought to remain attached to it.

In any event, the strategy

of the hacendados required direct political control of the
sierra and thus they grew to prefer the type of State and
State policies that would assure them of that control.
The coastal hacendados, who had borne the brunt of the
restrictive colonial labor distribution system and thus had
to rely on relatively expensive imported slave labor, did
not fare any better and probably did somewhat worse during
the early post colonial era.

The Wars of Independence had

only exacerbated their chronic labor shortages and early
Republican legislation which sought to remove the restrictions
on labor mobility between the sierra and the coast was in
effective against the dam erected by the confluence of interest
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of sierra hacendados and Indians.

Since a cheap labor force

was not available to them internally, the coastal hacendados
were forced to rely on a dying slave system, sharecropping
and later, imported indentured servants.
always eluded them.

Real prosperity

Given these conditions, coastal hacen-

dados developed an ambivalent position towards the type of
State they preferred.

On the one hand they sought policies

which would weaken the archaic social and economic system
of the sierra hoping to tap into the sierra labor force and
thus tended to support State political centralization.

On

the other hand, given that they too relied on pre-capitalist
social relations of production which required local political
control, they favored a weak decentralized State.

Argentina
Perhaps more than any other former Spanish American
colony Argentina suffered the severe dislocations of both
the break with the colonial system and the Wars of Indepen
dence.

Certainly more than any other Spanish American

country its economy, society and polity were restructured by
the events which gave it independence.

As we saw in

Chapter V, the sources of urban wealth which had sustained
the bureaucrat-merchant elite of Buenos Aires dried up when
the new State could not maintain the Viceregal lines of

252

political and economic domination.

With the traditional

sources of urban wealth removed, the basis of political power
became ruralized.

A similar process of ruralization affected

the Interior provinces but was more profound in that rather
than discovering new sources of wealth in the countryside
as did the elite of Buenos Aires, the disappearance of its
traditional markets in Peru and Bolivia (Upper Peru) left the
Interior elite with little to fall back on.

In an effort to

maintain their position, the elites of the Interior were
forced to turn their economies inward in an attempt to
isolate their provinces from the effects of foreign trade.
The task which occupied the elites in both areas, given the
crisis, was the same - to institute or maintain control over
the available sources of wealth, principally land and labor.
However, though their aims were similar, the political
requisites for the success of each threw them into a conflict
that was to take most of the 19th century to sort out.
In Buenos Aires province, the bureaucrat-merchant
elite began in earnest its conversion into a landholding
elite in the 1820's after it became clear that the old Vice
regal pattern of domination and trade could not be recon
structed with the fall of the Directory in 1820.
Lynch argues,4?
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As John

...the decline of trade with the interior,
the wartime destruction of the littoral
cattle industry, and above all the
irresistable competition of British mer
chants dislocated the traditional economy
and curtail the opportunities of local
entrepreneurs. The increase in exports
provoked by the British and the failure
of the export sector to respond caused
an outflow of precious metals, which was
accompanied by an increase in local demand
for currency. The time arrived when the
traditional economy of Buenos Aires could
no longer sustain the merchant elite.
From about 1820 many of them began to
seek other outlets and, without abandoning
commerce, to invest in land, cattle and
meat salting plants.
It was in this ruralization of a portion of the Buenos Aires
elite that the origin of Federal - Unitarian conflict lies.
Those who remained faithful to the traditional power struc
ture - principally professionals, politicians and
intellectuals along with some merchants - became Unitarians,
dedicated to the erection of a powerful
centered in Buenos Aires.

centralized State

Those who turned their attention

to the countryside and cattle raising - merchant-landowners became Federalists, opposed to the nationalizing and cen
tralizing tendencies of the Unitarians which they felt
neglected or harmed the cattle raising i n d u s t r y . T h o u g h
the political position of the Unitarians was conditioned by
the economic class struggles on the land, they themselves
had very little of an economic or social base, their fortunes
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were tied to those of the State.
closely in Chapter VII.

49

They will be examined more

It is rather the Federalists, those

who went out to conquer the land and the people, and whose
political attitudes were most conditioned by the economic
class struggle to which we turn here.
Although there had been some considerable development
of cattle raising in Buenos Aires province prior to 1820, it
had always been constrained by lack of markets, competition
with the cattle areas of Uruguay, insecurity arising from
Indian attack, and the low social status accorded to land
ownership in the Rio de la Plata.50

As a frontier area in

the Spanish colonial system, Buenos Aires province became a
haven for those displaced or discriminated against by the caste
system in the colonies.5^

Large expanses of unclaimed land

where the authority of the State was weak and a living could
be made off of the thousands c£ cattle roaming the pampa
nurtured a population of gauchos (cowboys) who were relatively
independent and dangerous because of their equestrian and
military-like skills.52

This relatively nomadic rural

population had always been of concern to the Spanish
colonial authorities who identified them as 1vagos (vagrants)
y mal entretenidos (n'eer do wells)' first because they were
thought to have stirred up and/or led Indian attacks on rural
estancias (ranches) and second, because this large rural
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population operated, on the whole, outside of the colonial
economy creating a labor shortage.53
As land under the legal ownership of estancieros
increased in the early 19th century the problem of the con
trol and use of this rural population became more and more
acute.

According to Silvio R. Duncan Baretta and John

Markoff, "...as the value of cattle rose and the former
colonies were threatened with political disintegration, the
need to settle and discipline populations became more pressing
than ever before".5*

The War of Independence, the Indian

wars, and the interminable civil wars only exacerbated the
problem of controlling the rural population.

Deserters

from the armies swelled the nomadic rural population while
civil war made it difficult to settle the people on the land
since the gaucho was needed as connon fodder in the political
conflicts of the era.

55

Further, land expansion directed

against both the Indians and the rural population only made
the gaucho more determined to elude peonization and thus be
come a *vago', "In short, wars, forced recruitment, the con
tinuous expansion of the great estates and the judicial
repression of vagabonds continually created new wanderers
and kept the old ones in movement".56
Prominent in the first half of the 19th century were
legal efforts to control the rural population of the province.
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Legislation of this type was supported by all elites whether
Unitarian or Federal, but not for the same reasons.

The

Unitarian Bernardino Rivadavia, "...gave Argentine vagrancy
statutes their enduring force and form during the 1920*s".57
The legislation of Rivadavia required that rural workers
have a passport for travel within and without the province,
have the written permission of an estanciero to leave his
ranch and expanded the definition of 'vagos y mal entretenidos' to include any rural male so defined by the testimony
of a justice of the peace.

Anyone who broke these laws or

who was defined as a vagrant was subject to several years of
forced military

s e r v i c e . ^8

The rural inhabitants found no

relief under the Federalist Juan Manuel de Rosas who, while
giving the impression that he 'understood the gaucho and was
concerned with his welfare', enforced the vagrancy laws
against the gaucho with increased vigor.50

According to

Richard Slatta, "Rosas blamed the backwardness of the pampa
on the ’throngs of idlers, vagrants and delinquents' that
afflicted the countryside.

He expended much of his adminis

trative energies on converting those he considered idlers
into sedentary, contractual ranch workers or cavalrymen for
his army".60

During the Rosas era the repression of the

rural population was carried out, for the most part by rural
justices of the peace who patrolled the countryside keeping
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order at the behest of the estancieros .61
Although Unitarian and Federal policies against the
rural population were the same, the intent seems to have
been dissimilar.

While the Unitarians were interested in

the health of the cattle raising industry, they were more
interested in creating the conditions for a stable farming
sector in which the ‘vagrant' population of the pampa would
have no place.

For Rivadavia, the rural population of

Buenos Aires was 'an unproductive class, a deadweight,
harmful to public morals and a cause of social disorder'.62
His prescription was conscription into the army for the mass
of them, harsh rural labor laws and European colonization to
create an honest and hard working rural laboring population.6^
The Federalists'apparent reason for desiring such legislation
was the lack of available labor to work and expand their
ranches.

64

As Slatta argues, the vagrancy laws had the

effect of, "...curtailing worker mobility, it functioned
much as the colonial labor systems of encomienda and
yanaconaje in controlling the Indians in New Spain and
Peru..."®5

However, although testimonies of labor shortage

by landowners abound 66 the primary reason for their desire
for such harsh legislation, "...was to impose law and order
in the countryside..."67
Not only did the estanciero seek to force the gaucho
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to work on his estancia, he sought to prevent the roaming
gaucho from becoming his competitor in the market and a
danger to his herds.

The gaucho# who "...maintained his

custom of free grazing on the open range and appropriating
unmarked animals even after 'terratenientes 1 (landowners)
had gained title to most of the better lands..."6 8 , became
a rustler by definition and thus a threat to the estanciero.
The low labor requirements of cattle raising indicates that,
in fact, the estanciero's objective in controlling the rural
population was not primarily his need for workers®®, but
rather to monopolize the resources of the countryside - land
and cattle ? 0 - because the only advantage he held over the
gaucho in the raising of cattle was his legal ownership of
the land and control of the local political-legal system with
which he could prosecute the gaucho for being an 'independent
entrepreneur'.

What in fact often necessitated the need for

more workers than cattle raising required was the fear of
raids by gauchos and other landowners.

Because wealth - the

cattle - was so mobile, large bodies of armed men were needed
to protect that wealth from neighboring estancieros and
gauchos alike.

These bodies of armed men formed the basis

for elite armed struggle during the civil wars.

In fact the

landgrabbing of many estancieros who had no actual need for
more land can only be explained by their attempt to deny the
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gauchos free possession of the land and cattle, make them de
pendent on the estancia and then provide for them as an
armed force with the land usurped.71
Control of the rural population necessitated a State
that would promote the export of cattle products, enforce
vagrancy laws, provide protection from the Indians and pro
vide cheap, if not free, land to the landowners.

In the

absence of such a State the estancieros preferred local
political control.
The elite of the Interior tended to favor local politi
cal control too for not so wholly different reasons.

The

economies of the Interior had received a shock equal to, if
not greater than, that of Buenos Aires from the War of
Independence and civil wars.

The Interior provinces held a

strategic place within the Viceregal economy selling their
produce in the mining areas of the Peruvian and Bolivian high
lands in return for silver with which they purchased imports
coming through Buenos Aires.

The Interior also dominated

the transport of both trades.
The definitive shutting down of this trade with the
loss of Bolivia (Upper Peru) ushered in political and
economic disintegration in the Interior.?2

The Wars of

Independence also took a heavy toll on the Interior provinces.
In La Rioja, for example, in 1819 the scarcity of cattle due
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to confiscations for the armies of independence became so
severe that slaughtering for commercial purposes had to be
reduced by half, while in Cordoba, in that same year, the
province could no longer provide horses for San Martin's
army. ^3

civil war too took a heavy toll in the Interior

as the march of armies across the provinces destroyed pro
duction and commerce and both national and provincial govern
ments scoured the countryside for funds to support their
causes.74
The same processes which ruralized the bases of
political power in Buenos Aires affected the Interior pro
vinces but the economic base which the Interior elite was
forced to fall back upon was contracting, not expanding as
in Buenos Aires.

As the State in Buenos Aires monopolized

the funds collected from foreign trade and trade in the
Interior was in a state of ruin, public office and commerce,
the two pillars of the Interior urban elite crumbled.
Treasuries everywhere in the Interior provinces were empty,
the public debt went unfunded, and the civil bureaucracy
and military often went u n p a i d . 75

Nowhere could sufficient

revenues be found as, even Cordoba, the most populous
(60,000) and prosperous of the Interior provinces, could
barely raise 70,000 pesos in 1824.75
In the absence of policies by the national governments
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under the Unitarians or the Buenos Aires Federalists favoring
their trade over foreign imported goods, the elites of the
Interior provinces could only try to protect themselves
against the total ruination of their economies through pro
tectionism.

Yet, as Burgin clearly argues, protectionism

against Buenos Aires was not what they really desired, rather
they sought to monopolize the Buenos Aires market for their
own goods.78
Protectionism did not however stem the decline of the
Interior economies.

Aldo Ferrer claims that,

Given the factors conditioning its development,
the economy of the interior did not change...
The output of each region went to the local
market and a large part of the working pop
ulation continued in subsistence activities.
In the Northwest, where exports actually
declined, ...it is likely that the economy
regressed from the levels it had reached in
the 18th century and that the proportion of
the labor force occupied in subsistence
activities even increased.
Everywhere in the Interior provinces production suffered
primarily from the loss of markets and was sustained at low
O A

levels only by inter-provincial trade.
To a large degree the disintegration of the Interior
economies reproduced the labor control problems found in
Buenos Aires province.

Of the Interior James Scobie writes,8^

Among the lower classes, the constant insecurity
and lack of employment resulted in the disinte
gration of the family unit and the disappearance of
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trained, disciplined laborers. Landless,, nomadic
masses increasingly replaced the industrious peons
and skilled artisans. Many formerly prosperous
areas now fell back on the rudimentary economy
which had existed in seventeenth century Buenos
Aires.
The gaucho and the colonial estancia
invaded the Andean region...
In addition, the Interior provinces lost men, not only
through conscription into the independence and civil war
armies, but also through migration to the coast and other
provinces in search of

work.

82

as Donna Guy shows, economic

activities associated with men declined in many areas of the
Interior leaving womens' household handicrafts the mainstay
of provincial economies.
As in Buenos Aires province, draconian vagrancy laws
were used against the laboring poor not only to create a
cheap labor force but to immobilize the rural population.
In Tucum^n,

for example, anti-vagrancy laws were enacted in

1823 and a 'ley de conchabo1, or forcedlabor law,
force in

18 32.84

putinto

Given the severe crisis prevailing with

regard to labor control in the Interior, the vagrancy laws
there contained many more provisions for worker registra
tion and the capture of vagrants and they lasted much longer
than in the coastal provinces.85
The need for such harsh legal control of the rural
working classes in the Interior, as in Buenos Aires, indicated
an extraordinary lack of economic control by the owning
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classes.

It is perhaps for this reason that they clung to

local political and administrative control, and thus.
Federalism.

However, if Unitarianism could have sustained

the Interior elites by distributing to them a share of the
revenues collected through the port of Buenos Aires, they
would have been satisfied with a centralized national State.
Unitarianism, though, denied them both the revenues, and
political and economic autonomy and thus the Interior rejected it for Federalism .86

Federalism however turned out

to be a double edged sword for the Interior provinces as the
political and economic autonomy they gained only prevented
their complete ruin - Federalist Buenos Aires province re
mained in control of the port, the import-export revenues,
and the future of the Interior.
In both Peru and Argentina political conflicts between
sectors of the dominant classes were the result of their own
economic conflicts with their laboring classes.

Already

conflict ridden during the colonial era, relations between
the dominant and dominated classes were further made tense
by the ruinous economic effects of the Wars of Independence
and the disappearance of the colonial administrative apparatus
which had managed those conflicts.
Inter and intra economic class conflicts always had the
potential of breaking out into open warfare during the colonial
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period but were held in check by the colonial State bureaucracy
This was possible as long as the bureaucracy was viewed by all
as the legitimate arbiter of such conflicts.

But, its demise

in the wake of the Bourbon reforms and the independence
struggles meant not only that these conflicts might break
out into the open but that they would affect the manner in
which political power was exercised and constituted.
The economic systems of both Peru and Argentina were
made up of a hodge-podge of non-capitalist forms of produc
tion which each required definite political requisites for
their maintenance and reproduction.

What each required was

often contradictory but, since their competition for the
various resources necessary for production - principally
land, labor and mercury (for silver production) - was
mediated through the colonial bureaucracy's control of these
resources, they did not face one another openly - either on
the economic or political level.

Independence, however,

transformed the context of the struggles between elites whose
dominance was based on conflicting social relations of pro
duction.

Without the independent hand of the colonial

political-administrative apparatus, they were thrown into
face to face competition at both the economic and political
levels.

Their conflicts, though, did not take on an economic

form - this would have required a transformation to capitalist
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forms of production which/ of course, did not occur.

Rather,

their conflicts took political form in that each sector of
the dominant class sought a State apparatus which would pro
vide the political requisites necessary to exploit its
laborers.
Thus, in both Peru and Argentina, inter and intra
economic class conflict formed the basis for the political
instability of the first half of the 19th century, and these
conflicts were generally expressed politically, not
economically.

As political power and the State held a crucial

position in providing the requisites of elite domination, how
political power would be exercised and what form the State
would take became the focus of owning class conflict.

In

Chapter VII the political conflicts that shaped the policies
and form of the State in Peru and Argentina will be examined.
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CHAPTER VII

POLITICAL CONFLICT IN 19TH CENTURY PERU
AND ARGENTINA:

POLITICAL CRISIS

AND THE STATE

In the first half of the 19th century most Spanish
American countries were the scene of intense and often
bloody political conflicts.

Though having a basis in inter

and intra economic class conflict, these conflicts dealt
essentially with how political authority would be recon
stituted in the wake of the collapse of the colonial State.
At issue was which groups would be privileged by the new
States and under what State forms and policies these privi
leges would be alloted, as well as what would constitute the
nation itself.
Although the Spanish colonial administration had been
losing legitimacy throughout the Bourbon period, its final
destruction hardly solved the problems its loss of legitimacy
had created.

However inefficient or discriminatory the

Spanish State in America had been, it managed, even in the late
Bourbon era, to assuage and mediate the disputes that the
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creole elite had amongst themselves.

Though they may have

been seething under the surface* "All of these social factions
were bound together during the colonial period by a common
denominator, their loyalty to the crown".^

Independence

governments, most of which were based upon town cabildos
which were the only institutions capable at the time of
exercising authority outside of the Spanish bureaucratic
administration, were hardly credible replacements.

The

crisis of legitimacy, which plagued the colonial establish
ment, infected them too and it became difficult for any
authority to claim the kind of legitimate power represented
by the king, once it was found that the system could be over
turned.

In fact, the popularity of monarchism with many ex

hausted independence regimes can be explained by their search
for some unifying force, above the fray, that could impose
order.^
Spanish colonialism did not prepare the Americans for
independence, although this is not meant in the conventional
sense that it did not develop in the creoles an aptitude for
government or that those who directed the new States were
without political experience.^

indeed, those in charge had

varied experience within the Spanish colonial bureaucracy as
lawyers, bureaucrats, churchmen and soldiers.5

Rather, as

Charles Anderson, argues, the nationalizing tendencies of
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absolutism and mercantilism did not touch Spanish America be
cause the Spanish State deemed it in its interest that the
economy, society and polity of Spanish America remain fragroented with the Spanish State as the only unifying principle .0
The result was that ,7
Independence became not a process of mitosis,
in which prior interaction had led to the
emergence of more or less self sufficient
organisms which could now go their separate
ways, but a rending and tearing apart of the
systemic substance about which social and
economic life was organized....The separation
from Spain did not serve to disentangle a
network of economic and social systems from
the strict regulation of absolute monarchy.
Rather, it severed the web of these relations
and left a ragged edge of broken strands.
Fragmented socially and economically, the break with
Spain only served to fragment Spanish America politically.
Competition within the elite for privileges, wealth, honors
and status that had been contained within the Spanish colonial
administration, became, in its absence, a naked struggle for
political power.®

Those who had been favored by the colonial

system tenaciously clung to those institutions and arrange
ment which assured their domination, while those not favored
attempted to destroy the old system and erect a new regime
more in concert with their interests.

As William Breezley

succinctly states, "Spanish America, at the beginning of the
national period, was characterized by a society in which there
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were numerous factions lacking a common ground for compromise
because there was no agreed-upon loyalty or shared conception
of a state idea ".9
Political conflict and state formation in early 19th
century Spanish America are integrally linked.

At just the

point when the elites required the intervention of the State
to ameliorate or reconcile their differences, it had lost
the requisite strength and legitimacy to perform that role.
The weakness of the State made elite conflict that much more
serious because the State was seen as a tool that could be
captured and used against one's opponents.

The relative

autonomy of the Spanish colonial State was replaced with
administrations that were not only subject to bribery and
influence (as admittedly was the Spanish colonial State) but,
more importantly, outright manipulation and control.
Political conflict, thus, was directed at the State,
particularly with regard to how the country would be structured
socially and economically.

The role of the State was crucial

to all interests because of its central position in the main
tenance and reproduction of the social and economic domination
of Spanish American owning classes during the colonial period.
As we have seen in chapter IV, the reforms introduced by the
Bourbon State in Spanish America led to discontent and protest.
With the disappearance of the Spanish colonial State after the
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Wars of Independence,

discontent: and protest turned into

direct action.
Below, four of the main aspects of political conflict
in Spanish America during the first half of the 19th century
will be examined in the national contexts of Peru and Argen
tina - liberalism vs conservatism, centralism vs federalism
(regionalism), church vs State, and the issue of caudillism.

Liberalism vs Conservatism
Although the conflict between liberals and conserva
tives dominated other political conflicts in Spanish America
in the first half of the 19th century (in fact the centralism
vs federalism and church vs State conflicts were subsumed
within it) there is a great deal of confusion as to who and
what constituted these political tendencies.

Excessive con

centration on an economic interpretation of these tendencies
has reduced them, as Charles Hale has noted, to the positions
of for or against free t r a d e . H a r d and fast delineations
of these two groups tend to dissolve upon closer inspection.
Liberals in Peru, according to Frederick Pike, were opposed
to monarchism, urged the establishment of democratic institu
tions, backed federalism, opposed a large standing army,
sought legislative supremacy over the executive, and favored
religious toleration and church-State separation.
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Conserva-

tives favored a strong centralist State, hierarchic aristocric
government, a large standing army, executive predominance and
a State c h u r c h . H

However, as John Lynch points out,12

In theory liberals favored federalism, supposedly
a decentralized and democratic form of government,
while conservatives demanded a strong executive
and central control. But when the opportunity
occurred liberals would impose liberalism by
central institutions in a unitary regime, such
as that formed by Rivadavia and Sarraiento in
Argentina. And to preserve their control in
particular provinces, or if they happened to
be the *outs', conservatives might well be
federalists.
Nor did conservative politics mean conservative economics as
Prank Safford's examples of the ’liberal' economic ideology
of Mariano Ospina Rodriguez in Colombia and Lucas Alam^n and
Esteban de Antunano in Mexico clearly

show.

The confusion over the definition of these tendencies
is furthered, in the opinion of Safford, by giving them an
occupational determination.^

Robert Schwartz, for example,

argues the traditional identification of conservatives as
landowners and liberals as wealthy merchants.^

This type

of delineation, for Safford, cannot be sustained because
landowners and merchants, as well as bureaucrats, lawyers,
military officers and intellectuals can be found on both
sides.16

For Safford, "There may have been a functional rea

son for this - to survive, each party needed the various con
tributions that could be made by landowners, merchant-
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capitalists, lawyer-ideologists and, certainly, military

men.'1!?
Safford is perhaps exaggerating the balance of forces
in terms of occupational equality between liberals and con
servatives, but he nonetheless has indicated the pitfalls of
such static analysis.

Perhaps more promising is his sugges

tion of dealing with the problem of defining these groups and
their supports in terms of social location.

Here, it is the

relationship of various individuals or groups to the centers
of institutional power which determines whether the individual
or group leans towards liberalism or conservatism.

In

Safford1s words, "Those in the elite whose close early rela
tionship to the structures of power gave them strategic ad
vantages at the beginning of the republican epoch were likely
to end up being termed 'conservative', those who stood at a
greater distance were likely to become 'liberal'".

IB

This

should not be at all surprising, liberalism in the 19th cen
tury was an ideology of protest, particularly against privi
leges derived from close association with the S t a t e . I t
was only natural that elements of the creole elite who were
not favored by the colonial compact would find in this
European bourgeois ideology an echo of their own dissatisfac
tion.
Although creole liberal intellectuals in Spanish
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America may have generally accepted the liberal credo intellec
tually, the evident selectivity they exhibited in its applica
tion indicates only the lack of the appropriate conditions for
20

its application in their countries, not opportunism. u
Indeed, it was also that their liberalism was tainted with a
large dose of Spanish medieval scholasticism which, as we
have seen in Chapter V, leads many commentators to interpret
the independence movements as 'liberal'.

The creole

ideologists of independence could appropriate some aspects
of liberalism because on the issue of absolute power it
mirrored their own scholastic thinking .21
A distinction should also be made between liberal and
conservative politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals and
the elements of the elite which they were representing .22
Particularly in the Viceregal centers of administration like
Lima and Buenos Aires21, there were large numbers of lawyers,
bureaucrats and clerics who made their livings off of the
administration and hundreds more who wanted to.

These ad

ministrators and potential administrators became conserva
tive or liberal in much the same way as the economic elite
although, more importantly, they became the ideologists of
the others and fought the political battles in the capitals.
The ideological disputes received particular clarity and venom
precisely because of competition within this group for
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political and administrative positions.

However, this should

not be construed to mean that the disputes had no social or
economic content.

As we have seen in Chapter VI, the inter

and intra economic conflicts of the elite who were in charge
of the surplus appropriating mechanisms led them to connect
themselves with either the preservers of the status quo or
reformers in the capital.
The roots of liberalism and conservatism in Spanish
America during the first half of the 19th century are clearly
linked to Spanish Bourbon reformism.

Although there was

general dissatisfaction with the reforms in America, the
issue for many creoles was not the reforms themselves but
rather that the expanded commercial economy and bureaucracy
benefited peninsulares and not themselves.

In Argentina, the

liberal regime of Rivadavia was tied to the traditional
Buenos Aires merchant-bureaucrat elite which had received
only relatively minor benefits from the Bourbon reforms when
compared to those received by the peninsulares and a very
few creole merchants tied to them.

The revolution against

the Spaniards was theirs, they felt, and the Rivadavia pro
gram reflected their attempt, even in the face of repeated'
setbacks caused by the failure to secure Upper Peru, Paraguay,
Uruguay and dominance over the Riverine and Interior pro
vinces, to create an economy and society which they could
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dominate commercially.

The program of the liberal Unitarians

was based upon a critique of the Spanish colonial system which
argued that ,25
...the economic and social backwardness
of Argentina was owing not so much to
her lack of material resources as to the
economic and fiscal policies of the Spanish
regime. Restrictions upon production and
distribution, minute regulation of economic
activities, oppressive taxes, all of which
characterized Spain's economic policies,
were contrary to the best interests of the
colony but of the mother country as well.
The policy of restriction was based upon
the notion that the interests of the state
(treasury) were opposed to those of the
individual.
This was, in fact, almost the same critique which the Spanish
Bourbon reformers made of Spain itself in the 18th century .25
It is not surprising that for the creoles the solution was
similar, centralization of administration, reduction of
regional autonomy, the development of agriculture and the
freeing of trade.

The Rivadavia plan called for the com

plete dismantling of colonial restrictions, and the recon
stituting of the economy on a more 'modern* basis under the
aegis of a powerful yet paternalistic State .27

The goal of

the Unitarians was thus an integrated national economy in
which foreign trade, foreign investment and foreign immigra
tion would play a major role .28
The opposition to the Unitarian plan, Federalism, cannot
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rightly be called 'conservative', although in some sense it
may be perceived as such.

A distinction should also be made

between provincial Federalism and porteno (Buenos Aires)
Federalism, both of which had liberal and conservative ten
dencies.

Federalism on the whole stood for provincial

autonomy in politics and economics against the central State
and thus could appeal to rather different

i n t e r e s t s . 29

i n

the face of Unitarian supremacy in the executive and legisla
ture, the mass of conflicting interests that made up the
opposition could come to no other basis for agreement.

Every

interest that was threatened by the centralizing scheme of
Rivadavia could at least agree on the need to halt it.20
Perhaps what most turned the provinces against the Rivadavia
plan was its call for the elimination of the provincial
governments' institutional autonomy which had served as a
major prop of the provincial elites.

Local political control

insured that they would control the local economy and not be
forced to compete with the foreign or porteno merchants.
Yet, they were not against free commerce within the country
itself and recognized the need for some kind of political
and economic association with Buenos Aires and the rest of
the provinces.21

Portefio Federalism tended to have greater

conservative tendencies.

The conservative portenos - estan-

cieros (ranchers) and saladeros (owners of meat salting
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plants) - were perhaps the most privileged economic sector in
Buenos Aires province and hadr more than any other sector
except the politican-intellectuals, reaped the benefits of
independence due to the breakdown of inter-provincial commerce
and the opening of the economy to foreign trade.

They opposed

the Unitarians because they believed that the Unitarian policy
of trying to force the provinces into a centralized State
structure was chiefly responsible for the instability and war
fare rampant in Argentina that was so harmful to their busi
n e s s e s . ^

They also resented the Rivadavian constitution of

1826 which would have nationalized the city of Buenos Aires
and denied the province its import-export revenues.

This

they believed would lead to higher taxation in the province
as the only means of financing a provincial government.^

in

any case, the constitution would have negated the privileged
position they had gained by virtue of controling one of the
few remaining sources of national wealth, immersing them
within a political and economic system in which their in
fluence would be of less

consequence.

^4

The effective elim

ination of the Unitarians by Juan Manuel de Rosas' Federalist
regime in Buenos Aires did not however remove the basis for
inter-elite conflicts over the form that the nation would
take.

*/

It continued in the conflict between porteno Federal

ists and provincial Federalists.
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I will return to this

conflict in the section on centralism vs federalism.
Liberalism and conservatism in Peru were more clearly
defined than in Argentina because the harsh lines of the
colonial past were more deeply ingrained there.

The liberal

tendency, which was predominantly urban based and had sat out
the movements for independence - putting their faith in the
liberal Spanish constitution of 1812, finally became the domi
nant force in 1827 (at least in Lima) after a number of set
backs at the hands of San Martin, whose interests, if not
affinities lay with the more established or conservative groups
in the capital, and Bolivar, who brought with him his own
’foreign* administrators.35

The liberals, generally weak

except in the capital, the depressed areas of the Coast in the
environs of Lima and in some provincial towns favored a con
siderably more open society than had existed during the
colonial regime.

They obviously hoped that a system based

upon merit rather than inherited status would favor them.

They

preferred a relatively weak central authority which they could
dominate and control through the legislature, the decentrali
zation of political authority - though not federalism presumably to afford coastal hacendados more direct control
over labor distribution and control, and legislative control
over the church and military - institutions seen by them as
strongholds of colonial, and thus conservative, dominance.35
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The liberals in Peru were particularly successful in
constitution writing, having created the constitutions of 1823,
1828, 1834, 1856 and 1867.

However, the application of these

instruments was rarely effective.

This was a result of two

separate but related developments.

First, the destruction of

the old political structure and its legitimacy created a
crisis in administration throughout the country.

Promotion

and appointment within the bureaucracy became capricious and
filled with dangers and disappointments as the weak liberal
establishment in Lima cast suspicion upon the loyalty of
administrators far from Lima.3?

And second, the military,

that sector of the bureaucracy which because of its function
was best able to retain its autonomy from the political
center tended to become dominant, especially in Peru where a
relatively professional army derived from the remnants of
the Spanish army in America and the independence forces
organized by Bolfvar was institutionally stronger than the
State itself.38

a

military career thus became a surer en

trance to political power than any civilian occupation.
Peruvian liberals concentrated their efforts on con
trolling or eliminating the sources of competition with their
State - the military and the church - which, at the same time
were the bulwarks of conservative power.

Liberals were not

belcw, however, putting forth their own military caudillos
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if a military man could buttress their authority.

Neverthe

less, they chose relatively weak generals like Luis Jos£ de
Orbegoso and Jose^ de La Mar who felt they could easily control
and dominate and thus, were faced with defeat at the hands of
more powerful conservative generals like Agustrn

Ga r a a r r a . ^ 9

The liberal constitution of 1834 reflected their experiences
with La Mar, Orbegoso and Gamarra in that it,*®
...gave to congress the power to designate
the size and composition of the armed forces.
A supreme council of war was created, its
members elected by congress, as a further
means of establishing civilian control over
the military.... £itl also stipulated that
no additional commissions to officer rank
would be given except as vacancies occurred
and that promotions were to be based solely
upon distinguished service on the field
of battle.
Such legislation was, however, ineffective as the conservative
provincial elite continued to provide backing for a host of
military caudillos who captured the State, "...for the pur
pose of guaranteeing a perpetuation of the status quo against
the 'excesses' of the liberalism of the urban intellectuals".**
Both the crisis engendered by military caudillism and the
liberal - conservative conflict over the church in Peru will
be discussed below.

Centralism vs Federalism (Regionalism)
Conflict over whether the political structure should be
centralized or decentralized affected countries throughout
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Spanish America in the first half of the 19th century and was
a result of two tendencies in conflict since the Bourbon re
forms.

As we have seen in Chapters III and IV, the political

Bourbon reforms sought to centralize the old Hapsburg system
of administration which lent the colonies a good deal of
local autonomy.

Obviously creoles were split on the merit

of this reform depending upon whether their interests were
harmed or furthered by it but, their general opinion was to
see the hordes of peninsular administrators who attempted to
reduce local autonomy as a threat.

Within this opposition

however, were two positions which were not to become important
until after political power had devolved upon the creoles.
On the one hand there was opposition by those, principally in
the viceregal capitals, who were denied positions in the ex
panding bureaucracy because they were creoles, and on the
other hand, those in the provinces who suffered the loss of
local control.

In addition, the geographic decentralization

of the Viceroyalty of Peru instituted by the Bourbons and
discussed in Chapter IV, which disrupted established patterns
of political administration and commerce made the creation of
nations out of the colonies that much more difficult and con
tentious .
The centralist-federalist and regionalist conflicts
were at the very heart of the problem of State formation in
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Spanish America.

With the disappearance of the Spanish

colonial State and two competing patterns of rule in con
flict (the Bourbon and the Hapsburg) the conflict over State
formation not only took the form of an internal battle within
Spanish American countries but of international battles as
well.

In no other country in Spanish America was this conflict

more a central fact of political life than in Argentina.
There, according to Joseph Criscenti, when the independence
movement got underway there were two quite distinct tendencies
regarding what constituted or would constitute the nation.

In

the provinces, particularly the Interior provinces, there was
a strong following for a continental solution to the problem
of nationhood wherein each province would become an indepen
dent political unit in its own right, joined to a great
federation of all the other provinces of the continent.4^

This

solution had obvious roots in the Hapsburg Viceroyalty of
Peru.

The tendency most predominant in Buenos Aires however,

saw the nation as the geographic extent of the Viceroyalty of
Rio de la Plata in which the provinces would be subordinate
to Buenos Aires .43

This solution had its roots in the Bourbon

Viceregal decentralization.

A third tendency however, that

was to prove almost indomitable in the first half of the 19th
century was the autonomist tendency which had its roots in the
conflict between the continental and Viceregal visions of the
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nation.
The continental tendency, which was represented by Jos^
de San Martxn and Carlos Maria de Alvear of the Lautaro Lodge,
lost a great deal of support in the Interior when, as the war
against the Spanish forces in America appeared to be headed
for defeat, their monarchist leanings became apparent in the
search by the Directory for a European aristocrat to preside
over America.^

When the continentalist constitution of

1819 in which the nation was defined as the 'United Provinces
of America* was rejected by the provinces, the disintegration
of the Viceroyalty became complete.

45

Although autonomism within the continentalist tendency
won out over centralizing monarchism, the conflict over what
form the nation and the State would take did not end there.
The provinces went their own separate ways, forming their
own decidedly centralist States and hoping for a continental
ist solution that would preserve their political autonomy.
This continentalist tendency was most vigorous in C<5rdoba
which, being the most populous and wealthy of the Interior
provinces, became a natural opponent to Buenos Aires.

As

each province declared its independence and set up its own
State structures pending a general congress which would de
cide the future of the nation, Cc>rdoba made provisions for
its advent by adopting, "...on January 30, 1921, a 'Reglamento
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Provisorio* which was to receive the approval of the 'authority
of the confederation,' the 'General Congress of the States'.
Executive power was vested in a 'governor of the republic',
the legislature in a congress.

With the consent of the General

Congress of the States the governor could negotiate treaties
with one or more provinces. "46

Tucuma*n and Cuyo followed

Cordoba's lead enacting similar legislation while throughout
the Interior autonomism led to further fragmentation of the
Intendencies into provinces.*7
Although the autonomist tendency pervaded all of
Argentina the Viceregal tendency still had a strong base in
the city of Buenos Aires.
Unitarianism.

This tendency came to be called

With the fall of the Directory, the Unitarians

quickly became the dominant force in the Buenos Aires State.
Rather than pushing their plan for the reconstitution of the
Viceroyalty under the hegemony of Buenos Aires - which had
already been rejected by the provinces at the Congress of
Tucum^n in

1821^8

and was not popular with the conservative

porteno estanciero-saladeros who, with the failure of their
monarchist plans, became more and more autonomist-federal
ist*^ - they bided their time hoping that success in creating
prosperity and stability in Buenos Aires province would con
vince the provinces of the value of becoming part of their
plan for an Argentine nation .50
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Although the Unitarian pro

gram did bring some prosperity to the province it could not
overcome the opposition of the provinces and rural elites of
Buenos Aires province who believed that the urban 'monocracy'
which the Unitarians represented did not and could not attend
to their particular interests .51
With the rejection of the Unitarian constitution in
1827, the government of Rivadavia fell and its plans for a
centralized national State were destroyed.

Manuel Dorrego,

a Federalist, was made governor of Buenos Aires province in
1828 and proceeded to put the Federalist program into practice
by recognizing the independence of the provinces and con
cluding treaties with a number of them .^2

Dorrego, however,

leaned too closely towards the interests of the provinces
for the porteffo Federalists and they supported, according to
Criscenti, the Unitarian General Juan Lavalle who, at the
head of the national army returning from the war with Brazil,
overthrew Dorrego.

Far from bringing the peace and tran

quility that the rural elites desired, Lavalle's execution of
Dorrego brought a provincial invasion of Buenos Aires and
they immediately shifted their support to Juan Manuel de Rosas,
who was acceptable to the provincial Federalists and made a
kind of unstable peace with the Unitarian army under General
Joss' M. Paz in Cdrdoba .^2
The regime of Rosas will be discussed in Chapter VIII,
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but several aspects of his rule are relevant here.

Rosas, it

seems, as leader of the autonomist tendency in Buenos Aires
Federalism would have been satisfied to have isolated the
province and concentrated upon the needs of the class he
represented until such time as stability in the region allowed
the formation of a federation.

However, the successes of the

Unitarian Army in the Interior under Paz in 1830, forced
Rosas to come to the defence of the provincial Federalists if
only to protect his regime in Buenos Aires.

Thus began his

holy war against the 'savage

With resistance

Unitarians'.^

to his rule in both Buenos Aires province and the other
provinces by the 1840's, Rosas found that the only sure means
of dominating his opponents was a powerful centralized State
under his personal control.

The provincial leaders were kept

within the Rosas fold through the threat of armed force while
in Buenos Aires province terrorist campaigns kept his oppo
nents at bay.

Rosas the Federalist, became Rosas the

centralist.
Rosas ruled with an iron grip on the Federalist pro
vinces and it was the Federalist provinces under the leader
ship of Justo J o s ^ d e Urquiza that overthrew him in 1852.
Yet, the overthrow of Rosas did not solve the problem of
national organization, it eliminated the logjam created by
Rosas, but not the fundamental conflict between Buenos Aires

293

and the provinces.

The power and wealth of Buenos Aires

was built on the basis of policies which strangled the export
trade of the Riverine provinces and denied the port market
to the Interior provinces.

Urquiza, who was successful in

organizing all of the other Argentine provinces into a Con
federation in 1852 was unsuccessful in getting Buenos Aires
to join.

This was chiefly because the Federalist plan called

for the domination of the province of Buenos Aires by the
Confederation through the separation of the port from the
p r o v i n c e . i n September 1852, a coalition of urban elites
and rural caudillos (former lieutentants of Rosas) overthrew
the puppet government of Urquiza in Buenos A i r e s . ^

However,

the military aggressiveness of the new government in
attempting to bring the entire Confederation under its sway
received swift reaction against it by the rural caudillos
and the forces of the Confederation.®®

These movements against

Buenos Aires ultimately failed and the independent province of
Buenos Aires and the Confederation fought an economic war with
one another until the matter was settled on the field of
battle with Urquiza's defeat by a porteno army headed by
Bartolome' Mitre in September 1861.®®

Mitre, now both governor

of Buenos Aires and president of the Confederation, proceeded
to enact the plan of Rivadavia and secure the dominance of
Buenos Aires over the rest of the Argentine provinces.®®
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The issue of centralism vs federalism Cor regionalism)
did not so dominate the political scene in Peru .61

Yet, as

in Argentina, there were two aspects to this conflict - one
rather mild conflict over the centralization or decentrali
zation of the State and the other, over the geographic extent
and balance between the regions that would make up the
Peruvian nation.

Neither of these conflicts tore Peru apart

the way they did Argentina but, they contributed to the
instability of the era and became grist for the mill of
caudillo warfare.
Peruvian liberals, who, as we have seen, at least con
trolled the legislative branch of early national governments
evidenced an ideological preference for federalism and the
decentralization of the State administration but did not
follow this preference with action.

The federalist faction

within the liberal congress of 1823 suffered defeat as the
liberal majority wrote into the Constitution a decidedly cen
tralized political structure.6^

Although all Peruvian con-

stitutions except those of 1856 and 1867 rejected federalism,
the federalist tendency existed with more reality in the
actual political makeup of the country than any words printed
in the constitution.

The tradition of rewarding military

leaders with the prefectures of the departments and basing
national armies under the control of those prefects upon
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Indian tribute revenues collected at the department level,
gave these military chieftains strong regional bases from
which to challenge the central S t a t e . A t

times these

military men represented legitimate regional grievances
against what was considered the overbearing central adminis
tration in Lima and at times they only represented themselves.
Nevertheless, they gave regional animosities the destructive
power they might not have had with central control over the
military .65
Perhaps no reform went further to reduce regional in
dependence than Ramc^n Castilla's abolition of the Indian
tribute.

In the sierra, local governments and warlords who

relied upon that revenue became dependent upon the revenue
passed along to them by the central State in Lima.

However,

as Frederick Pike comments, ".../itj produced a type of
centralism that actually still further separated the various
part of the country rather than binding them together.

The

longer this centralism...by the capital remained in effect,
the more intense became the regional animosities that it
generated .''00

Regionalism or federalism continued to be an

issue in Peru throughout the 19th century but, as Jos^Carlos
Marfategui relates, "Actually, the parties were not anxious
to abolish centralism.

Sincere federalists were not only few

in number and scattered among the different parties, but they
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exercised no real influence on opinion. They did not represent
a popular c a u s e . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,

the imposition of a cen-

tralistic order on the departments and their reaction against
it added to the political instability of the era and the dif
ficulty in consolidating the State.
The definition of the geographical extent of the nation
was a much shorter and violent affair.

Two tendencies/ though

they were not mutually exclusive, were evident
economic and political motives.

and both had

As in Argentina, these ten

dencies represented attempts by Peru to reconstruct the
administrative and economic pattern of the Hapsburg Vice
royalty by annexing Ecuador and/or Bolivia.

Perhaps the more

politically motivated of these movements was the invasion of
Colombia (Ecuador was then part of Colombia) by President
J o s ^ d e La Mar in 1828 with the encouragement of the 'war
mongering' liberal congress.

The congress not only sought

to annex Ecuador which had been disputed over by the Viceroyaltys of Peru and New Granada ever since the latter's
establishment i n *1739®®, but also to destroy the Bolivarian
conservatives in Colombia, hoping for a liberal ascendancy
there.

70

La Mar?^ secured Guayaquil but was defeated by

Bolivar's forces at C u e n c a ^ though, he was perhaps defeated
more by a plot by Generals Agustin Gamarra and Antonio
Gutierrez de La Fuente to discredit him on the field of battle
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by having Gamarra retreat and allowing defeat.73

Gamarra then

forced the liberal congress to make him president and La Fuente
vice president.74
The attempt to reconstruct the Viceregal patterns of
administration and commerce on the southern flank with the
annexation of Bolivia by Peru (or Peru by Bolivia) was per
haps the more important and potentially beneficial to both.
The separation of southern Peru from Upper Peru (Bolivia) by
the Bourbons in the 18th century seriously upset the regional
economies of both, because they had formed, since at least the
Inca period, one political, social and economic unit.

The

logic of the Bourbon reformers in separating them was, as we
have seen in Chapter IV, strategic - to finance the Vice
royalty of Rio de la Plata with the silver mines of Upper
Peru.

There was then good historical precedent and economic

logic to the re-unification of these two areas.

The attempt

however, was only to increase instability in Peru and Bolivia
and subject the former to invasion by Chile.
The idea of a Peru-Bolivia Confederation arose with the
desires of Generals Andres Santa Cruz and Gamarra to re-unite
the sierra, although each preferred unification under their
own domination.

Santa Cruz and Gamarra first agreed to the

formation of a Peru-Bolivia Confederation when Gamarra was
plotting to overthrow La Mar.
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The plan was for Gamarra and

his army to march into Bolivia and pressure the president of
Bolivia, General Jos^f de Sucre, to abandon the country.

With

Sucre gone, Santa Cruz, a native Bolivian, would assume con
trol and declare for a Peru-Bolivia Confederation with him
self as its head.

Gamarra, having seized power in Peru,

would join the Confederation and receive a high position in
the new

S t a t e .

?5

Santa Cruz gained control of Bolivia but
76

Gamarra betrayed him and ignored the agreement.

However,

given Santa Cruz's commitment to a Peru-Bolivia Confederation,
Gamarra decided that it would be best if he acted first and
prepared to invade Bolivia.

Only the meiiation of the dispute

by Chile in 1831 forstalled war between the two.??
The Peru-Bolivia Confederation became a reality in 1836
under the leadership of Santa Cruz after a confusing and vio
lent game of musical presidential chairs in Peru.

These

macabre events included an attempt by Gamarra to oust the
legal president General Luis Jose"de Orbegoso, another deal
between Gamarra and Santa Cruz to create a Peru-Bolivia Con
federation once Gamarra had seized power in Peru, a revolt by
General Felipe Salaverry against Orbegoso, and an alliance
between Orbegoso and Santa Cruz against Gamarra and Salaverry
which stipulated that Orbegoso agree to a Peru-Bolivia Con
federation under the leadership of Santa

Cruz.?8

The Santa

Cruz-Orbegoso alliance ultimately won the internal struggle
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and Peru was divided into two republics - South Peru, headed
by Santa Cruz and North Peru, headed by Orbegoso.

Santa

Cruz remained president of Bolivia in addition to becoming
the head of the entire Confederation.

The Confederation had

a great deal of support in the Peruvian highlands with the
elites of both Areguipa and Cuzco believing that they had at
last been freed of the domination of

L i m a .

79

In the end though, the Confederation really pleased no
particular region,®®
Lima resented the debilitating division of
Peru and domination by a Bolivian.
Southern
Peru would have preferred union of only itself
and Bolivia, a weaker Confederation that might
have been controlled from Areguipa,
the capi
tal of the South. La Paz opposed the selection
of Lima as the seat of the general government
of the Confederation and citizens of both Peru
and Bolivia objected to the impairment of their
nations * independence.
However, it was the intervention of Chile rather than over
whelming internal discord that sounded the death knell of
the Confederation.

Chile, under the sway of Diego Portales,

feared its now powerful neighbor to the north believing that
with his success in re-establishing the east-west axis of
the old Viceroyalty, Santa Cruz would attempt to re-establish
the north-south axis and swallow up Chile.

In fact, Portales

considered the destruction of the Peru-Bolivia Confederation
as Chile's 'second independence'.®^
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Chile also had a long

standing trade dispute with Peru which was settled when
Salaverry momentarily took over the presidency but was recinded by Santa Cruz, while Portales believed that Santa
Cruz was behind an attempt to overthrow his conservative
government.®^

In 1839, with the aid of the ever present

General Gamarra, Chilean forces defeated Santa Cruz and the
Confederation was dissolved - Peru and Bolivia receiving
back their respective sovereignties.®®

Gamarra, now presi

dent of Peru again, made one last attempt to create a PeruBolivia Confederation and died trying.

Gamarra was killed

on the battlefield at Ingavr, Bolivia with the defeat of his
Peruvian Army.®^

Church vs State
Although the 19th century conflict between the church
and State had economic and ideological aspects, it was pri
marily a political conflict that centered upon what role the
church as an institution would play in the new nations.

The

church, as one of the more powerful institutions of colonial
society, presented a distinct challenge to the new Spanish
American States because of its wealth, legitimacy and internal
institutional strength.

During the colonial period, as we

have seen in chapter III, the church functioned as the right
arm of the crown, forming an integral part of the State
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through the king's right of patronage over the Catholic church
in America.

Although the church was a bastion of conservatism

and hierarchy within the colonies and thus a prop of the creole
elites against the lower classes, it also functioned to con
trol the creoles in the interest of the crown through the
Inquisition and its restrictions on the use of the Indian
labor force.

The church’s monopolization of the economy in

some areas like Paraguay** 5, and its role as chief rural creditor^G, often made it the object of creole disfavor.
When independence was won, the dual nature of the
church's role in society produced contending reactions in
favor of the church and against it depending upon the politi
cal, economic and social goals of various creole factions.
The early attack on church wealth, for example, received
support from almost all elite sectors.

In the 1850's and

1860's when most Spanish American States took over the finances
of the church in order to raise much needed funds, they reduced
the debts owed to the church by creole landowners to a frac
tion of their value and liberals as well as conservatives took
advantage of that windfall.

In Peru, for example, though no

figures are available, Arnold Bauer contends that these
church obligations, "...evaporated in bureaucratic confusion;
the documents of others were lost or disposed of in 'a most
irregular manner'."®^

The lands of the regular clergy were
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confiscated or severely reduced by republican governments with
little protest from the conservatives because these estates
often competed for land and labor with theirs.

They also were

able to buy these properties from penurous governments at
greatly reduced prices.®®

The Inquisition/ hated by all

creoles because it was directed at them, was swept away
without protest, although the intolerance for un-orthodoxy was
not .89
Attacks against the wealth of the church

only became a

source of contention when it was recognized by the conserva
tives that the social control and political roles of the
church, which they sought to maintain, were being erroded by
attacks on its wealth.

However, both liberals and conserva

tives, when in power, sought to bring the church under the
control of the State; the liberals to expel church influence
from temporal affairs, the conservatives to use it, much as
had the Spanish crown, as an arm of the State.
and conservative factions

Both liberal

of the creole elite then, asserted

the right of the new States to the patronato of the Spanish
kings.

Neither sought an independent church and this put the

Spanish American States at loggerheads with not only the church
hierarchy but also with the Pope .90
In the early years of independence conflicts also raged
within the clergy itself.

High ecclesiastic positions in
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America had been dominated by peninsulares and thus, the lower
clergy, which was predominantly creole, welcomed, and even
participated in, the anti-Spanish independence movements.
Often, liberal clergymen led the fight for State control over
the church, especially in attacks on the regular clergy.
However, this liberal interregnum did not last.

As these self

same clergymen became the rules of the national churches, they
also became the most ardent defenders of the autonomy of the
church.
In neither Argentina nor Peru did the church-State
conflict ever reach the fever pitch or violence that it did
fll

in Mexico.

But, the conflict chat did exist was indicative

of the difficulty the new States had in asserting their
authority and legitimacy and managing elite conflicts.

In

Argentina, the church and its hierarchy was subjected to
attacks by, and the control of, the independence regimes very
early.

The Bishops of Buenos Aires, Cordoba and Salta were

removed from control over their churches by the civil
authorities and replaced with priests who were considered
'patriotic* while the clergy was used to propagandize the
faithful as to the rightness of the new order .92

Without the

higher clergy in control, the inherent conflict between the
regular and secular clergy 'led to a fight with fists and
knives' which the State often did nothing to halt, the better
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to control both sides .9 3

Church properties, especially those

of the regular orders, were confiscated by the State while
appointments to high ecclesiastic positions were made depen
dent upon one's adherence to the independence cause.

All

churchmen were now considered, "...as another class within
the State, and obliged therefore 'to share in the conservaP

tion of the whole, on the existence and increase of which the
welfare of each part depends"* 94

The result of these attacks

upon the church was a cowed and ineffective institution whose
members, without the guidance of the hierarchy, suffered a
'moral' and religious decline.
In 1822, Bernardino Rivadavia, then the principal minis
ter in the Unitarian government, got the congress to abolish
the tithe and ecclesiastical fuero, put church finances,
(including those of the regular orders) under Stare supervision,
restrict the regular orders' recruitment to those over 25 years
of age and set the membership of ecclesiastic houses to a
minimum of 16 and a maximum of 30.

In addition, some regular

orders were suppressed altogether and their property turned
over to the State while the State was made responsible for
funding the church.®®

The reaction to these reforms was limited

yet violent as ultramontane opposition developed led by
Gregorio Tagle who, with the cry of 'religion o muerte'
attacked the

g o v e r n m e n t .

This movement was supported by
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conservative port dno estanciero-saladeros who opposed the
secularization program of the Unitarians.9®
With the rise of the Federalist Rosas in the 1830's,
the church believed it had found a friend and supporter.
Rosas went to great lengths to reassert the temporal influence
of the church although, only under his control and for his
purposes.

The clergy became ardent supporters of Rosista

Federalism, denouncing the 'savage Unitarians' from the pulpit
and extrolling the 'Holy Federal Cause*.

Some fanatics such

as Father Gaeta, "...draped his statues in federal colours
and badges, and began all his sermons with the exhortation
'Parishioners, if there is any filthy Unitarian savage among
us, crush h i m '."99

Rosas regarded the Unitarians as 'enemies

of Jesus Christ' and set to reverse the reforms of Rivadavia,
returning church property, re-instating the Dominicans and
even authorizing the return of the Jesuits.

The Jesuits

returned but were expelled again by Rosas when they refused
to become part of the religious arm of his dictatorship.
Though the church was nurtured and protected by Rosas, it be
came a State church, more so than any in Spanish America at
the time.
Perhaps the chief basis for church-State conflict in
Argentina has been the exercise of the right of patronage by
the

S
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rr^e State has never conceded its right to
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appoint high ecclesiastic officials and rule on communications
between the national church and Rome, nor has the Pope con
ceded to the State the right to exercise these perogatives.
This has led to conflict not only between the Argentine State
and Rome but between the State and the national church.

The

national clergy, hoping to retain its independence vis-S-vis
the State by putting itself under the authority of Rome, has
been in continuous conflict with the civil authorities who
desire to control it.

Though this conflict has not been

serious, it has remained a cause of considerable friction
between the church and State throughout the 19th and into
the

20th

c e n t u r i e s . ^-03

In Peru, the secular clergy were early participants in
the independence governments but these were the lower clergy,
not the hierarchy.

Liberal clergymen like Francisco Javier

de Luna Pizarro and Mariano Jos^ de Arce were important
figures in early governments and sought closer control of
the church by the State.104

iower clergy of Peru were

predominantly creoles of either pure Spanish or mestizo ori
gins who had been discriminated against by

the crown's

preference for peninsulares in high ecclesiastic appoint
ments .^-05

It is hardly surprising then that a large con

tingent of them would be ardent supporters of creole inde
pendence.

They were also in the forefront of the movement
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to reform the church and put it under the control of the
State which was a reflection of their strong position within
the congress and the resistance of their Bishops to the
independence movement.
The bulk of the clergy, including the hierarchy, was
not in favor of independence and was less in favor of the re
forms introduced by the independence governments.

The oppo

sition of Archbishop Bartolom^ Maria de Las Heras to San
Martin caused his expulsion from the country while Bolivar's
policies of reducing the number of monasteries and convents,
reducing Indian payments to the clergy, reducing the number
of religious holidays, and filling bishoprics without Papal
approval led to intense clerical opposition in the sierra,
led by the only remaining Bishop in the country, the creole
Jos^ Sebastian Goyenche of Arequipa.

For his opposition,

Goyenche was relieved of his authority, though not his
office. ^06
In the early national period both liberals and con
servatives were apparently in agreement on the principle of
State control of the church but with, it seems, two different
visions of its role.

Liberals wanted to reduce the influence

of the church in politics and society while the conservatives
favored a church dependent upon the State but functioning as
a State directed social control mechanism against the lower
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classes.10?

s>he usefulness of the Church for the conserva

tives , and the reason for the need to
of the liberals,

curb it in the opinion

is obvious in an incident described

S.S. Hill who traveled throughout Peru in the 1850's.

by
Hill

found that when the town authorities of Arequipa wanted a
pile of dirt removed from an excavation in the town square
they called upon the Bishop to help.

The Bishop had a statue

of San Juan from a church in a nearby

Indian village removed

and set upon the pile of dirt and declared to the Indian
villagers that it would not be put back in their church until
the pile of dirt had been cleared away .108
The conflict over church-State relations in Peru did
not become an important issue until the conservatives took
up the cause of the church in earnest in the late 1830's.

The

liberals felt that the only way to break the temporal power of
the church was to weaken its internal cohesion which was based
on hierarchy.

They therefore began favoring the democratiza

tion of the church.

Liberals like Manuel Lorenzo de Vidaurre

and Francisco de Paula Gonzalez Vigil called for democrati
zation of the structures of the church, the abolition of
ecclesiastic privileges, freedom of thought within the church,
freedom from Papal authority and a return to the simplicity
and poverty of the early church .109

In effect, the liberals

were calling for the abolition of hierarchy and authoritari-
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anism in the c h u r c h . T h e conservatives, who had been un
concerned with past liberal attempts to put the church under
the control of the State, saw this new liberal tactic as a
threat to them and began supporting the church against the
State, even to the extent of supporting ultramontanism.
Having changed their tack on the church-State issue, conserva
tives began supporting churchmen like Bartolom^Herrera, a
confirmed ultramontanist. m

The conservatives and Herrera

came to believe that the only way to save Peru from the con
stant instability and warfare of the age was for the people
to be subject to the authority of the church.

For Herrera,

only the church could say what the law should be because all
authority and sovereignty was derived from God.

Herrera's

position thus was not only ultramontane, it was intensely
theocratic.
Though the debate continued on an ideological level
throughout the 19th century, the political conflict between
liberals and conservatives on this issue was solved by
president Ram^n Castilla's compromise constitution of 1860.
In this constitution, the liberals won the suppression of
separate ecclesiastical courts and fueros, the prohibiting of
State collection of church tithes in favor of a State subsidy
to the church and a system of public education that would end
the monopoly of the church in education.
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The conservatives

won safeguards to church wealth and property, relative
autonomy to the church's internal organization, the perpetua
tion of Catholic exclusiveness in Peru, and most importantly,
a highly centralized authoritarian S t a t e . W i t h

this

assured, the Peruvian conservatives abandoned the ultramontanetheocratic position of Herrera while the liberals, although
they did try to reverse this 'defeat' in the constitution of
1867, generally retreated from this battle.

The Rise Of The Caudillo
Caudillisiu, which arose throughout Spanish America in
the first half of the 19th century, was more a result of
political, social and economic conflicts within the elites
than it was the cause of them.

A combination of the break

down of political and social controls and the militarization
of Spanish American societies during the Wars of Independence
produced this rather informal system of political power and
recruitment which was bridled and then eliminated with the
consolidation of strong central States in the late 19th
century.
The phenomenon of caudillism is directly related to
both the form and breakdown of the Spanish colonial State.
The form of rule within the Spanish bureaucracy which cen
tralized executive, legislative and judicial power in the
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same office gave legitimacy to the form of one man rule that
became the hallmark of caudillism.^^

The breakdown of the

Spanish State apparatus in America saw no satisfactory replace-*
ment, given the factionalism and conflict within the elites
and weakness of the independence governments .116

In the

countryside and provincial centers, however, strong authority
developed upon those institutions at the local level which
were able to weather the storm of the independence struggle
the best - the military and the hacienda based militias. m
With the social control mechanisms of the colonial
State breaking down, and large recruitments of mestizos and
pardos by both sides into their respective armies, the career
of arms became, for a small few of the lower classes, a means
to rise to positions, either in the military or in politics,
which they would never have attained under the colonial
system.

The implications of this breakdown of the rigid

social system which this rise implied however, was exaggerated,
perhaps, by its novelty.

A very few of the lower classes were

able to rise in this manner despite the fears of the creole
119
elites.

Yet, in a sense, Caudillism and the instability it

tended to perpetuate found ardent adherents.

As Tulio

Halperin-Donghi argues, "All that sector of the population
which was not to receive its share of the new wealth, the con
quest of which was held by many to be the only legitimate goal
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of the new Spanish American states, could be classified among
the potential supporters of civil war."120
Evidence supports viewing the caudillo as both the
expression of owning class rule and the expression of the
rural masses or 'folk', as E. Bradford Burns terms them.121
This is perhaps because caudillos performed contradictory
roles.

On the one hand, some local caudillos, although they

lorded over the local population and were more times than not
members of the local elite, also protected the local people
from outsiders - either other caudillos or representatives
of the central government - who 'exploited'

them.

^2

Francois Bourricaud describes a scene from Jcse^Maria
Arguedas' novel Yawar Fiesta in which this protection of the
local population by the 'good* local patrdn is explained,123
When any of the authorities of Cajabamba mayor or judge - did wrong, the people would
come to Don Teodoro in demand of justice.
Then he, at the head of the people, would go
after the wrongdoer, make him get on a donkey,
and ride him out of town with a band of fire
crackers. The person expelled like that never
returned. Don Teodoro explained: 'If we compain
to the capital, they will pay no attention to us.
In Lima they laugh at the Provinces and dump
their scoundrels on us.'
Even those caudillos who had their origins as representatives
of the central authorities like Juan Facundo Quiroga, the
Argentine 'tiger of

the Pampas', could become theprotector

of local

economy.12^

values and

313

On the other hand, the local

caudillo who was a member of the owning class (whether an old
member or new one with lands acquired through war) preserved
the traditional basis of domination - control over land and
administrative positions.

If he were not yet a member, he had

to take into account the local power structure even as it
opposed and feared him.^2^
In both Argentina and Peru, caudillism was an important
aspect of the instability and conflict of the first half of
the 19th century.

In Argentina, the caudillism of the 1820-

1860 period had its roots in the breakdown of both the Vice
regal and independence political structures, the militariza
tion of society with the interminable conflicts of the inde
pendence and civil wars, and localist protectionism against
the economic and political pretentions of Buenos Aires.
The breakdown of the political administration in
Argentina and the ruralization of the basis of political
power tended to place the leadership of both the Unitarian
and the Federalist causes in the hands of military leaders.
For the Unitarians, the generals of the national army began
to serve as its leadership while for the Federalists it was
the rural estancieros at the head of their m i l i t i a s . T h e
estanciero became a natural leader of the militia because of
his ability to provide, organize and provision large numbers
of men, even when the central government could not.
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James

Scobie describes the Argentine caudrllo as,

127

...usually a landowner and decendent of
some powerful creole family.
In the interior
and on the coast, he gathered his gauchos
and peons into irregular but effective cavalry
forces. With this military power and through
his economic and social influence, he became
the government, ruling either directly or
through puppets. Those with land and capital
sought security in his shadow. The rapidly
growing lower classes looked to him for
protection.
In most provinces, local caudillos fought each other for
supremacy, the more successful ones, like Ricardo Lopez
Jordan of Entre Rios, Juan Facundo Quiroga of La Rioja,
Martin Guemes of Salta, Juan Bautista Bustos of Cordoba and
of course Juan Manuel de Rosas of Buenos Aires, becoming
the chiefs and protectors of their provinces.
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Rosas was not only the most successful of the caudillos
but the only one who, for an extended period, was able to
produce a system of national power based upon his domination
of all the other provincial caudillos in the Argentine.

In

his own province of Buenos Aires Rosas attempted to diminish
the powers of the local caudillos by building a strong pro
vincial army not based upon the local estancieros.I29

His

system, however centralized it may have been, did not last
nor did it rid Argentina of caudillism because it did not
institutionalize or legitimize the State itself.

He was

ultimately defeated by the caudillo governor of Entre Rros,

Justo J o s ^ de Urquiza (who had been one of Rosas' most ardent
supporters), who managed to put together a coalition of pro
vincial caudillos for the purposes of removing Rosas from
power in Buenos Aires and organizing a genuine national
federal

S t a t e .

130

The final extirpation of caudillism in

Argentina was left to the governments of Bartolom^*Mitre and
Domingo Sarmiento who, with the expanding power of the national
State, put an end to provincial autonomy.131
Caudillism in Peru, at least at the national level,
tended to be associated with the military proper.

Many of

the national caudillos of the early 19th century, like
Agustfn Gamarra, Andres Santa Cruz, J o s ^ d e La Mar and Ramon"
Castilla held commissions in the Royalist armies during the
Wars of Independence and only switched to the rebels after
Peru was invaded by San Martin or Bolivar.

These were

generally men from modest backgrounds who, with the breakdown
of Royal power were catapulted to national leadership in the
absence of a strong, centralized State in Lima.132

Their

armies, based in the populous and, at least in relation to the
coast, prosperous sierra became the basis of regional and
personal power with which they vied for the presidency of the
nation.133
The caudillo's relationship with the owning classes was
inherently problematic.

Several caudillos, for example,
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J o s ^ d e La Mar, Felipe Santiago Salaverry and Manuel Ignacio
Vivanco had strong connections with, or were themselves
members of, the upper classes.

But, most of the others

related to the elite on the basis of mutual suspicion.

If

the State was too weak to put a brake on social disintegra>

tion, the owning classes were willing to acquiesce and support
the strongmen of the military.*34

xt was not exclusively the

conservative forces that put their faith in caudillism, the
liberals of Lima and the coast also offered up their share
of caudillos like General Orbegoso.

If they could not impose

liberalism through the constitution, they would try to with
the mailed fist.*35
The regime of Ramon Castilla, military caudillo from
Arequipa, did a good deal to finally end caudillism in Peru,
although not in his own lifetime.

Castilla strengthened and

centralized the Peruvian State with windfall revenues secured
by the government's monopoly of the guano trade.

Under

Castilla, the State itself became the greatest power base in
Peru and its largesse began to produce a group - bureaucrats,
merchants, businessmen and coastal plantation owners - who,
in succeeding years, would form a class basis for an effective
Peruvian State.*3®

However, guano revenues were from the be-

gining an unstable basis for the establishment of State power
and it would take the maturation of this class generated by

the policies of Castilla's State to rid Peru of caudillism in
the late 19th century.
States in Spanish America in the first half of the 19th
century were inherently weak given the breakdown of the
legitimacy and political structures of the colonial era.

The

pre-eminent post colonial problem in almost all Spanish Ameri
can countries was the re-establishment of some kind of order
and above all else, a powerful and legitimate State structure.
As we have seen this was hampered by both the legacy of the
colonial system and its destruction.

Political conflicts

wracked the new nations making a new political order almost
impossible to construct.

Yet, it was only through the recon

struction of political order that such conflicts would cease
to tear the nations apart.

In the middle and latter half of

the 19th century there began to emerge, in most Spanish
American countries, States which began to consolidate a class
basis for political order by managing the conflicts we have
just examined.

It was in the process of managing these con

flicts and creating a basis for State power, that States had
a profound effect upon the Spanish American economies.

It

was, in large measure, through these activities of the States
that their economies became export economies.
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CHAPTER VIII

THE STATE AND THE ORIGIN OP THE EXPORT ECONOMY
PERU AND ARGENTINA

The second half of the 19th century saw the beginnings
of the consolidation of the State in most Spanish American
countries and with that, the rise of full-blown export
economies.

Rather than the one creating the other there

arose a dialectical relationship between the two, with the
State clearly the determining instance.

As we have seen,

States in the early 19th century were relatively weak and
clearly unable to manage the intense conflicts within the
owning classes.

In fact, the State itself was most often

the object of those conflicts.

Yet, the position of the

State within a socio-economic formation - the space it occu
pies as the 'public power' .- enforces upon those who occupy
it the role of managing class conflict and creating a class
hegemony within the dominant class, not only in the interest
of the dominant class but, in the interest of the State
itself.1
The economic role of the State is derived from this
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purely political role and, in performing this role it has
economic effects.

Absolutist States, for example, had the

effect of encouraging the development of capitalism in
Western Europe, not because they consciously sought to develop
capitalism but because in encouraging bourgeois development
the States were strengthened and thus were able to perform their
political role - managing class conflict.2
In Spanish America, in the second half of the 19th
century, States seeking to create political order in their
countries steered, often unconsciously, their economies into
the international economy as agro/mineral export economies.
There is no doubt that this v/ould have been impossible without
the existence of the international economy and the increasing
demand for agro/mineral products created by capitalist indus
trialization in Europe.
economies

Nevertheless, Spanish American

did not lock step to the tune of European demand

without the mediation of their States.

It was the internal

constellation of political forces and the activity of the
State in each Spanish American country rather than the pull
of the international economy, that would decide how and to
what degree they would be integrated into the international
economy.^
In 1913, Francisco G a r c ^ Calderon in his Latin America;
Its Rise and Progress observed that Spanish Americans had left
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foreigners to develop their national wealth.

He attributed

this to the inordinate 'bloating' of the State which necessi
tated large customs revenues to pay for huge military and
bureaucratic establishments.4
far from the truth.

In this analysis he was not so

The failure to create, early on, a

unified ruling class in most Spanish American nations led to
the growth of State structures which far exceeded what might
have been necessary.

The resources which these States needed

in order to impose order on conflict ridden societies turned
them towards the only sources of finance available to them foreign trade.

Unable to draw resources out of their own

internal economies which were hardly within their control,
Spanish American States, from the very beginning relied, almost
exclusively, on the customs house.

In this we find the first

step in the creation of dependent economies.

The State And The Creation Of
The Peruvian Export Economy
Peru in the 19th century is probably the clearest example
of a State induced export economy.

Not only was its first im

portant link with the international economy, guano, made by
the State itself, but succeeding links can be traced to the
effects of that first tie.

In the aftermath of the indepen

dence wars the Peruvian economy was, as we have seen, almost
prostrate.

The coastal plantations, in decline since the
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colonial period, were in ruins; the mines never returned to
their former productivity or wealth; and trade, dependent
upon the other two, seriously declined.

Early independence

governments were bankrupt, surviving on forced and foreign
loans.5

The State was forced to rely upon colonial taxes

and the customs house for revenues which were substantially
less than those of the colonial period.
Although the liberals who took charge of the government
were dedicated to dismantling the colonial system, especially
in the sierra, by force of circumstance they had to continue
to rely upon the Indian tribute, now called the 'contribucion
de indigenas1, for State revenues.

The tribute was abolished

in 1808, re-established in 1815, abolished again by San
Martin in 1821 but re-instituted in 1826 when it became
clear that no other source of income could be found.®

The

'contribucion* was the only source of revenue upon which the
State could count, as revenues from customs were subject to
the ebb and flow of commerce.

Until revenues from the guano

trade became important, the 'contribucion* provided almost
1,400,000 pesos of a total of about 3,000,000 pesos collected
by the State, customs revenues making up the balance.
Tariffs in Peru were not, as with many other Spanish
American nations, set for the sole purpose of raising reve
nues.

They were chiefly protective and this indicates the
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influence that the local craftsmen and artisans of Lima had on
the liberal congress (which ideologically favored free trade)
and the limited ability of the Peruvian market to absorb im
ports.8

The tariff of 1826 provided for an 80% duty on all

goods similar to those produced in Peru and 30% on all other
goods.

In 1828 the tariff was revised to completely prohibit

the import of goods 'more or less similar' to those produced in
Peru.8

Included on the prohibited list were olivesr olive oil,

brandy, alcohol, rice, sugarcane, sulfur, cacao, coffee, shoes,
leather, chocolate, vermicelli, flour, soap, liquors, corn,
lard, butter, dried vegetables, horse harnesses and saddles,
furniture, dried fruit, gunpowder, ready-made clothing, salt
peter, salt, straw hats, tobacco, coarse wool and cotton cloth,
tallow and wax candles.1°

This tariff was abolished during the

Confederation period but re-established with the return of inde
pendence. H

Protection did have some beneficial effects, con

tributing to a revival of the textile industry, but Peru had
never beenj. an important producer of agricultural or manufactured
goods and those sectors continued to languish.12

Its economy re

volved around the mines in the highlands and these, despite go
vernment aid in financing the miners' mercury debt and the infu
sion of British capital and machinery, continued to weaken.*-3
The lack of resources available to the State contributed
as much to political instability in Peru as did political
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conflict itself.

In fact, the two were inextricably linked.

If the State was to perform its function of managing the intra
class conflicts of the elite, it had to have the resources
necessary to impose order effectively.

Only this would win

it legitimacy in the eyes of the elite sectors.

The State's

weakness in the face of caudillos whose economic and political
bases were beyond its control, led to a succession of caudillo
led revolts whose aim was the capture of the State itself.
The spoils of success could enhance the power and wealth of a
caudillo and his followers but such success bred further
caudillo led revolts while the State never proved strong
enough, regardless of what caudillo headed it, to impose
order.H

The central State was strengthened and political

conflict attenuated only with the rise of Ramon Castilla to
the Peruvian presidency and the discovery that guano, a
fertilizer of which Peru held a virtual monopoly, could be
marketed in Europe very profitably.
Castilla was a typical military caudillo of the first
half of the 19th century.

Born in Tarapaca^in 1799, his

parents were of the 'lower middle class', his father a merchant-miner working the refuse silver ores of the mines of
El Carmen.

He spent a short period of study in Chile but,

when the Wars of Independence broke out he quickly joined the
Royalist army in Peru.

He was captured by the rebels of
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Buenos Aires but: escaped to rejoin the Royalist forces in
Lima.

After Peruvian independence was declared by San

Martfn in 1821, Castilla joined the rebellion and served
at the battles of Junxn and Ayacucho.

He was rewarded by

being appointed prefect of his native TarapaccT and then
Tacna.

In a dizzying display of false loyalty Castilla

played the game of Peruvian caudillism, first opposing
Gamarra and fighting for Orbegoso, then breaking with Orbegoso,
reconciling with Gamarra and fighting against Orbegoso and
Santa Cruz.

For his 'loyalty' to Gamarra, Castilla was

rewarded with the ministry of the treasury under Gamarra.
Castilla developed his political base in Arequipa where he
married and cemented important connections with the elite.
Of Castilla, Mariategui has said, "Castilla was the military
caudillo at his best."^-^
Yet, skilled and connected as he was, Castilla would not
have been able to succeed in strengthening the State had he
not been fortunate enough to have come to power just when
guano revenues were to provide him with the revenues with
which to do it.

Guano (from the Indian word for the Guanay

bird) is bird excrement which, deposited for centuries on
coastal islands off of Peru proved to be an excellent ferti
lizer which, when its properties were discovered, became much
in demand in European agriculture.
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Roberto Cortes Conde

explains that,^®
The cold currents off Peru make its climate
belie its tropical location. They also account
for the dryness of the coastal zone which con
stituted an agricultural disadvantage in the
central zone, accounted for the accumulation
of enormous deposits of animal excrement in the
islands off the coast of Peru. The coldness of
the water (the Humboldt Current) attracted fish,
hence, birds. The atmospheric dryness permitted
the preservation and calcination of their deposits,
which had a high concentration of nitrogen.
On this collection of rocks, the Chincha Islands, guano de
posits reached one hundred feet in depth and only needed to
be hacked off with picks and shovels, loaded onto waiting
cargo ships and senr to Europe.

There was no need for pro

cessing and thus capital inputs were negligible - a few
tools and a labor force.

19

The State, under the direction of Castilla as treasury
minister, laid claim to these islands in 1840 and ran the
guano trade as a monopoly of the Peruvian State.20

In the

following years guano revenues were to become the basis for
an expanded State bureaucracy and army, the re-capitalization
of the declining coastal agriculture and railroads which began
creating a unified national political structure.

Guano, more

than any other factor, led to the rise of a strong Peruvian
State which could finally impose relative political stability.
In 1865 Pedro Davalos y Liss<5n wrote, 21

335

With abundance, anarchy flees...Until then
Q>efore guano] the government survived on
customs and Indian tribute, and was at the
mercy of funds sent by the Provinces...
With guano, now the government did not have
to fear uprisings, vitality flowed to where
the money was; and Lima became, for the first
time, the social head of the nation.
For the State, guano changed everything.

As revenues

grew the State acquired resources against which regional
caudillo revolts were to prove ineffective.

These reve

nues did not require the State to be beholden to any domes
tic force and allowed it to become 'relatively autonomous'
from the clashing upper class sectors in society.22
But, guano did not become important in Peruvian Stare
finances until Castilla became president in 1845.

The first

guano contract was given, in 1840, to Francisco de Quiroz, a
legislator and president of the Peruvian Chamber of Commerce,
who proposed to pay the government 10,000 pesos per year, for
six years, and advance it 40,000 pesos immediately for the
exclusive right to export guano.23

However, when the govern

ment learned that guano, which Quiroz said would net 12 pounds
per ton in London, fetched 18, it cancelled his contract and
^ j

asked for new bids.

Few bids came in and the contract

again went to Quiroz who, with his London backers, agreed to
pay the State 64% of his net receipts and loan it 287,000
pesos against its anticipated share.
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Three months later, the

government cancelled this arrangement and again contracted
with the Quiroz group for a five year monopoly in which the
treasury would receive advances of nearly half a million
pesos, the first 30 dollars per ton obtained from the sale
of guano plus 75% of any remaining profits.^

The benefits

of guano however did not materialize until the late 1840's.
The British found the only other source of guano in the
world available for the taking on Ichabone Island in the
South Atlantic off of Africa.

Guano exports from Peru could

hardly match those of Ichabone.

In 1846, Peru exported only

25,100 tons compared with Ichabone's 254,527 tons.

But by

1847 the deposits at Ichabone were exhausted.26
Castilla came to the presidency in 1845 after a horren
dous period of civil war between 1841 and 1845.2?

Castilla,

popular with a cross section of the political spectrum,
steered a course geared towards avoiding conflict with either
the liberals or conservatives.

23

As guano income to the State

rose, he was able to increase the size of the bureaucracy,
strengthen the armed forces and create a solid class basis
for the State based on guano revenue disbursements.

29

Throughout Castilla's two presidencies, the intervening period
of the Echenigue government, and into the 1870's guano
revenues rose through a series of lucrative contracts between
the State and domestic and foreign consignees.^®
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By 1852,

guano revenues made up over one third of the national budget
and by 1861 they rose to almost 80%. -*1

Peruvian budgets rose

dramatically, totaling 8,699,000 pesos in 1852, 21,246,000
pesos in 1861 and 42,236,000 pesos in 1869.

32

With these

funds, Castilla was able, between 1851 and 1861, to double
government spending on the bureaucracy and more than triple
the military budget.33

The bureaucracy was stabilized,

regularly paid and expanded so that by 1861 it counted over
33,000 employees - about 1.6% of the total population.**^
The key to the success of the State created by Castilla
was not its ability to impose order.
poorly during the 'guano age'.

That it did rather

Its success lay in the crea

tion of what Shane Hunt calls a 'rentier economy'.33

Peru

became, as it had been during the colonial era with silver,
a society that revolved around one commodity which was con
trolled by the State.

With this control the State could use

the carrot and stick method of rule - those who supported it
received guano contracts, sinecures, grants and favors, those
who did not received the army.

This method, of course, did

not that appreciably reduce political instability as
Castilla's own revolts against the governments of Jos^Hufino
Echenigue in 1854 and Mariano Ignacio Prado clearly show3®
but, the nature of the revolts against the government changed.
No longer were they revolts against the capital, they were now
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initiated to share in the largesse of the State.37
With the huge revenues derived from guano, some 454
million pesos over the 40 year period, the

State created a

class, principally on the coast, which was integrally tied
to the State through guano.

Not only did the Peruvian elite

benefit indirectly through jobs in the bureaucracy and army
but, in 1849, Castilla had been convinced that Peruvians
should participate directly in the guano trade.

Peruvians

received lucrative consignment contracts from the government
and, although it was not until the 1860's that they could
take full control of the trade, large fortunes were made.3®
These fortunes became the basis for the development of a
native banking and credit system which did

much to re

capitalize the large sugar and cotton plantations on the
coast.

39
Castilla used guano revenues to begin retiring Peru's

outstanding foreign and, more importantly, domestic debt.
The foreign debt was a result of the borrowings of a penurous
government during the Wars of Independence and the costs of
Chilean and Colombian assistance against the Spaniards.

The

British debts of 1822 and 1825 were converted into bonds
guaranteed by half the government's share of revenues from
guano consignments shipped to B r i t a i n . H o w e v e r , more im
portant for Peruvian development was the consolidation of
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the domestic debt.

After the State had begun to repay its

foreign debt protests were heard from Peruvians who claimed
that the government's policy should be balanced and should
recognize the obligations of past governments to Peruvians
as

w

e

l

l

.

Castilla agreed to recognize the legitimate debt

incurred by the armies and governments of Peru throughout the
entire post-independence period.

The laws of 1847# 1848 and

1850 allowed Peruvians to present their claims - often
scribbled notes of military caudillos - to a special tribunal
which would make a determination on the legitimacy of the
claim.43

These debts would be converted into bonds paying a

yearly interest rate of 6%.

Claims amounting to 4.3 million

pesos were recognized in the first few years and Castilla
believed that the final accounting would reach between 6 and
7 million pesos.44

In 1851, however, Echenique became presi

dent and claims skyrocketed to over 19,154,000 pesos by 1852.
"Realizing the questionable nature of much of this newly
created debt, the government feared the possibility that a
future administration would repudiate it.

To avoid this, in

1853 it entered into a secret contract with European financial
houses whereby some 9 million pesos of the total was converted
from internal to external debt."4^

When this 'secret' loan

became known, Castilla led a revolution against Echenique and,
although a tribunal of investigation found that over 12 million
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pesos of these claims were spurious, the debt was not repu
diated. 46

Echenique's attitude towards his prodigality was

prophetic, "'What does it matter,' he asked,

'that a few

have enriched themselves whose wealth has also remained in
the country and contributed to the development of these
benefits'."47
Guano revenues were additionally made available to the
coastal elite through the abolition of slavery in 1854.

In

order to win the support of liberal abolitionist Jos^ Galvez
and to enlist the slaves in his revolt against Echenique,
Castilla declared the abolition of slavery.48

However, this

was not an attack on the slave-holding coastal elite.

A Q

Slave

owners were compensated for the loss of their slaves with
bonds worth 300 pesos per slave, sometimes even for already
escaped slaves.

According to Laura Randall, "By 1855, 15,871

certificates of liberation were issued, and payments of
4,761,500 pesos made: 1,432,000 in cash and
bonds.

3,329,500 in

By 1860 25,505 slaves were freed at a cost of 7,651,000

pesos."50

Although Frederick Pike writes that, "The sudden

abolition...produced serious difficulties within the private
/

sector of the economy."51, william Bollinger argues that
there was, "...a smooth transition out of slavery through the
massive importation of indentured servants financed by
generous government compensation for each freed slave.
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In either case, the State policy of compensated manumission
freed a great deal of capital, that had been tied up in
chattels, for further investment on ccastal plantations.
At the same time he abolished slavery, Castilla abolished
the contribucion de indigenas.

Though this had been a major

source of revenue for the State, guano revenues gave Castilla
the freedom to abolish i t . i t s
political and economic effects.

abolition had far reaching
Politically, it weakened the

sierra elite as this internal tax was the basis of provincial
finances.

Without it, as Pike argues, "These governments now

found themselves dependent upon the largesse of the central
bureaucracy in Lima.

Host frequently money was doled out

from Lima not to aid the development of the provinces, but
to entrench in power supporters of the political machine that
was at the moment in control of the

c a p i t a l . "54

^he

'contribucion1 had also been an important coercive device in
the hands of the sierra hacendados.

It was used by them to

force the Indians to work on their lands (as Indians needed
cash to pay the tax) and its abolition led to an economic de
pression in the

h i g h l a n d s .

55

However, the re-imposiition of

the tax by Mariano Ignacio Prado in 1866, in order to make up
for lost guano revenues when the Spanish navy seized the
Chincha Islands in 186456, led to an Indian revolt in the
highlands which was put down by the government and hacendados.
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This outbreak led to the re-imposition of hacienda pre
dominance in the highlands through the breakup of Indian
comunidades

and land confiscations.57

Much of the revenue from guano was dissipated in waste
ful expenditures but Shane Hunt has found that the greater
part of it found its way into the Peruvian economy.58

The

consolidation of the domestic debt, slave compensation, and
guano contracts became the basis for the rise of an export
elite in the late 19th century.

Coastal agriculture became

its first base, as Peter Klaren relates,
Important for the resurgence of coastal
agriculture during this period...was the
guano boom of the 1840* and 1850's, which
for the first time since independence
produced large amounts of capital for
reinvestment in the agrarian sector.
Profits from this 'new industry' rapidly
soared, enriching in the process the old
creole families and parvenue landholders
of the independence period - many of whom
now turned to the problem of reorganizing
and revitalizing coastal agriculture.
Plush with guano money, coastal agriculture began a slow but
steady rise.

Cotton, though helped along by the price rise

and shortage caused by the U.S. civil war, found new pros
perity while sugar prices zoomed.

Yet, neither could have

reacted to these new markets had guano not provided the capi
talization for production, as Hunt relates,
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Landowners had acquired the means to purchase
coolie contracts, partly through payments
received for manumissions of slaves, partly
through finance available from newly created
banks and concentrations of private wealth
created by guano prosperity. This finance
did more than merely purchase a labor force:
It permitted coastal haciendas a spending
spree on borrowed funds. New machinery, new
buildings and new consumption standards came
along with new workers and new plantings.
As State largesse was converted into large personal
fortunes, banks, and coastal prosperity and as the expenses
of an expanded bureaucracy and military grew, total revenues
began to fall below budget needs.

The war with Spain led to

an accumulated deficit of 17,000,000 pesos by 1 8 6 9 / 7 0 . In
order to deal with the deficit, the State, under J o s ^ Balta
and his treasury minister Nicholas de Pierola, cancelled all
of the contracts of Peruvian consignees in 1868 and contracted
the lucrative commerce to the French firm of Dreyfus and
Company in 1869.
The Dreyfus Contract was heavily criticized, particu
larly by the jilted Peruvian guano consignees, but it did
solve, at least temporarily, the crisis of State finances and
provided the government with the funds for an ambitious rail
road building scheme.63

Dreyfus was given a monopoly on the

sale of 2 million tons of guano in Europe for which the
Peruvian State received a 2.4 million sole advance against
sales and a promised 700,000 soles per month for twenty
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months.

In addition, Dreyfus assumed the 16 million sole

obligation of the government to the Peruvian consignees and
agreed to service Peru’s foreign debt to the tune of 5 mil
lion soles per year while the State was to pay 5% interest
on all advances made to it by Dreyfus.6^

Dreyfus also became

responsible for floating large loans for the government's
railroad building program.66
With the Dreyfus Contract, State finances were put in
order and Peru's international credit rose, allowing it to
have Dreyfus float loans of 12 million pounds in 1870 and
15 million pounds in 1872, for the purpose of railroad con
struction. *>6

Balta and Pi€rola contracted with Henry Meiggs

to build a dizzying array of railways whose economic benefits
were, even then, suspect.67

The railways cost Peru 91.9

million pesos, a bit less than one quarter of all the guano
revenue received by the State between 1847 and 1878.

By

1872, foreign debts consumed almost all of the 700,000 sole
per month advance made by Dreyfus.

68

The engineering feats

of Meiggs were, though, truly amazing, he,6^
...connected the southern port of Mollendo with
Arequipa and then extended the line to Puno, on
Lake Titicaca. About 325 miles in length and
reaching heights of over 14,600 feet, the
Southern Railway was the longest and highest
railroad in South America at the time... As a com
plement to the Southern, Meiggs transported two
steamboats over the Andes in Pieces and re
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assembled them on Lake Titicaca. He also began
work on a railroad from Cuzco to Puno. An even
more spectacular engineering achievement was the
Central Railway, an extension of the Lima-Callao
line to La Oroya, in the central highlands.
Climbing more than 15,000 feet in only 78 miles...
the central had 65 tunnels, totaling 30,000 feet
in length, 61 bridges including an iron span of
580 feet.
Meiggs also built a 93-mile railroad from
the harbor at Pacasmayo inland toward the
sierra city of Cajamarca, another one of 50 miles
from the coastal town of Chimbote up the Santa
River valley and a 60 mile line connecting
Moguega with the port of Ilo.
Although the shorter coastal lines did contribute to the
economy, the lines to the sierra were, at least in the short
run, a total disaster.

The British minister, Spencer St.

John reported that the railroad from Callao to the sierra,
'passes through sterile country without population, resources
or trade1, while silver shipments required only one car per
month.

The Arequipa - Mollendo line ran one passenger train

per day and the line between Arequipa and Puno only two per
week.'*0

The lines could not even compete with llamas and

mules which were still more economic, if slower, means of
transport.71
Railroad construction, however, was not only geared
towards economic development and this must explain the
patently un-economic lines.

As Pike suggests, "Balta in

particular came to believe that by criss-crossing Peru with
railroads, the full economic potentialities of so richly
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endowed a country could be readily realized, while at the same
time anarchy and revolutionary activities would be stamped
out.1,72

Charles McQueen also argues that Balta was looking for

a way to unify the country and end internal strife while at
the same time secure an alternative source of State revenues73,
while Randall finds that, "...the government was building a
'railroad to nowhere,' for political, rather than economic rea
sons."74

The 'political' railways understandably did nothing to

create economic development in Peru.

The rails, bridges and

rolling stock were all imported as was the bulk
force.75

of the labor

In later years, they would contribute substantially

to the Peruvian export economy, but in the 1870*s they led in
exorably to the near bankruptcy of the State.

By the close of

the 1870's, Peru had the largest rail system in South America,
it also had the largest foreign debt.
State expenditures on the railways and the near bank
ruptcy of the State became a scandal in Peru.

It was also

to lead to the beginnings of the consolidation of the coastal
plutocracy in the form of the Civilista Party.

The Civilista

Party was founded in 1871 under the leadership of Manuel
Pardo and was the first coherent expression of the new coastal
76
elite created by the guano policies of the S t a t e . T h e Party

avoided the old liberal-conservative disputes and organized
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both tendencies into a broad based coalition.^

After a

brief attempt by elements of the military to remove him,
Pardo took over the presidency in 1872.

Pardo and the

Civilistas believed, in line with the interests of the
coastal plutocracy, that the pie-in-the-sky programs of
the Balta regime would only lead to ruin.

What was needed

they argued was for the government to put the State's
finances in order and promote 'modernization* which,
"...within the plutocratic lexicon meant an expansion of
export

1,78

Under Pardo, however, State finances were in serious
shape.

Guano income hardly covered the foreign debt service

and the budget faced an 8.5 million sole deficit.79

Pardo

also continued the Balta railroad program because some of the
lines were useful to the coastal elite and to protect the
o rt

enormous investment the State had already made. w

He there

fore set out on a program to strengthen State finances by re
ducing the size of the bureaucracy and military, imposing new
taxes, negotiating a new guano contract with Dreyfus and
nationalizing Peru's nitrate wealth.
Although the military budget was reduced, the bureaucracy
thinned and customs and internal taxes increased, the center
piece of the Civilista plan was to make nitrate a State
monopoly like guano and therefore solve the problem of State
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finance.

Nitrate revenue they felt would provide the State

with the means to pay its foreign debt and expand the infra
structure for the export economy which the coastal plutocracy
desired.
Nitrate, found in the Atacama desert, had been known as
a fertilizer in Peru since the days of the Incas and was
mined throughout the colonial period under a monopoly from
the crown to the Jesuits.

Small quantities were sent to

Britain in the 1820's, 1095 quintals (hundredweights) exported
in the 1830's, 3,679,951 during the 1840's, 8,895,993 in the
1850's and during the 1860's, 10,587,390.^1

Peruvians were

involved in its manufacture but, only as small producers.

The

bulk of the nitrate business was in the hands of foreigners Chileans and British.

Nitrate production in Peru, until the

late 1870's, was an example of a. classic enclave economy in
which labor, capital and inputs were brought in from the out
side while profits were sent overseas.82
however, was not like guano production.

Nitrate production,
It required costly

machines to process and remove the various impurities of the
ore and the establishment of a vast infrastructure of rail
ways, towns and p o r t s . L a r g e

firms like the Tara p a c ^ N i 

trate Company thus became the chief producers of nitrate.
Nitrate paid only a 4 centavo per quintal export tax
to the Peruvian state so the first act by Pardo was to propose
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an increase in the tax to 25 centavos per quintal.

The con

gress, however, proposed and approved a plan to turn nitrate
into a State monopoly a-la guano.84

The justification for

this was clear - Peruvians, in and out of congress, believed
that the growth of nitrate exports was responsible for the
fall in guano sales in Europe.

Between 1869 and 1873 guano

sales fell from 575,000 tons to less than 350,000 tons.

If

the State could control the export of both fertilizers, the
price and sales of guano could be increased and Peru's
foreign debt, which was tied to guano, paid.****

The 'estanco*

proposal, as it was called, would not have taken the nitrate
fields away from their owners.

Rather, it would have insti

tuted a Peruvian State monopoly of its purchase.

The State

would have bought nitrate at 2.4 soles per quintal and shared
with the owners any profit when nitrate sold for over 3.1
soles per quintal.88

In addition, production quotas were to

be assigned to each nitrate field working and those unworked
07

would become the property of the State.
The 'estanco* never got off the ground.

First, there

was clear opposition to the plan from the nitrate companies
who feared that government quotas would hurt their businesses.
They increased production dramatically in anticipation of
quotas and sent the price of nitrate plummeting to 1.87
soles per quintal.

At that price the State would have to
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pay the nitrate producers more than it received on the European
market.Second,

the Peruvian State neither had the estimated

8 million soles nor the legions of trained administrators
needed to run the monopoly.®9

jn March 1873 the plan was

shelved in favor of an export tax of 15 centavos per
quintal.90
A rise in export taxes on nitrates, however, did not
solve the problem of State Finances.

In fact they worsened

as the now lower priced nitrate continued to replace guano in
Europe.91

In 1875 a new solution was proposed by the congress

and accepted by the president whereby the Stare would expro
priate the nitrate fields with funds received by floating a
7 million pound loan in Europe.

The loan would be serviced

by revenues from the sale of nitrate.9^
The plan immediately ran into difficulties when the
State could not raise the funds in Europe and was forced to
purchase the nitrate fields with government certificates due
in two years and paying 8% interest.

It was agreed that the

owners of the fields would work them for the State under
quotas set by the State.9®

By 1877 the government had issued

19,550,000 soles in certificates.9*

in order to ship and

market the nitrate in Europe, the State came to agreement
with the London firm of Antony Gibbs and Sons which had in
terests in nitrate and had been a State guano consignee in
351

the past.

In 1876, Gibbs was given the exclusive monopoly of

the sale of State nitrate and agreed to advance to the
Peruvian banks managing the business for the State 40,000
pounds at 6% interest, return to them 2% commission on all
sales and pay 1.7 soles per quintal to the nitrate producers.95
The State nitrate monopoly was a complete disaster and
led to the greatest crisis in Peruvian history since the Wars
of Independence.

The State never completed the expropriation

of the nitrate fields and the independence of the largest
producers undermined the value of Gibbs' monopoly; in 1878
it withdrew from the trade®® while Peru's attempt to secure
a monopoly in the nitrate trade went far to bring about a
Chilean declaration of war.®?

The War of the Pacific

( 1 8 7 9 - 1 8 8 3 ) was an utter catastrophe for the Peruvian State
and economy.

Much of what had been built up during the

'guano age* was either destroyed or lost to national control.
The Chileans occupied Lima and the rich coastal provinces
demanding forced 'contributions' to support the occupation.
They carried off the books in the National Library, stripped
the National Archives, sent the Lima Zoo animals to Santiago
and dismantled and shipped to Chile much of the Southern
Railway.^®

Peru lost the nitrate province of Tarapacfif out

right, while Chile was to administer the provinces of Tacna
and Arica until a plebiscite was held ten years hence to
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decide on their fate.*00

It also lost the guano islands and

thus, the means to pay off its foreign debts.

Its productive

capacity was in total ruins, as the value of its exports
dropped to 2,400,000 soles while the currency became vir
tually worthless.*0*
In debt to foreigners, its economy in a shambles, the
State gave away what was left.

The debts arising from the

loans of 1869, 1870 and 1872 were retired by giving the State
railways for 66 years to the Peruvian Corporation of London,
a company organized by the holders of defaulted Peruvian
bonds.

In addition, the Corporation received free navigation

of, and the right to the steamboat concession on, Lake
Titicaca, the right to 3 million tons of guano and 80,000
pounds per year for 33 years.

102

In return, the Corporation

agreed to extend and repair several railways and arrange for
the new government loans of up to 5 million pounds.103

This

agreement, known as the Grace Contract, ushered Peru into an
age of foreign exploitation and dependency.

The country was

thrown open to foreign capitalists who bought up ruined
coastal plantations, sierra mines, invested heavily in them
and built in Peru a modern export sector.*0^

The coastal

plutocracy regained control of the State in 1895, but by
then it was no more than a comprador class.
Peru began its history as an independent country as a
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very minor participant in the international economy.

By the

end of the 19th century it had become a typical export
economy.

Instrumental in that transformation was the Peru

vian State.

The State, as we have seen, did not act con

sciously as an engine of economic development.

It acted

politically, in its own interest and that of the Peruvian
elite.

The guano revenue of the State went to enhancing its

ability to solve the problem of political order in Peru and,
in the process, it created a hegemonic ruling class which,
when it did capture the State, destroyed it and the Peruvian
economy.

The basis of the Peruvian export economy was thus

laid by the State in the 'guano ag e '.

The State And The Creation Of The
Argentine Export Economy
The foundation of the Argentine export economy was
laid much earlier than that of Peru and the role of the
State was fundamental here too.

For Argentina, it was pre

cisely the trap pointed to by Garcia Calderon - a reliance
upon customs revenues which led succeeding Argentine govern
ments to favor the growth of import-export trade.

This

occurred almost immediately with the Wars of Independence as,
the independence governments, cut off from traditional Vice
regal sources of income from the silver mines of Upper Peru,
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opened the port of Buenos Aires to international trade as a
means of financing the government and the war.^05

Early

Argentine governments were, therefore, forced to rely upon
forced loans (particularly from peninsular merchants), the
printing of paper money, and encouraging the export of cattle
hides and products which would provide import-export
revenue.10^
The importance of customs revenues cannot be over
emphasized.

They made up 82.5% of total State revenues in

1822, 78.3% in 1824 and almost 82% in 1829.108•

Other taxes

provided very little revenue to the government.

The 'contri-

bucion directa1 introduced in 1821 provided only 1% of total
revenues in 1822 and by 1829 did not exceed 3%.

1 HQ

The stamp

tax provided between 3 and 4% and port dues another 1%.
The balance was made up with equally insignificant taxes.
It is no wonder that the State supported and encouraged
import-export commerce.
The expense of the war of liberation which was followed
closely by civil war forced the authorities in Buenos Aires
to rely heavily upon customs revenues.

The costs of the war

with Spain and the civil war were high and military require
ments made up the bulk of the b u d g e t . m

Yet, there had

been no intention on the part of those in control of the State
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to create a dependence upon foreign commerce.

Rather, the

creole bureaucrat-merchant elite of Buenos Aires sought to
re-establish the former Viceregal patterns of trade and
administration for their exclusive benefit.

The attempt to

impose this solution to the crisis of independence on the
rest of the country caused the provinces to rebel against the
capital.

The Buenos Aires elite was then forced to fall back

on the only resource at their disposal - the pastoral products
of the Buenos Aires countryside.
The Unitarians, who took power in Buenos Aires in the
wake of the defeat of Directory by the provinces at the battle
of Cepeda in 1820, did nor allow that defeat to deter them
from their plans for Argentina.

Although convinced 'free

traders', the Unitarians under Martin Rodriguez and Bernardino
Rivadavia did not see the future of Argentina in cattle pro
duct exports.

Their vision of a future Argentina was much

more grandiose and ultimately led to their downfall.
Rivadavia planned to use the State to create in Argentina an
'integrated national e c o n o m y Tfce Unitarians believed
that Argentina contained all the necessary resources for the
construction of a 'well balanced economy* but, it lacked the
capital, labor and technical skills to bring them to fruition.
These, they believed could be attracted through foreign trade,
foreign investment and foreign immigration.

356

A most important aspect of the Rivadavia plan was the
settling of the land, with the aim of creating a prosperous
small farmer, not rancher, economy.

Unable to sell public

lands which were used as collateral against a British loan,
Rivadavia developed a system of emphyteusis in which land
was rented for a period of twenty years at the rate of 8% of
the value of the land used for pasturage, and 4% for land
used for agriculture.

The State reserved the right to revise

rents after a period of ten years.
There is some controversy over the intentions of
Rivadavia's emphyteusis plan.

On the one hand, it has been

interpreted as a means of halting the accumulation of large
tracts of land by estancieros and providing an impetus to
agriculture, and on the other, simply as a means of halting
the accumulation of land that would be used solely for the
purposes of s p e c u l a t i o n . M i r o n Burgin argues that if it
was meant to limit the accumulation of land by the large
estancieros, it was singularly unsuccessful in that it did
not limit the amount that one could rent.*^®

That under

emphyteusis 112 corporations and individuals received
65,500,000 acres by 1 8 2 7 * ^ seems to bear out Burgin's claim.
But, it seems clear that this was not Rivadavia's intention,
as, in 1827, he complained that.
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The lack of limitation £with) which, until now,
public land has been ceded in enfiteusis, in
all the extent which has been solicited, has given
rise to an abuse whose consequences already are
begining to be felt. Immense areas are denounced
£.claimecQ without intention or possibility of
settling them, but with the security of selling
in the distant future at a good price the right
which has been acquired at little public cost.
Thus it is that the entire extension of public
lands included within the new frontier line,
even though the majority of them are unpopu
lated, are already almost entirely distributed.
The accumulation of such large areas in so few
hands is necessarily going to retard their
settlement and cultivation. Nor is it just,
on the other hand, that a few appropriate to
themselves exclusively a benefit which the law
made available in order to favor the industry
of all. (emphasis added)
As an adjunct to this plan, Rivadavia sought to encourage
European immigration which he believed would change the
character of the countryside.

In his opinion, the country

people of Buenos Aires province were 'immoral* and unwilling
to w o r k . Thus, as Scobie argues, "Rather than adapt to
the existing conditions, he hoped to submerge the gaucho with
industrious European peasants, to cover the grasslands with
crops, and to create a democracy of smallholders."120

por

this purpose a Colonization Commission was established and
colonization companies were encouraged.

121

The Unitarians also sought foreign investment to build
the Argentina of their vision.

It was at this time that

Argentina first contracted large foreign debts.

358

In 1822, in

order to raise funds to finance harbor improvements, frontier
settlements and a municipal waterworks

the State authorized

the floating of a loan for 5 million gold pesos in London.
The contract for this loan was concluded with Baring Brothers
of London in 1824.

After all costs had been deducted, the

State received only 3 million gold p e s o s . i oan though,
was never used for its intended purposes.

The war with

Brazil intervened and the funds were dissipated in military
expenditures.
In an attempt to find alternative sources of government
funds, Rivadavia sought foreign investment to re-activate
mining which had provided Viceregal governments with almost
half of their revenues.

Since the mines of Potosi^had been

lost, Rivadavia's hopes were placed on the development of
the Fatima mine in La Rioja province.

To this end he en

couraged the forming of a company in London, the Compania de
Minas de Las Provincias Unidas del Rio de La Plata.

The com

pany did some preliminary surveying, but the project was
halted by the government of La Rioja which was opposed to the
Proto-national State at Buenos Aires giving concessions to
foreigners in mines not within its jurisdiction.

123

The expansion of trade, investment and industry further
required an expansion of credit.

The Unitarians established

a National Bank, under the strict control of the State, which
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they hoped would form the basis for the economic unification
of the country through the creation of a national market.
The Bank was not geared towards the needs of the cattle in
dustry.

As Burgin argues, "The fact that in defining the

functions of the bank no recognition was accorded to the
needs and interests of agriculture and cattle breeding was
not due to oversignt."^24

Its primary purpose was to lend

funds to the government and finance commerce.

Loans due in

90 days, as were the credits of the National Bank, could not
provide a source of cheap credit to the cattle industry whose
cycle of production was more lengthly.^JS
Theoretical free traders, the Unitarians however,
recognized the dependence of the State on customs revenues
and the interests of the small manufacturing and agricul
tural sectors of the province of Buenos Aires.

Their tariff

policy was a balance between the revenue needs of the State
and the protection of domestic production.

The tariff of

1822 provided for a basic rate of 15% ad valorem on all
foreign imports.

While lowering the rate to 5% for some

commodities, particularly those needed for the State's eco
nomic development plan such as mercury, agricultural tools,
mining machinery, construction materials, saltpeter and
bricks, it raised others in an effort to protect national
industries.

An impost of 20% was laid upon foreign sugar,
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coffee,cocoa, yerba mate, tea, rice and foodstuffs, 25% on
furniture, clocks, carriages, shoes, vinegar, cider, mirrors,
saddles, clothing, wines, beer and tobacco, and 30% on
brandy, liquors and cana.

Increased protection was afforded

to the hat industry as foreign imports were required to pay
a tax of 3 pesos per hat.

Wheat and flour imports were sub

ject to a sliding scale tax by which wheat paid 4 pesos per
fanega (1.5 bushels) when the domestic price was 6 pesos
per fanega and decreased to 1 peso per fanega when the domes
tic price reached 9 pesos per fanega - flour imports were
similarly taxed to balance the interests of the producer and
c o n s u m e r .

^-26

Throughout the 1820's tariffs on overseas im

ports generally rose, affording greater protection to domestic
industries.
Rivadavia's plan was never fully put into effect.
Strong opposition to it was raised in several powerful sec
tors of Argentina.

The provinces rejected it not only be

cause the tariff was not protective enough, but because
Rivadavia sought an economic policy directed by a strong
central State.

Each province, in the aftermath of Cepeda,

had developed its own State with its own interest and these
were not the same as that of the national State Rivadavia was
attempting to construct.

Provincial governments, in finan

cial straits due to the breakdown of internal trade and
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production as a result of the independence struggles, would
have accepted Rivadavia*s plan only if the central State
shares the revenues of the port of Buenos Aires with them
and thus assured the financial health of their governments.
This was unacceptable to the Buenos Aires State.

1 27

The estancieros of Buenos Aires province opposed the
Rivadavia plan because they felt that the Unitarians were
willing to give up their province's dominant position in
the polity and economy of Argentina by separating the port
of Buenos Aires from the province.

This they believed would

lead to an increase in taxes to support a provincial govern
ment as well as reduced influence on national policy.
They also resented the policy of 'national' economic develop
ment, feeling, with some justification, that the State would
ignore the needs of the cattle industry.

For the estancieros,

major difficulties in the development of the economy in
Buenos Aires province were the expansion of the frontier
and Indian attacks.

Although the Unitary State recognized

the problems, it did nothing to solve them.^2®
The Rivadavia plan did not even find favor amongst the
farmers, artisans or lower bureaucrats of Buenos Aires.

The

farmers felt that the tariff of 1822 did not provide adequate
protection while the artisans continued to complain about
competition from foreign imports.
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The protective character

istics of the 1822 tariff had been eroded by inflation caused
by large emissions of the National Bank and so these protests
had validity but, on the opposite side, high duties on food
stuffs brought complaints from the city's consumers,130
The failure of the Rivadavia plan was non that it was
unrealistic and did not take into account the realities of
Argentina's potential in the 1820's as Burgin claims131, it
was rather that no important sector of the economy or polity
was willing to make the kind of sacrifices it called for,
nor was the State powerful enough to enforce them.

The

problem of economic development in Argentina was integrally
linked to the problem of political unification.

As we have

seen in Chapters V, VI, and VII, the political and economic
crisis of Argentina in the independence period initiated a
decided shift of political power to rural elites.

Political

and military power were decentralized and fell into the hands
of those who used them for their own narrow interests.

The

incipient State was weakened, and by the time the Unitarians
were able to lay the constitutional foundation (Constitution
of 1826) for a State that could impose its development plan
on the country, the real basis of power had shifted to its
opponents.

As H.S. Ferns

argues,1^

The policy of Rivadavia was in its design logical
and realistic.... But in the 1820's it was not
successful.
It required for its implementation
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political stability, peace and the determined
support of at least one predominant element in
the community ... the appeal of Rivadavia’s plans
could excite the enthusiasm and win the support
of only those with sufficiently long view of the
community interest, but there was nothing about
them either as ideas or activities vrfiich
immediately and strongly engaged the interest
and support of the men on horseback in the pro
vince of Buenos Aires, Entre Rios or Corrientes.
There is, perhaps, no better example of how the interests
of the State steer economic development than the regime of
Juan Manuel de Rosas.

Rosas, a porteno Federalist, became

governor of Buenos Aires province in 1829 in the wake of the
Unitarian defeat.

He was one of the largest and wealthiest

estanciero-saladeros of the province and there is no doubt
that he favored his class.

Yet, in some cases, his regime,

by its tariff policy and nationalist stance against foreign
intervention in the Rib de La Plata, was in direct opposi
tion to the interests of the estanciero-saladeros.

This

contradiction can be explained by the fact that Rosas, as
head of the Buenos Aires State was not only responsible to
the class that put him into power but also to the State it
self.
The estanciero-saladero Federalist of Buenos Aires
quickly came into conflict with the provincial Federalsits
after the defeat of the Unitarians.

The provincial Federal-

ists and a sector of the porteno Federalists were committed
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to national unification, though under a federal, not cen
tralized, national State.

This group sought to bring Buenos

Aires under the control of the provinces and that was exactly
what the majority of porteno Federalists opposed.333

The

estanciero-saladeros understood the economic advantages which
Buenos Aires had against the other provinces and sought to
maintain them through a policy of political separation from
the other provinces.33** This contradiction, that in order
to dominate the provinces the Buenos Aires State had to be
politically separated from the provinces, was to plague
Argentina for twenty years.

Rosas was able to create in

Argentina what Rivadavia failed to - a strong centralized
State - by virtue of porteno economic domination of the
country and the political isolation of its State.

Because

the provinces were dominated economically and militarily,
the emphasis shifted from the kind of centralized adminis
tration which Rivadavia had suggested to armed force and
economic exclusion-

The power of Rosas' State against the

provinces depended upon the economic position of Buenos Aires
and that position depended upon the cattle industry.

Yet,

when the interests of the cattle industry and the State came
into conflict, it was the interest of the State that pre
vailed.
Rosas may have taken over the Buenos Aires State in the
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interest of the cattle industry but the exigencies of that
State very quickly impressed themselves upon his regime.

The

land policy of Rosas is most often pointed to in support of
the argument that he favored the interests of the cattle in
dustry over those of the rest of the province.^35

However,

what choice did Rosas have given the dependence of the State
upon the revenues generated by pastoral exports?
policy had three purposes,

His land

(1) to extend cattle production

in the province and thus, provide increased revenues to the
State,

(2) to provide income for the State through the sale

of land, and (3) to provide political support for the State
and reduce the cost of the large armies needed to keep the
provinces at bay by paying these off in land.

Although the

major thrust of his land distribution policy was the extension
of cattle raising in order to raise customs revenues, it also
had other fiscal, and more importantly, political functions.
Fiscally, the Rosas land policy was geared to provide the
State with extraordinary income.
could hardly assist the budget.

The income from emphyteusis
In 1833, rents amounted to

only 198,000 pesos and although they were doubled when the
leases came up in that year, they dropped to 196,000 pesos in
1839.

Obviously many tenants were not paying their rents or,

many did not pay them in full, and rather than continue this
policy, Rosas began to sell public lands outright.
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In 1836,

the State was authorized to sell 1,500 square leagues of
public lands.137
The land sales, however, were not very successful
either.

By 1839, land sales had only yielded about one

million pesos and in 1840, only about 100,000 pesos.
of the land went unsold in a buyers m a r k e t . 1^8

Much

Rosas was

then forced to give land away, hoping that it would find its
way into production and thus into the balance of imports and
exports upon which State finances depended.13^

Land was

additionally used to pay the army and administration.

Rosas

himself received land in this manner as the leader of the
Desert Campaign which pushed the Indian frontier south and
put millions of acres of land into the hands of the State.
For his services Rosas was awarded, in 1834, the Island of
Choele-Choel on the Rio Negro - which he promptly exchanged
for 60 square leagues of pasture land.

Officers and common

soldiers were also awarded land as payment.1^®
Payment of the army in land became a State policy with
Rosas as governor and, when a rebellion against the State
arose in 1839, rewards of land, cattle and sheep were made to
the army that put down the rebellion.

Six square leagues were

awarded to generals, 5 for colonels, one half for non-com
missioned officers and one quarter for privates. lj*l

Altogether

8,500 'boletos de premios entierras* were awarded by the State
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and these became a kind of money with which the wealthy
speculated.

Although thousands were issued to soldiers and

minor bureaucrats, they almost always ended up in the hands
of the large estancieros.142

More than anything else, land

was a political tool for Rosas.

With it he could gain ad

herents to the State and, by taking it away (confiscations),
he could harm its

e n e m i e s .

143

As John Lynch observes,

"...land was the richest source of patronage available, a
weapon for Rosas, a welfare system for his supporters."144
Without focusing on Rosas as the head of the Buenos
Aires State, his tax and tariff policies seem terribly con
tradictory.

Here we have the representative of the estan-

ciero-saladero class raising internal taxes and imposing
protective tariffs, both of which were opposed by that class.
Rosas' first aim, of course, was to maximize the revenues
taken in through the customs house but he also sought to
reduce the reliance of the State on those through increases
in internal taxes.

The 1contribution directa', a poor source

of income throughout the independence period, was doubled by
Rosas in 1838.

In 1839 he hoped that it would produce 3

million pesos, 27% of the State budget.

However, the tax

brought in only 891,000 pesos in 1839, about one million in
1840, and then dropped to 868,000 in 1841.

Rosas in that year

demanded that the legislature revise the system of assessment
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but it would not act and the tax remained a minor part of
State revenues throughout his

r

e

g

i

m

e

.

5

£ h e

'contribucion

directs' failed mainly because assessments were made to the
tax collectors by the property owners themselves and thus
there were, by declaration, quite a few 'poor' residents in
Buenos Aires province.

Though Rosas railed against such a

poor system of valuation, arguing that the law,146
...made no provision for an equitable and
objective evaluation of taxable wealth.
This omission was not only injurious to
the treasury but it was also unjust to the
taxpayer, for 'nothing was more cruel and
inhuman than to compel an individual to
give an account of his private wealth*.
Had this law ... been more in accord with
the conception of justice, had it been
based upon the principles of liberalism and
equality, the tax would have been more
productive of revenue, and might also
encourage economy and frugality, the true
source of public and private wealth.,
the 'contribution' failed to live up to his expectations.147
The tariff issue clearly illustrates the contradiction
of Rosas' position as the representative of the estancieros
and his position as the head of the Buenos Aires State which
was the provincial State yet also a proto-national State.
Since Rosas denied the other Riverine provinces direct trade
with Europe and the Interior provinces' trade passed through
the port of Buenos Aires, he had to incorporate their in
terests into the policies of the State if he was to conciliate
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them to the predominance of Buenos Aires.

If this was not in

the interest of the estancieros of Buenos Aires, it was cer
tainly in that of Rosas' State.
If the issue of centralism vs. federalism was the chief
conflict between Federalists and Unitarians, the issue of
tariff protection was the chief conflict between porteno
federalism and provincial federalism.^®

The provincial

Federalists argued strenuously for the protection of their
agricultural and manufacturing industries which were damaged
by the relatively light duties charged on foreign imports
by Buenos Aires.

The porteno Federalists argued that protec

tive tariffs would ruin the economy of Buenos Aires, raise
the prices of goods to consumers and protect industries
there, and in the provinces, that were uneconomic and should,
by all economic logic, be allowed to fail.-^®

That Rosas

supported the views of the porteno Federalists makes his
volte-face all the more interesting.
The Tariff Act of 1835 (for 1836) constituted a decided
shift by Rosas to protectionism.

The basic import duty was

set at 17% ad valorem on all commodities not specifically
provided for in the law.

Goods which did not compete with

those of Buenos Aires and the provinces or were required for
their industries paid relatively low duties.

Hides, horse

hair, crude wool, crude tallow,horns, bones, jerked beef,
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ostrich feathers and precious metals were allowed in free.

A

tax of 5% was imposed on plaster, coal, bricks, tin plates,
steel, bronze, mercury, raw wool, paintings, printed matter,
watches, jewelry and agricultural implements; 10% on silk,
tar, rice, sack cloth and arms; and 24% on sugar, coffee,
cocoa, tea, yerba mate, cotton, wool and food stuffs.150

The

tariff then began to become protective with a 35% duty on
shoes, clothing, furniture, wine, brandy, liquors, tobacco,
oil, leather goods, cheese, guitars (1), ink, and mirrors;
50% on beer, saddles, spaghetti and other flour products,
while hats were to pay a stiff 13 pesos per hat.33l

For the

first time since 1821, a large number of goods were prohibited
altogether, these included brass and tin plate wares, orna
mental iron, iron and steel goods, all kinds of kitchen
utensils, textiles, wood products, maize, peas, beans and
other vegetables, butter and mustard.

Wheat was prohibited

unless its price in Buenos Aires exceeded 50 pesos per
fanega, and then it could be imported only by special permit.152
Overland trade between Buenos Aires and the provinces was free
except for certain products of Paraguay (still considered a
province), Corrientes and Missiones.^53

About his new policy

Rosas argued that, "...foreign competition was the principal
obstacle to industrial and agricultural recovery and that the
tariff 'should result in progressive growth of foreign and
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domestic commerce as well as higher revenues'."154
There certainly were interests in Buenos Aires province,
particularly in the city and agricultural sector in its
suburbs, to which this policy could be laid.

But, they were

weak in comparison to the estancieros and consumers of the
city who would have to pay higher prices in the absence of
cheap imported foreign articles.

Rosas, rather, instituted

this policy because he believed that it was in the best
political interest of the Buenos Aires State.

"In the eyes

of the provinces Rosas became the most Argentine of all
portetfo governors, the only governor in fact who placed the
economic interests of the nation above those of foreign mer
chants.

The Buenos Aires government revealed itself as a

national government and Rosas became the recognized leader
of the nation."1^
It is not unlikely that Rosas favored the creation of
an Argentine confederation under the leadership of Buenos
Aires and that the Tariff was a first step in reconciling the
provinces to the Buenos Aires State.

Such a step was impos

sible earlier because from 1829-1831 the commerce of the city
of Buenos Aires was in a 'wretched state* due to the lack of
trade with the provinces and civil war and, the drought of
1829-1932 had turned the pampas 'into an arid desert* where
cattle died like flies.

The National Bank had failed and
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thus the State had no means of raising revenues except
through customs.*56

The Buenos Aires State was in no condi

tion fiscally or politically to make concessions to the other
provinces.

By 1835, these problems had receded and it is

possible that Rosas was making a bid for unification.

Juan

Facundo Quiroga, the La Rioja caudillo, is reported to have
said that Rosas was in accord with him on the need to form
an Argentine Confederation and that as soon as the provinces
were at peace again he would, with Quiroga, take steps to
convoke a congress of the provinces for that purpose.15?
Rosas himself, writing to Quiroga said that, "Mo one can
be more fully convinced than you and I of the necessity of
organizing a general government and that this procedure is
the only means of insuring existence and respectability to
our republic..."158
The protective tariff was, however, very quickly revoked
when Buenos Aires became embroiled in conflicts with France
and Britain which led to blockades of the port.

As a result

of the Federal Fact of 1831, a defensive-offensive alliance
between Buenos Aires and the Riverine provinces, the Buenos
Aires State received the role of representing those provinces
in international relations.159

when, in the late 1830's

Rosas refused certain demands of the French for commercial
privileges and immunities for its nationals against military

conscription, a French naval squadron blockaded the port of
Buenos Aires.

In 1838, the French found support for their

blockade in Uruguay (whose independence Rosas did not recog
nize) and the Riverine provinces which opposed the policy of
Buenos Aires of denying them direct access to overseas trade.
Although the dispute with the French was settled by 1840,
the issue of Uruguayan independence, and Buenos Aires opposi
tion to it, continued and in 1845 brought about a blockade of
the port by both the French and the British.160
The blockades themselves are beyond the scope of this
work161, however, it is clear that any hope of Argentine
unity on the basis of Rosas' tariff was all but lost by this
assertion of nationalism by the Buenos Aires State.

The

blockades forced the abandonment of the protective tariff
policy as import-export revenues dropped and Buenos Aires
sought to make running the blockade attractive through lower
duties.1®^

The French blockade and intervention lit the fires

of disunity as Buenos Aires was attacked by a 'Coalition of
the North' in 1839 led by the hated Unitarians and, in the
same year, by an army raised by disgruntled estancieros of
southern Buenos Aires province who blamed Rosas for the bloc
kade and cutoff of exports.16^

Rosas was able to defeat both

the internal and external challenges to his regime but he
became convinced that the only way to deal with his opponents
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in Buenos Aires and the provinces was through f o r c e . T h e
dictatorship imposed by Rosas ruled out formal national
unity.

If any unity existed in Argentina during the 1840's

it was that imposed by Rosas' praetorian State.

The failure

of Rosas was thus, the impossibility of reconciling the role
of the State as the expression of Buenos Aires province with
its role as the expression of the Argentine nation.

For

Burgin,166
...as long as Rosas' government remained essentially
a provincial government it served a useful purpose
and was economically justified. But when by force
of circumstance, the porteno government assumed the
functions of a national government it not only for
sook the interests of Buenos Aires but it also
fanned the flames of bitter resentment in the
Interior and the Litoral.
The importance of the Rosas period for the development
of the Argentine export economy in the late 19th century
cannot be underestimated although, Argentina by 1860 was
only marginally integrated into the international economy
compared to what it would become by the turn of the century.167
Patterns of economic and political development laid by the
politico-economic conflict over the formation of the State
were to relegate the Argentine economy to the status of an
export economy.

The intransigence of the political structure

in Buenos Aires finally bore fruit in the 1860's and 1870's
with the failure of the Provinces in the 1850's, under Justo
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J o s ^ d e Urquiza, to create a State in which Buenos Aires was
subservient to the p r o v i n c e s . A r g e n t i n e unification arose
on the basis of Buenos Aires and its pattern of development stockraising.

Railroads opened up the pampas to world trade

but the previous pattern of landholding reduced the impact of
immigration and the growth of agriculture.

Argentina became

a major producer of grains but the benefits of this develop
ment did not emerge as the Argentine farmer became a tenant
or laborer on the lands of large estancias rather than an
independent smallholder.170

The cities and towns, which in

the U.S. arose as a result of the opening of the frontier to
food crop agriculture and provided the markets necessary
for the rise of modern industrialization, were absent in
Argentina.171

Industry received very little impetus from

the poor Argentine tenant farmer as he never became a perma
nent fixture in the countryside.

Estancieros would rent a

section of their land to the tenant for a period of from 3 to
6 years and, at the end of the contract, require the tenant
to grow alfalfa for his cattle.

The evicted tenant there

fore had no incentive to improve the land or build permanent
structures.

Every 3 to 6 years he was forced to pick up

stakes and find a new home.

173

Immigrants therefore collected

in Buenos Aires, servicing the export sector.

Capitalist de

velopment in Argentina thus was stunted by the economic pat-
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terns created as a result of political conflict and the State
in the first half of the 19th century.

Argentina entered the

20th century as an export economy.
It is paradoxical that in both Peru and Argentina the
political conflicts between sectors of the dominant classes
which made the consolidation of the State so difficult were
also what made the consolidation of strong States so impera
tive.

It was because the States themselves were the objects

of such conflicts that they could not perform their role
of mediating these conflicts and producing stable class basis
for rule.

The Spanish colonial administration had been able

to perform the function of mediating class conflict by vir
tue of its 'relative autonomy' from the Spanish American
classes but, in the early republican era, the basis of rule
in Spanish America had been dramatically transformed.
Whereas the authority and legitimacy, as well as the 'rela
tive autonomy' of the colonial administration had been based
upon its representation of the Spanish monarchy, the new
republican State administrations were based upon the notion
of 'popular sovereignty'

(although narrowly defined to in

clude only members of the dominant classes) which automatic
ally made the public authority - the State - the target and
prize of intra-class conflict.

State and dominant class con

solidation were thus hampered by the lack of 'relative
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autonomy* and maneuverability of the new State.
The authority of early Peruvian and Argentine States
was rarely effective outside of the capitals and/or major
ports.

Although, as we have seen, efforts were made to con

solidate State authority on the basis of programs of national
development and integration, these were made impossible by
political conflicts between sectors of the dominant classes
and the political and economic weakness of the new States.
Both the Peruvian and Argentine States therefore came to rely
more and more upon the factor which they could easily tap
into - foreign trade.

A stopgap measure designed to shore up

State finances in the face of the enormous costs of the inde
pendence struggles, customs revenues became the major source
of State finance in Peru (up until guano revenues replaced
customs revenues in the 1850's] and Argentina, as well as in
most other Spanish American countries.

Such reliance led

States to encourage the growth of agro/mineral export enter
prises as a means of enlarging State revenues and thus the
ability of States to impose political order.

The results of

this strategy led, as we have seen, to a strengthening of the
export elite in Argentina and the creation of one in Peru
as well as the hardening of a pattern of agro/mineral export
growth in both.

In the late 19th century these patterns

formed the basis for the dramatic expansion of agro/mineral
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export development fueled by active State support.
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CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION:

SPANISH AMERICA AND THE

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

In both Peru and Argentina, State policies aimed at
strengthening the State and creating political and social
order laid the foundation for the development of the export,
economies of the late 19th century.

Though the aims of the

Peruvian and Argentine States were political, the effects of
their policies tended to steer their countries into economic
roles in the international economy that were solidified with
their success.
Political instability, of course, did not disappear.
In Peru, the late 19th century was the scene of some of the
fiercest political conflict in its history.

This conflict was

brought about by Peru's defeat in the War of the Pacific as
each faction blamed the other for the ruination of the
country.^

Yet, the rapidity with which a powerful State was

reconstructed indicates that the terms of the conflict were
decidedly different than in the early 19th century.

After a

short period of military rule under Andres Caceres, the only
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recognized hero of the War of the Pacific, the two contending
factions of the coastal plutocracy - Democrats (Pierolistas)
and Civilistas - joined together to oust him in a bloody
civil war in 1895.2

Under the presidency of Democrat Nicolas

de P^erola (1895-1899), the hegemonic class created by the
policies of the State in the 'guano age' took charge and re
built the economy on the basis of their own interests - export
production.^
With Pierola, Peru marched rapidly into the international
economy as an export producer.

The State was employed by his

administration and succeeding ones to steadily advance the
growth of exports.

Peru converted to the gold standard in

order to attract foreign investment and stabilize the cur
rency so that Peruvian financiers would shift their interests
from currency speculation to productive investment.

4

Since

currency stabilization required an expansion of exports to
finance a gold backed money, the State encouraged the growth
of mining and coastal agriculture.

Between 1895 and 1897 the

total value of Peruvian exports rose by 40%.^
With the currency stabilized and the financial position
of the State solidified, the decade after Pierola's term saw
even more spectacular growth of the export economy.

The

quantity of exports expanded by 41% between 1900 and 1904 and,
by 1907 by 164%.b

New export industries were rapidly inte-
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grated into the economy.

Rubber exports grew from 16

toneladas (tons) in 1900 to 3,193 toneladas in 1912?, while
oil production in the rich La Brea Paritfas fields tripled
between 1904 and 1908 under the leadership of the foreign
owned Pacific Petroleum Company which had purchased the
g
rights to the fields from the State in 1889.
The mining
industry, freed from taxation by the State for 25 years in
1890, and allowed to import machinery free of duty, ex
panded rapidly with copper exports doubling between 1901
and 1902.

g

In 1902, the U.S. Cerro de Pasco Corporation

was formed and, in the next twenty-five years became one of
the largest agro/mineral producers in the world .'*'0
The leading role of the State in this 'economic
miracle' is indisputable.

Currency stabilization, laws pro

viding for the development of corporations which facilitated
large agro/mineral exploitation, the instituting of the
National Agricultural Society, National Mining Society and
National Industrial Society, improvements in port facilities,
roads and communication - all geared towards export promotion were the legacy of the plutocratic Peruvian S t a t e . ^

So

successful was this State that it could accommodate the coastal
plutocracy, foreign capital and even the sierra elite.
If Peru's strides in integrating its economy into the
international market were prodigious, Argentina's were
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astounding.

With Bartolom^ Mitre's success against Urquiza's

Confederation at the battle of Pavon in 1861, Buenos Aires
and the economic pattern produced by its State prevailed over
the whole of Argentina.

However, the definitive unification

of Argentina under the hegemony of the Buenos Aires State and
its class supports - merchants and landowners - did not come
about until the State set out on a policy to destroy the
autonomy of the provinces by removing all barriers to their
incorporation into the nation, as defined by Buenos Aires.
The methods used were the Constitution of 1853 and railroad
construction.
The Constitution of 1853 was designed by the provinces
of the Confederation to once and for all reduce the influence
of Buenos Aires in Argentina.

In the hands of the provinces,

the Constitution would have been able to limit the autonomy,
so closely guarded by the Buenos Aires elite, which gave it
such overwhelming mastery.1^

But, in the hands of the Buenos

Aires State, it meant the subordination of the provinces and,
ultimately, Buenos Aires province itself .14

Under Mitre and

Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, the Argentine State was centralized
and the provinces brought to submission (although Buenos Aires
province was not reduced until 1880 when the city was separated
from the province).

Between 1862 and 1880 some 22 instances of

Federal State intervention in the provinces were recorded.
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During the late 1860's they used the cover of the Paraguayan
War to reduce the power of provincial strongman Urquiza and
his supporters-*-®, while the isolation of the Interior and
rural Buenos Aires province, which had always provided bases
for opposition to the State, was destroyed by a wave of rail
way building by the State.
Railroad construction had political as well as economic
designs.

In 1852, Juan Bautista Alberdi wrote, "Without the

railroad political unity cannot be had in a country where dis
tance makes central political power impossible... Political
unity can only begin through territorial unity, and only the
railroad can make places separated by five hundred leagues a
unified country."!?

The dual role of railway construction

was clearly recognized by those in charge of the Argentine
State.

Mitre, in his speech at the groundbreaking ceremonies

for the Central Argentine Railroad in 1863 said, "Everyone
must rejoice on the opening of this road, for it will tend to
give riches where there is poverty and to institute order
where there is anarchy."!®
Perhaps no State policy was more responsible for Argen
tina's dramatic export growth in the late 19th century than
the financing of the railroads.

The railways were not built

by British capitalists seeking to expand Argentina's export
production.

They were built by the State through its
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guarantees to reluctant British investors.

If the railroads

did not pay for themselves, the Argentine government would
assure them a profit.

British investors were thus assured a

7% return on capital invested whether the railroads were
profitable or not .19
The progress of the railroads and Argentine export
growth went hand in hand.

The railroads made possible what

James Scobie calls the 'revolution on the pampas '^9 by
bringing immigration into the pampas to convert vast areas
over to grain cultivation and carrying the crops to the ports
for export.

In 1872-1873 only 325,000 acres were devoted to

wheat while by 1887-1888 it had increased to 2,000,000 acres.
Wheat exports jumped from 9 toneladas in 1871 co 327,894 in
1890 while corn exports rose from 15,032 tons in 1880 to
707,282 in 1890.21

By 1904, agriculture had displaced stock

raising as Argentina's major exporter.22

The sugar industry

in Tucumctn also received enormous stimulation with the coming
of the railroad, production doubling between 1880 and 1886.^3
Better transport and the development of refrigeration
led to a shift in emphasis in the cattle industry as the ex
port of salted meat was replaced by the export of frozen and
chilled meat.

Salted meat which made up 48% of all meat ex

ports in 1887 dropped to only 4% by 1904 while frozen meat
rose to

51 %.24

Between 1870 and 1900 the total value of
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Argentine exports rose from 30 million gold pesos to over
150 million gold pesos ,25
It is obvious that without the external demand Argen
tina would not have experienced such dramatic growth in so
short a time.

But, even so, it would not have been able to

respond to that demand had not the State taken an active role
in the promotion of export activities .26

In 1894, invest

ments in infrastructure for the export economy accounted for
63.1% of the entire public debt, while such investments made
up 36.6% of the national budget.

By making government guar

antees available to foreign investment for the construction
of railroads, port facilities and other export related infra
structure, the State was able to attract foreign capital
amounting to 3.5 million pesos by 1913.2?

In fact, as Roberto

Cortes Conde argues, "One could say that government action in
directing this process of growth by specifically promoting,
encouraging, and guaranteeing basic investment in infrastruc
ture played a much more important role than is generally
assumed ..."28

In order to finally do away with provincial

autonomy, in order to 'civilize* the Argentine, in order to
promote the predominance of the political center, Argentine
statesmen steered the economy into rapid export growth in the
second half of the 19th century.
Exclusive agro/mineral export development in Peru and
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Argentina, as well as in most other Spanish American countries
of this era, ultimately resulted in what writers such as Andre
Gunder Frank, Theotonio Dos Santos, and Fernando Henrique
Cardoso and Enzo Faletto have described as underdevelopment
and dependency.

Nevertheless, although these writers may

claim that Spanish American underdevelopment and dependency
was a result of capitalist exploitation expressed as a system
of international trade within which the Spanish American
economies were relegated to the role of raw materials pro
ducers by that system, the historical evidence does not bear
out their thesis.

As I have argued throughout this work, the

fact that Spanish American countries developed agro/mineral
export economies was not primarily the result of the influences
of the international economy.
I have challenged the dependency thesis as it specific
ally relates to the origin of the Spanish American export
economies in.the 19th century because of its emphasis on the
primacy of the international economy whether expressed pre
dominantly as external domination as with Frank or as external
domination expressed through internal class forces as with
Cardoso and Faletto.

By shifting the focus of analysis away

from the international system of trade to the historical
development of the social relations of production, inter-class
conflict, intra-class conflict, and the State within Spanish
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American countries I have shown that the agro/mineral export
economies were chiefly the result of the complex interaction
of these forces.

The international economy, rather than

being the determinant factor, influenced the development of
the Spanish American economies in the 19th century by
offering the possibility of export development as an alterna
tive to inward focused economic development.

Of course,

there is no reason to believe as the dependentistas do, that
inward focused economic development would have created pro
gressive capitalist economies - that such a possibility
existed would have to be proven, not assumed.

2 9

Neverthe

less, I have argued that a choice was made to develop out
wardly - to develop export economies - through a process in
which essentially domestic crisis, class conflicts and State
development played the dominant role.
By defining capitalism, with Marx, as a system of
production, not trade, I have found that, contrary to the
assertion of the dependentistas, Spanish America has not
been capitalist since the 16th century.

The forms of produc

tion developed during the colonial period, which I have found
remained essentially intact through the 19th century, were
indisputably non-capitalist.

Thus, the appropriation of

surplus value at the level of production (profit) was not
the result of capitalist exploitation.
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This is hardly

surprising since the colonial power, Spain, did not intself
develop capitalist relations of production (wage labor and
capital) to any great extent during the colonial era.

It is

clear then that the exploitation of Spanish America by Spain
was not based on capitalist exploitation but rather the
colonial relationship which was imposed politically.

The

trading system through which Spanish merchants made their
profits was never based upon capitalist market relationships
in which trade - the circulation of commodities - was only a
moment in the realization of surplus value generated at the
level of production.

Rather, it was based on a trade mono

poly imposed politically in which the colonies were forced to
turn over a part of their non-capitalistically generated
surplus free to Spanish merchants.

In any case, I have made

clear that this Spanish trade monopoly was only an adjunct to
the primary focus of Spanish Colonialism which was the ex
traction of precious metals from the colonies by the Spanish
State.

In Spain, this colonial booty did not form the basis

of any 'primitive accumulation' leading to the development of
capitalism but, rather, was used to buttress the monarchy
against the aristocracy and to finance its imperial designs
in Europe.
By focusing on the development of the colonial
political economy itself rather than its external trade
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links with Spain, I have found that the role of the Spanish
State's colonial bureaucracy in regulating the colonial
economy was the key element in both the development of that
economy and in the political administrative crisis that
engulfed Spanish American countries in the wake of the 19th
century Wars of Independence.

I have argued that it was the

effort to resolve this political-administrative crisis,
rather than the pull of the international economy, that moved
most Spanish American countries to construct agro/mineral
export economies in the 19th century.

Not only did the

colonial bureaucracy regulate class relations between the
dominant classes and the subordinate laboring classes but
also, and more importantly, class relations within the domi
nant classes.

It was able to do this through its control of

key economic factors - land, labor, mercury distribution
(for the processing of silver) and trade.

Competition for

these resources, and thus the conflict over their appropria
tion and distribution, was directed at the bureaucracy, short
circuiting direct intra-class conflict within the dominant
classes.

The net result of this political, rather than

economic regulation of society was to keep the colonial
economy directed towards the interests of the Spanish State
and, more importantly for Spanish American development, to
keep inherently conflictual class relations in check.
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This politico-economic complex of rule and management
of class conflict, I have argued, was weakened by the Bourbon
reforms of the latter half of the 18th century which, because
they undermined the legitimacy of the colonial bureaucracy,
led to the movements for independence when the Spanish State
in Spain collapsed during the Napoleonic Wars.

Thus, as I

have argued, the movements for independence were not, as the
dependentistas claim, an expression of Spanish America's
quest for a more direct integration into the international
economy, but rather a result of the political-administrative
crisis caused by the Bourbon reforms.

With independence the

international economy became somewhat more important to the
Spanish American economies owing to the elimination of the
Spanish monopoly trading system, however little dramatic
change occurred in either the form or extent of their trade
until the second half of the 19th century.
More important than the international economy in deter
mining the direction of the Spanish American economies in
the 19th century was the specific manner in which the new
Spanish American States attempted to resolve the political
turmoil which erupted with the complete disappearance of the
Spanish colonial administrative apparatus.

The secret of

that administration's success in regulating inter-class and
intra-class conflicts during the colonial period had been

•*02

its 'relative autonomy 1 from the classes in conflict.

But,

as I have shown, the weakness of the new Spanish American
States made the regulating of these conflicts and the
fashioning of unified ruling classes by these States impos
sible.

In fact, the focus of intra-class conflict within the

dominant classes became the State itself because the new
political-administrative structures could enhance or upset the
control of the dominant classes over the laboring classes.

In

effect, different sectors of the dominant classes in the
Spanish American countries required incompatable politicaladministrative requisites for the reproduction of their ex
ploitative relationship with the laboring classes.

Thus,

they engaged in predominantly political, not economic,
battles with one another over the administrative and legal
form of the new States.
What the new Spanish American States lacked was the
kind of 'relative autonomy' which had served the Spanish
colonial bureaucratic administration so well.

Without the

resources to impose their political sway in the new countries
they could neither regulate inter-class and intra-class con
flicts nor prevent attacks on their own structures.

The lack

of authority and legitimacy of these States further prevented
their appropriating the necessary resources to strengthen
themselves on the basis of wholely or predominantly domestic
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sources.

Thus, as I have argued, these resources were acquired

by the Spanish American States primarily through external
economic links - revenues from the custom houses (and thus the
encouraging of production for export), foreign loans to
finance State expenditures, trade/production monopolies (such
as guano in Peru), and foreign investment, principally in
railroad construction which, while serving to encourage export
expansion, also gave the States the means with which to
eliminate local political autonomy and opposition.

Spanish

American States were thus the mediation through which the
Spanish American economies were articulated with the inter
national economy.

I have argued, therefore, that the general

pattern of economic articulation with the international
economy - agro/mineral export - was not economically moti
vated by those States nor economically imposed by inter
national capitalism.

It was rather primarily the result of

the strategy of Spanish American States attempting to solve
political crises.
By the late 19th century Spanish American countries
leapt to meet the expanding international economy with open
arms.

'Modernization* - the link with the outside, Euro

peanization - became the panacea for all the conflicts of the
19th century.

It was - for a time.

States were strengthened,

political conflicts were confined within their institutional
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structures and hegemonic ruling classes tied to export growth
emerged.

But, the veneer of capitalism could not create the

effects of the real thing.

The export economies' dynamic

center lay elsewhere - in the industrial capitalist nations and it would not be long before Spanish Americans realized
that they had exchanged the possibilities of development for
growth and dependence.
Although the argument in this study has centered on
the origin of dependency in 19th century Spanish America, it
clearly has implications for the debate on the contemporary
relationship between the developed and less developed coun
tries.

As in its thesis on the causes of 19th century de

pendency in Spanish America, the dependency perspective
leans heavily on the effects of international economic forces
to explain the causes of contemporary dependency.

The success

of this view has spawned even grander theories, like the World
Systems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, which holds that the
development of individual economies can only be analyzed and
understood within the context of the Capitalist World System
which, he argues, had its origin in Europe and began to expand
in the 16th century.

30

Development and underdevelopment are

thus two aspects of the development of this system.

Although

within this theoretical perspective classes are acknowledged though only in their international character as a 'world
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proletariat 1 and 'world bourgeoisie' - the World Capitalist
System is a system of countries, some of which constitute
the 'core'

(the developed countries), others the 'semi

periphery'

(the semi-developed countries), and still others

the 'periphery'

(the under or less developed countries).

While a country's position in the system is determined by
its internal economic Structure, that structure is determined
by the system.
The displacement of attention from the political and
economic processess within countries to the relations between
countries, whether individually or within the context of a
World Capitalist System, in explaining underdevelopment has
led to Marxists and non-Marxists alike to similar approaches
to the problem of underdevelopment.

Samir Amin, for example,

sees world revolution arising from the contradictions between
rich and poor nations - in effect, proletarian countries vs.
bourgeois c o u n t r i e s . I n a somewhat similar vein both left
and right wing governments of the less developed countries
have focused their energies at the United Nations on the cre
ation of a 'new international economic order' in which the
developed countries will be forced to redistribute their
wealth to the less developed on the assumption that the unequal
economic relationship between the two has been the cause of the
latter's underdevelopment.

Thus, in the less developed coun
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tries, the exploiters of the working classes represent them
selves as the exploited of the Capitalist World System in
the hope of derailing the class struggles in their countries
through appeals to nationalism.

This trend has also found

favor in the developed countries as depression, unemployment
and reduced living standards are blamed on the international
economy.

Workers there, no doubt, feel better knowing that

the causes of their economic woes lay beyond their effective
influence and their attention thus placed on the international
level make them less troublesome opponents for the national
bourgeoisies.
Dependency and World Systems theory have, consequently,
obfuscated what this study has sought to illuminate - that
countries become underdeveloped and dependent primarily as a
result of political and economic forces internal to those
countries and, if they are to break free of this condition,
it will depend upon changes within those countries which can
only come about as a result of those same internal forces.
The class struggle, the State and the political process in
the less developed countries, as I have argued, should be the
focus of any analysis of the causes of underdevelopment and
dependency because these social formations are and have been
the arenas within which the maintenance or transformation of
economic patterns are decided.
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While dependency and World

Systems theory have been valuable in directing attention to
the 'effects' of international economic relations, their
emphasis on these as main explanatory variables lead only
to misguided analysis, ideological confusion and reactionary
practice.
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